Badagliacca v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., CASE NO. 1:09-cv-152-MMP-GRJ
| Decision Date | 07 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:09-cv-152-MMP-GRJ |
| Parties | JOSEPH A BADAGLIACCA Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Petitioner initiated this case by filing a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. The Respondent filed a response and an appendix with relevant portions of the state-court record, and Petitioner filed a reply. Docs. 15, 19. Upon due consideration of the Petition, the Response, the Reply, and the state-court record, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be denied.1
An Alachua County grand jury indicted Petitioner and co-defendants Pamela Creedon, Robert Parra, and Shawn McKinley for first-degree murder, home invasion robbery, and conspiracy. Special conflict counsel and co-counsel were appointed to represent Petitioner. Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, conspiracy, and home invasion robbery. Pursuant to a plea and cooperation agreement, Petitioner agreed to provide testimony about the murder in exchange for a total sentence of 55years in prison. App. Exh. M.
The State subsequently moved to set aside Petitioner's plea due to his refusal to testify in the prosecution of Pamela Creedon, who was subsequently acquitted. The court conditionally granted the State's motion, subject to a ruling on whether Petitioner's proffer in connection with his plea would be admissible in his trial. App. Exh. N. The court ruled that the statement was admissible and afforded Petitioner a further opportunity to decide whether he wanted to follow through with his plea and cooperation agreement. Petitioner testified that he did not, and the court set aside the plea and set the case for trial. App. Exh. O.
Petitioner's counsel unsuccessfully sought to suppress the two confessions that Petitioner gave to New York and Alachua County officers following his arrest, as well as to suppress Petitioner's proffer under the plea agreement. The substance of the confessions may be summarized as follows. Petitioner and Creedon traveled from New York to Florida after Petitioner took his grandfather's car. Creedon worked as an exotic dancer; she also has been referred to as an "escort". They eventually traveled to Gainesville and met Robert Parra and Shawn McKinley. Creedon and Petitioner, Parra, and McKinley discussed robbing Walter Alban, who was one of Creedon's clients, because Creedon said that Alban had money and jewelry. They planned that Creedon would enter Alban's house, and then unlock a window for Parra. Creedon would take Alban upstairs and choke him and then unlock the front door for Petitioner and McKinley to enter and look for money and jewelry. They also planned to take Alban's truck and return to New York. According to Petitioner, Parra choked Alban while Petitioner and McKinley kicked the victim. Petitioner broke a wine bottle over the victim's head.Petitioner and McKinley also choked the victim with an electrical cord. The group found $60 in cash, a checkbook, phone card, and Visa card. They left in the victim's truck and then traveled to New York, where Petitioner was eventually arrested. Petitioner told police that although robbery was the first object of the conspiracy, he wanted to show Creedon that he would do anything for her, including killing Alban, to prove how much he loved her. Petitioner also drew a diagram of the crime scene. App. Exh. E at 413-18.
In addition to the two confessions and the plea proffer, the State's trial evidence included: testimony by Christie Davis, a friend who drove the four conspirators to Alban's house; testimony of co-defendant McKinley; testimony by crime scene investigators; photographs of the victim and other physical evidence from the crime scene; testimony by the New York and Alachua County officers who arrested Petitioner and took his confessions; and testimony by the medical examiner.
The jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder, home invasion robbery and conspiracy, and he was sentenced to life without parole on the murder charge, to 247.75 months on home-invasion robbery and to 15 years on conspiracy, with all sentences to run concurrently. App. Exh. A at 179-86. Petitioner raised three claims on appeal: the order denying the motion to suppress his statements, the admission of multiple pictures of the victim's body, and the cumulative effect of those two alleged errors. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam without opinion. App. Exh. S.
Petitioner filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, contending that he was not given credit for two weeks time spent in the Alalchua County Jail following his sentence. The court denied the motion, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. App. Exh. U, V. Petitioner filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state postconviction court summarily denied relief and denied rehearing. App. Exh. W, X, Y. The First DCA affirmed on all grounds except for "one minor particular," which it remanded so that the postconviction court could attach the portions of the record that conclusively refuted that particular claim. App. Exh. BB. The state postconviction court again denied relief and attached additional pages from the record. App. Exh. CC. The First DCA affirmed per curiam without written opinion. App. Exh. DD.
The instant Petition followed. Respondent concedes that the Petition is timely, and the Court's review of the record also shows that the Petition is timely. Petitioner enumerates 24 claims for relief, most of which involve allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Doc. 1. Respondent contends that some of Petitioner's claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Doc. 15. Such procedural arguments will be addressed in turn as to each claim.
Before bringing a habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state post-conviction motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c). Exhaustion requires that prisoners give the state courts a "full and fair opportunity" to resolve all federal constitutional claims by "invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). To properly exhaust a federal claim, a petitioner must "fairly present" the claim in each appropriate state court, thereby affording the state courts a meaningful opportunity to"pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quotation omitted).
When a petitioner fails to properly exhaust a federal claim in state court, and it is obvious that the unexhausted claim would now be procedurally barred under state law, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999). Federal habeas courts are precluded from reviewing the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner can show either (1) cause for the failure to properly present the claim and actual prejudice from the default, or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not considered. Id. at 1302, 1306.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may not grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim already adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Under § 2254(e)(1), the petitioner must advance clear and convincing evidence that the state court's factual determination was "objectively unreasonable" to rebut the presumption that the determination was correct. Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir.2011); see § 2254(e) (1).
As to legal findings, a petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if the state court's adjudication of the merits of the federal claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." § 2254(d)(1). "[C]learlyestablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers only to holdings (rather than dicta) of the Supreme Court, but decisions of lower federal courts may be considered to the extent that they demonstrate how those courts applied Supreme Court holdings. Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) ("The decisions of other federal circuit courts (and our decisions for that matter) are helpful to the AEDPA inquiry only to the extent that the decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court's pre-existing, clearly established law compelled the circuit courts (and by implication would compel a state court) to decide in a definite way the case before them."). See also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74-77 (2006) ().
The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent meanings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-406 (2000); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (citing Williams ). "Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. ...
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