Backer v. Brainard 13, 14 1969 183 461, 161 508 Per Curiam 393 1076, 89 856, 21 770 v. 331 549, 67 1409, 91 1666 v. 391 145, 88 1444, 20 491 v. 391

• Decision Date: 20 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 15,15
• Citation: 24 L.Ed.2d 148,396 U.S. 28,90 S.Ct. 163
• Parties: Clarence DeBACKER, Appellant, v. Homer BRAINARD, Sheriff of Dodge County, Nebraska. Argued Oct. 13, 14, 1969. . The Nebraska Supreme Court, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508, affirmed, and juvenile appealed. The United States Supreme Court held that where juvenile's counsel at juvenile court hearing did not object to preponderance-of-evidence standard and counsel admitted in oral argument before United States Supreme Court that no matter what standard was used evidence would be sufficient to support finding of delinquency, case was not appropriate one for consideration of whether preponderance-of-evidence standard in juvenile court proceedings required by Nebraska statute satisfied due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Appeal dismissed. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented. William G. Line, Fremont, Neb., for appellant. Richard L. Kuhlman, Fremont, Neb., for appellee. Alfred L. Scanlan, Washington, D. C., for National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. PER CURIAM. After a hearing before a juvenile court judge, appellant DeBacker was found to be a 'delinquent child' 1 and ordered committeed to the Boys' Training School at Kearney, Nebraska 2 DeBacker did not seek direct review of his commitment, but instead sought state habeas corpus. The Nebraska District Court dismissed appellant's petition, a divided Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, 3 and last Term we noted probable jurisdiction over the present appeal, 393 U.S. 1076, 89 S.Ct. 856, 21 L.Ed.2d 770. Because we find that resolution of the constitutional issues presented by appellant would not be appropriate in the circum- stances of this case, the appeal is dismissed. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666. 1. Appellant asks this Court to decide whether the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, in light of this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

396 U.S. 28

90 S.Ct. 163

24 L.Ed.2d 148

Clarence DeBACKER, Appellant,

v Homer BRAINARD, Sheriff of Dodge County, Nebraska.

No. 15.

Argued Oct. 13, 14, 1969.

Juvenile who had been found to be a delinquent child sought state habeas corpus. The District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska, dismissed petition, and juvenile appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508, affirmed, and juvenile appealed. The United States Supreme Court held that where juvenile's counsel at juvenile court hearing did not object to preponderance-of-evidence standard and counsel admitted in oral argument before United States Supreme Court that no matter what standard was used evidence would be sufficient to support finding of delinquency, case was not appropriate one for consideration of whether preponderance-of-evidence standard in juvenile court proceedings required by Nebraska statute satisfied due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment.

Appeal dismissed.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.

William G. Line, Fremont, Neb., for appellant.

Richard L. Kuhlman, Fremont, Neb., for appellee.

Alfred L. Scanlan, Washington, D. C., for National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

PER CURIAM.

After a hearing before a juvenile court judge, appellant DeBacker was found to be a 'delinquent child'¹ and ordered committeed to the Boys' Training School at Kearney, Nebraska² DeBacker did not seek direct review of his commitment, but instead sought state habeas corpus. The Nebraska District Court dismissed appellant's petition, a divided Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed,³ and last Term we noted probable jurisdiction over the present appeal, 393 U.S. 1076, 89 S.Ct. 856, 21 L.Ed.2d 770. Because we find that resolution of the constitutional issues presented by appellant would not be appropriate in the circum- stances of this case, the appeal is dismissed. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666.

1. Appellant asks this Court to decide whether the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, in light of this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522; and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, require a trial by jury in a state juvenile court proceeding based on an alleged act of the juvenile which, if committed by an adult, would, under the Duncan and Bloom cases, require a jury trial if requested. In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, we held that Duncan and Bloom 'should receive only prospective application' and stated that we would 'not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois.' 392 U.S., at 633, 635, 88 S.C., at 2095, 2096. Because appellant's juvenile court hearing was held on March 28, 1968—prior to the date of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom—appellant would have had no constitutional right to a trial by jury if he had been tried as an adult in a criminal proceeding. It thus seems manifest that this case is not an appropriate one for considering whether the Nebraska statute which provides that juvenile hearings be 'without a jury,' Neb. Rev.Stat. § 43-206.03(2), is constitutionally invalid in light of Duncan and Bloom.⁴ 2. 2. Appellant next asks this Court to decide whether the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for burden of proof in juvenile court proceedings, required by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43206.03(3), satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, at the appellant's juvenile court hearing, his counsel neither objected to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, nor asked the judge to make a ruling based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In explaining why he did not seek a direct appeal from the juvenile court's determination that appellant had committed the act upon which rested the delinquent child finding, appellant's counsel stated at oral argument before this Court:

'[I]t has been pointed out that I did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence.

'Of course, the reason for that is obvious. The evidence is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction of what he did. An appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence would have been close to frivolous.' (Tr. 41-42.)

Later in oral argument counsel acknowledged that '[n]o matter what the standard was * * * [o]ur evidence just isn't insufficient.' (Tr. 47.) And when specifically asked whether '[t]he evidence was sufficient even under a reasonable doubt standard,' counsel responded: 'Even under a reasonable doubt standard * * *.' (Tr. 47.)

Given this commendably forthright explanation by appellant's counsel, this case is not an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the standard of proof in juvenile proceedings.⁵

3. Appellant finally asks us to decide whether due process is denied because, as it is claimed, the Nebraska prosecutor had unreviewable discretion whether he would proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings. The record shows (1) that appellant did not make this contention before the juvenile court judge; (2) that appellant raised the issue in his habeas corpus petition but that it was not passed on by the Nebraska District Court; (3) that appellant did not press the District Court's failure to consider this issue in his appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, and made only passing reference to the issue in his brief to that court; and (4) that the opinions of the Nebraska Supreme Court, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 did not pass on the issue, nor even refer to the contention. Given the barrenness of the record on this issue, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to pass on it. So far as we have been made aware, this issue does not draw into question the validity of any Nebraska statute.⁶ Therefore, it could not, standing alone, be subject to review in this Court by way of an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). '[I]nsofar as notation of probable jurisdiction may be regarded as a grant of the certiorari writ' as to this issue, we dismiss such writ as improvidently granted. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 513, 86 S.Ct. 958, 966, 16 L.Ed.2d 56.

For the foregoing reasons this appeal is dismissed.

Dismissed.

Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.

For the reasons set forth herein and in the dissenting opinion of my Brother DOUGLAS, I dissent and would reverse the judgment below.

In February 1968 appellant, who was then 17 years old, was charged under the laws of Nebraska with being a 'delinquent child'¹ because he had a forged bank check which he intended to use for his own purposes.² At the hearing on this charge he asked for a jury trial, arguing that this was a right guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and that a statute prohibitng juries in 'delinquency' proceedings³ was therefore unconstitutional.

This Court in In re Gault, 384 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), held that juveniles charged with being 'delinquents' as a result of committing a criminal act were entitled to certain constitutional safeguards—namely, notice of the issues involved, benefit of counsel, protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and confrontation of the witnesses against them. I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of those rights and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-speaking world.

The Court here decides that it would not be 'appropriate' to decide this issue in light of DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968). That case held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—made applicable to the States in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)—did not apply in state proceedings held prior to May 20, 1968. Mr. Justice Douglas and I dissented in that case as we have in every case holding that constitutional decisions would take effect only from the day they were announced.⁴ I think this doctrine of prospective-only application is nothing less than judicial amendment of the Constitution, since it results in the Constitution's meaning one thing the day prior to a particular decision and something entirely different the next day even though the language remains the same. Under our system of government such amendments cannot constitutionally be made by judges but only by the action of Congress and the people. Depriving defendants of jury trials prior to Duncan violated the Constitution just as much as would similar deprivations after that decision, yet this Court treats these equal deprivation with clearly unequal justice. I cannot agree to such refusals to apply what appear to me to be the clear commends of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 2096, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, I stated my view that the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, which guaranteed to adults in serious criminal cases and contempts the right to a trial by jury, should be given retroactive effect.^* In light of this view, I am unable to join the Court's per curiam opinion in this case, holding that because appellant's juvenile court hearing was held prior to the date of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom the Court is precluded from deciding appellant's right to a jury trial.

I would reach the merits and hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require a jury trial as a matter of right where the delinquency charged is an offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable by jury. Such is this case, for behind...