Bacon v. Lee

• Citation: 549 S.E.2d 840,353 N.C. 696
• Decision Date: 02 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 209A91-4.,209A91-4.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Parties: Robert BACON, Richard Cagle, and Elton McLaughlin v. R.C. LEE, Warden of Central Prison, Michael F. Easley, Governor of North Carolina, & Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina.

549 S.E.2d 840

353 N.C. 696

Robert BACON, Richard Cagle, and Elton McLaughlin v. R.C. LEE, Warden of Central Prison, Michael F. Easley, Governor of North Carolina, & Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina.

No. 209A91-4.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 2, 2001.

Thomas F. Loflin III, Durham, for plaintiff-appellees; J. Kirk Osborn, Chapel Hill, for plaintiff-appellee McLaughlin; and Stephen R. Greenwald, pro hac vice, New York, NY, for plaintiff-appellees Bacon and McLaughlin.

Roy A. Cooper, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Edwin W. Welch, and Valérie B. Spalding, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for defendant-appellants.

MARTIN, Justice.

Plaintiffs instituted the instant civil action to challenge the constitutionality of the Governor's exercise of his clemency power under Article III, Section 5(6) of the Constitution of North Carolina.¹

Plaintiff Robert Bacon (Bacon) was convicted of the first-degree murder of Glennie Leroy Clark at the 18 May 1987 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Onslow County. After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with that recommendation. On 5 April 1990 this Court found no error in Bacon's first-degree murder conviction but remanded the case to the trial court for a new capital sentencing proceeding. State v. Bacon, 326 N.C. 404, 390 S.E.2d 327 (1990). On 19 February 1991 a second jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with that recommendation. On 29 July 1994 this Court found no error in Bacon's capital sentencing proceeding. State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994). On 21 February 1995 the United States Supreme Court denied Bacon's petition for writ of certiorari. Bacon v. North Carolina, 513 U.S. 1159, 115 S.Ct. 1120, 130 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1995).

On 25 September 1995 Bacon filed a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) in Superior Court, Onslow County. On 20 November 1995 the trial court denied Bacon's MAR. On 15 February 1996 Bacon filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his MAR. The trial court granted Bacon's motion and heard oral argument. On 10 May 1996 the trial court issued an order denying all claims within Bacon's MAR. On 7 February 1997 this Court denied Bacon's petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court's order. State v. Bacon, 345 N.C. 348, 483 S.E.2d 179 (1997). On 6 October 1997 the United States Supreme Court denied Bacon's petition for writ of certiorari. Bacon v. North Carolina, 522 U.S. 843, 118 S.Ct. 124, 139 L.Ed.2d 75 (1997).

On 26 November 1997 Bacon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. That court granted the writ as to Bacon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bacon and the State of North Carolina both appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On 30 August 2000 the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on Bacon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and otherwise affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000). On 26 March 2001 the United States Supreme Court denied Bacon's petition for writ of certiorari. Bacon v. Lee, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1420, 149 L.Ed.2d 360 (2001). On 9 May 2001 Bacon submitted a clemency request to the Governor of North Carolina.

Governor Easley served as Attorney General of North Carolina from January 1993 to January 2001 and therefore served as counsel of record for the State of North Carolina during the majority of Bacon's appellate and post-conviction proceedings. Plaintiff Richard Cagle (Cagle) was convicted of the first-degree murder of Dennis Craig House and was thereafter sentenced to death at the 15 June 1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Cumberland County. On 24 July 1997 this Court found no error in Cagle's first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. State v. Cagle, 346 N.C. 497, 488 S.E.2d 535 (1997). On 15 December 1997 the United States Supreme Court denied Cagle's petition for writ of certiorari. Cagle v. North Carolina, 522 U.S. 1032, 118 S.Ct. 635, 139 L.Ed.2d 614 (1997).

Cagle filed a MAR in 1998, which the trial court denied in 2000. Cagle filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his MAR in March 2000, which was denied in November 2000. On 11 January 2001 the trial court entered an amended order dismissing Cagle's MAR upon reconsideration.

Governor Easley served as Attorney General of North Carolina and therefore served as counsel of record for the State of North Carolina during Cagle's appellate and postconviction proceedings from 1995 until January 2001.

Plaintiff Elton McLaughlin (McLaughlin) was convicted of the first-degree murders of James Elwell Worley, Shelia Denise Worley, and Psoma Wine Baggett at the 10 September 1984 Special Session of Superior Court, Bladen County. After a capital sentencing proceeding, the trial court sentenced McLaughlin to death for the James Worley murder and to life imprisonment for the other two murders. On 7 September 1988 this Court found no error in McLaughlin's convictions and sentences. State v. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 372 S.E.2d 49 (1988). The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari and vacated the death sentence in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990). McLaughlin v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S.Ct. 1463, 108 L.Ed.2d 601 (1990).

On 3 October 1991 this Court remanded the case for a new capital sentencing proceeding. State v. McLaughlin, 330 N.C. 66, 408 S.E.2d 732 (1991). McLaughlin was again sentenced to death in 1993. On 8 September 1995 this Court found no error in his second capital sentencing proceeding. State v. McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426, 462 S.E.2d 1 (1995). On 20 February 1996 the United States Supreme Court denied McLaughlin's petition for writ of certiorari. McLaughlin v. North Carolina, 516 U.S. 1133, 116 S.Ct. 956, 133 L.Ed.2d 879 (1996).

In 1997 McLaughlin filed a MAR in Superior Court, Bladen County, which the trial court denied in 1998. On 24 June 1999 this Court denied McLaughlin's petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court's order denying his MAR. State v. McLaughlin, 537 S.E.2d 489 (N.C.1999). On 19 November 1999 the United States Supreme Court denied McLaughlin's petition for writ of certiorari. McLaughlin v. North Carolina, 528 U.S. 1025, 120 S.Ct. 539, 145 L.Ed.2d 418 (1999). McLaughlin has since initiated habeas corpus proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.

Governor Easley served as District Attorney for the Thirteenth Prosecutorial District, which includes Bladen County, from 1982 to 1992. In this capacity he served as "the local prosecutor" at McLaughlin's trial in 1984. As noted above, the United States Supreme Court vacated McLaughlin's 1984 death sentence in 1990. McLaughlin v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 1021, 110 S.Ct. 1463, 108 L.Ed.2d 601. McLaughlin received his second death sentence in 1993. The imposition of this death sentence, as well as part of McLaughlin's appeal and post-conviction proceedings arising therefrom, occurred during Governor Easley's service as Attorney General of North Carolina.

On 11 May 2001 plaintiffs instituted the instant civil action with the filing of a complaint entitled, "Class Action: Complaint for Temporary, Preliminary & Permanent Injunctive Relief & for a Declaratory Judgment." Named defendants include R.C. Lee, Warden of Central Prison in Raleigh; Michael F. Easley, Governor of North Carolina; and Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina.

Plaintiffs allege in their first claim for relief that they have "the right to petition for [executive] clemency at any time after conviction, pursuant to Art. III, § 5(6) of the North Carolina Constitution," and that they have a due process right under Article I, Sections 1, 19, 21, 27, and 35 of the North Carolina Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution for their clemency petition to "be considered and decided by a neutral and impartial decision maker, untainted by his prior participation in [any] Plaintiff's prosecution." Plaintiffs allege that because Governor Easley "was the Attorney General of North Carolina throughout part, or all, of each and every Plaintiff's appellate and post-conviction review proceedings in state and/or federal court, and was also the local prosecutor in the initial trial proceedings of Plaintiff McLaughlin, he has an inherent conflict of interest that precludes him from fairly considering any Plaintiff's clemency request, and [therefore] does not qualify as a neutral and impartial decision maker."

Plaintiffs' second claim for relief is "grounded in each of the Plaintiffs' [sic] cognizable liberty interest in his continued life and existence, and his right, under the North Carolina Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, to equal protection of law against deprivation of such cognizable interest." Plaintiffs further allege, upon information and belief, that there is a class of "five convicted capital defendants under sentence of death in North Carolina who were not involved in litigation in opposition to the Attorney General's Office when Defendant Easley was the Attorney General." According to plaintiffs, Governor Easley may consider clemency petitions originating from that class of five death row inmates without violating those inmates' due process rights. In contrast, because of previous proceedings involving Governor Easley and the class consisting of plaintiffs and putative class members, clemency requests arising from within this class of persons "will be considered and decided by a party who does not qualify as a neutral and impartial decision maker, resulting in unconstitutionally disparate treatment and a denial of equal protection of the law under Art....