Badgett v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 25 February 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–01363 (TFH).
• Citation: 925 F.Supp.2d 23
• Parties: Joanne BADGETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

925 F.Supp.2d 23

Joanne BADGETT, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–01363 (TFH).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Feb. 25, 2013.

Donald M. Temple, Donald M. Temple, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew J. Saindon, D.C. Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THOMAS F. HOGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, 34 former employees of the District of Columbia's Department of Parks and Recreation, brought this action seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief against the District of Columbia. The claims originate from Plaintiffs' dismissal from their positions pursuant to a reduction-in-force. Plaintiffs' five count Complaint alleges they were wrongfully terminated from their positions and that the District violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights during their administrative appeal of the reduction-in-force.

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ¹ [Dkt. No. 3], Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 7] and Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record In Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 15]. Upon careful consideration of the motions, responses thereto, and the record in this matter, the Court grants the District's Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs' federal law claims (Counts I–IV); denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; dismisses Plaintiffs' remaining state law claim (Count V) without prejudice; and dismisses Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record In Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court lacks no familiarity with the parties in this action nor the circumstances from which the action arises. Indeed, the present suit represents the third action, all originating from the same essential facts, brought against the District Defendants within the last three years. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 2741 v. District of Columbia, 689 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C.2009) (“AFGE I ”); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 2741 v. District of Columbia, No. 2009 CA 8263 (D.C.Super.Ct. June 23, 2011) (“ AFGE II ”).

Prior to September of 2009, the District of Columbia's Department of Parks and Recreation (“DPR”), through its Office of Educational Services (“OES”), “operated approximately twenty-two Early Care and Before and After School Care Centers ... throughout the District of Columbia.” Compl. ¶ 4 [Dkt. No. 1]. At some point in 2009, District officials revealed a $4 million funding gap between the operating costs for OES's programs and the revenue generated by those services. Id. ¶ 18, 21. Citing the fiscal distress as the cause, the District elected to “privatize the daycare workers ['] jobs and/or transfer those positions to the District Public School System.” Id. ¶ 15; see also id. ¶¶ 17, 19. Furthermore, the District notified Plaintiffs' union, American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2741 (“AFGE” or “Local 2741”), DPR would undergo a reduction-in-force (“RIF”). Id. ¶ 16. Effective September 25, 2009, 165 positions within DPR were eliminated. Id. ¶ 20.

Plaintiffs were among those whose positions were eliminated through the RIF. Id. ¶ 1. According to Plaintiffs, the District “intentionally” and “maliciously” manufactured the budgetary shortfall “in order to justify [the] closure of child care centers and contract[ ] out services originally provided by OES.” Id. ¶ 10. They allege, the District did so by: intentionally suppressing program enrollment figures; declining to apply for federal funding for the programs; and unlawfully reallocating some $4 million in appropriated funds. Id. ¶ 28. The following actions ensued.

A. Prior Litigation

In August of 2009, individual OES employees, Local 2741, and its bargaining unit members filed suit in this Court seeking to enjoin the RIF. See AFGE I, 689 F.Supp.2d at 33. Relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs in AFGE I alleged the District's actions leading up to the RIF violated their procedural and substantive due process rights as well as District law. Id. The Court dismissed the procedural due process claim for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. See id. at 35–36. The substantive due process claim, on the other hand, was dismissed on its merits for failing to state a claim for relief. See id. at 36. The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims. Id. at 37.

Weeks after this Court dismissed AFGE I, Local 2741, its bargaining unit members, and 34 individually named DPR employees filed a complaint against the District of Columbia in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Their amended complaint alleged numerous violations of District law. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Local 2741 v. District of Columbia, No. 2009–CA–8263 (D.C.Super.Ct. June 23, 2011) (attached as Ex. 1 to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss) [Dkt. No. 7–1]. Also finding the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 7.

B. Appeal to the Office of Employee Appeals

Plaintiffs eventually turned to the administrative process prescribed by the Comprehensive Merit Protection Act (“CMPA”), D.C.Code §§ 1–601.01 et seq., which governs most grievances by District employees. See District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 634 (D.C.1991) (noting the CMPA was created as “a mechanism for addressing virtually every conceivable personnel issue among the District, its employees, and their unions ...”); Dickerson v. District of Columbia, 806 F.Supp.2d 116, 121 (D.D.C.2011). In the fall of 2009, pursuant to the CMPA, Plaintiffs appealed the RIF to the District's Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”). See Compl. ¶ 31. Section 1–606.03 of the CMPA governs the appeals procedure, including timing for the resolution of appeals before the OEA. See D.C.Code § 1–606.03(c). According to § 1–606.03, the OEA is to make jurisdictional determinations within 45 days of the filing of an appeal and decisions on the merits of an appeal are to be issued within 120 days of the appeal. Id. In the spring of 2012, well after the statutory deadlines had passed, the OEA issued initial decisions upholding the RIF.² See Initial Decision (March 20, 2012); Initial Decision (March 30, 2012); Initial Decision (April 3, 2012) [Dkt. No. 21–2]. ³ At oral argument, Plaintiffs represented they did not appeal the OEA's initial decision.

C. Present Action

Counts I–III of Plaintiffs' five-count Complaint allege Plaintiffs were terminated without an opportunity to be heard in violation of their Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights; Count IV alleges the OEA's delay constituted a violation of Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; and Count V alleges wrongful termination in violation of District law. Both sides have filed dispositive motions in this matter. Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment. The District seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. At the outset, the Court notes that because it has been asked to consider matters outside of the pleadings, it will treat the District's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(a) provides “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). As the rule suggests, the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. This burden may be satisfied by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An adverse or nonmoving party may oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by “[setting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (noting “mere allegations or denials” by the nonmoving party insufficient). When considering the motion,“[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is appropriate where “the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court's power to hear a case. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted). When challenged on the issue, the party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that the court does in fact have subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C.Cir.2007).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court first addresses, and ultimately rejects, the District's arguments that Plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, under the doctrine of res judicata. The Court then turns to Plaintiffs' due...