Bady v. Detwiler

Citation127 Cal.App.2d 321,273 P.2d 941
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Decision Date10 September 1954
PartiesFendora BADY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dr. Howard F. DETWILER; Margaret Detwiler; Black & White Company, a corporation; One Roe to Five Roe, inclusive, copartners, doing business under the fictitious firm name and style of Roe Company, a copartnership; City of Los Angeles (sued as John Doe) and Jane Doe, Defendants. City of Los Angeles, Appellant. Dewey LEWIS, Lynda Lou Lewis, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Dewey Lewis and Arleen Stephenson, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Frank PERKINS, John Doe One, John Doe Two and Jane Doe, Defendants. City of Los Angeles, Appellant. Dewey LEWIS, Lynda Lou Lewis, a Minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Dewey Lewis and Arleen Stephenson, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Frank W. PERKINS, Jr., Emma Burns and Ruth J. Nelson, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Margaret Detwiler, N. H. Detwiler, First Doe and Second Doe, Defendants. City of Los Angeles, Appellant. Margaret DETWILER, N. H. Detwiler and Katherine Varner, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Margaret Detwiler and N. H. Detwiler, Respondents. Katherine VARNER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank W. PERKINS, Jr., John Doe I, John Doe II and Jane Doe, Defendants. City of Los Angeles, Appellant. Civ. 20044.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., Joseph N. Owen, Deputy City Atty., Weldon L. Weber, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for appellant.

Erb, French & Picone, Beverly Hills, Samuel B. Picone, Hagenbaugh & Murphy, Van A. Hagenbaugh, and Robert E. Benton, Los Angeles, for respondents.

VALLEE, Justice.

The city of Los Angeles appeals from three consolidated judgments against it entered on eight jury verdicts in favor of the several plaintiffs in actions for damages for personal injuries. Liability was imposed on the city under the Public Liability Act of 1923, now sections 53050 and 53051 of the Government Code, sometimes referred to as the 'act.' A motion for a new trial was denied.

On Sunday morning, August 5, 1951, at about 7:30 a. m., a collision between an automobile driven by Frank Perkins and one driven by Margaret Detwiler occurred at the intersection of Jefferson Boulevard and Flower Street in Los Angeles. Traffic control devices of the 'Acme' type, owned, maintained, and operated by the city, were located at each of the four corners of the intersection, having lights and semaphore arms operating on independent electrical circuits from a master control box at the southwest corner of the intersection.

Perkins, with four passengers, was driving an automobile east on Jefferson. When about 150 feet from the intersection he observed that the semaphore arm on the signal on the southwest corner, controlling eastbound Jefferson traffic, indicated 'Go.' When about 20 feet from the intersection he observed that the semaphore arm on the signal on the northeast corner, controlling westbound Jefferson traffic, also indicated 'Go.' He did not observe any signal lights, only the semaphore arms. He continued into the intersection.

Mrs. Detwiler, with four passengers, was driving an automobile north on Flower Street. As she approached the intersection she saw that the semaphore arm on the signal on the southeast corner, controlling northbound Flower traffic, indicated 'Go.' She did not observe the signal on the northwest corner, controlling southbound Flower traffic. She continued into the intersection.

The two cars collided in the intersection. The signals were not cycling, changing from 'Go' to 'Stop' and vice versa. They were stuck on 'Go' for Jefferson traffic, on 'Go' for northbound Flower traffic, and on 'Stop' for southbound Flower traffic. It is agreed that the condition of the traffic control devices was defective and dangerous.

The city's first contention is that the liability imposed by the Public Liability Act of 1923 does not extend to the defective and dangerous condition of traffic control devices.

Section 53050 of the Government Code provides: 'As used in this article: * * * (b) 'Public property' means public street, highway, building, park, grounds, works, or property. (c) 'Local agency' means city, county, or school district.' Section 53051 reads: 'A local agency is liable for injuries to persons and property resulting from the dangerous or defective condition of public property if the legislative body, board, or person authorized to remedy the condition: (a) Had knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition. (b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge or receiving notice, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition.'

The city argues that traffic control devices are not included in the term 'property' as used in the statute.

Generally, the word 'property' is used as referring to a thing of which there may be ownership. Civil Code section 654 says: '[T]he thing of which there may be ownership is called property.' The word is a generic one. When unqualified it is sufficiently comprehensive to include every species of estate, both real and personal, whether choate or inchoate. Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co., 210 Cal. 229, 232, 291 P. 167; Crouch v. Crouch, 28 Cal.2d 243, 261-262, 169 P.2d 897; Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 295-296, 169 P.2d 913, 171 A.L.R. 1379; In re Estate of Glassford, 114 Cal.App.2d 181, 189-190, 249 P.2d 908, 34 A.L.R.2d 1259; People v. Settles, 29 Cal.App.2d Supp. 781, 786, 78 P.2d 274; Finley v. Winkler, 99 Cal.App.2d Supp. 887, 890, 222 P.2d 345.

The question in Coleman v. City of Oakland, 110 Cal.App. 715, 295 P. 59, was whether the word 'property,' as used in the Public Liability Act of 1923, included a city-owned and-operated motor truck. In holding it did, the court said, 110 Cal.App. page 718, 295 P. at page 60: 'It is respondent's contention that the general word 'property,' following as it does the words 'public streets, highways, buildings, grounds, works,' must take its color from them, and can only apply to other classes of real property not therein specifically enumerated under the doctrine ejusdem generis. * * * In this case the section above quoted contains within itself a strong indication that the word 'property' was not intended to have a restricted meaning. We have intentionally italicized the word 'property' in the places in which it occurs in section 2, Statutes of 1923, page 675. In the first instance its meaning is not restricted. It imposes a liability 'for injuries to persons and property.' Clearly the liability is for injuries to property of any character, real or personal. Separated from the first place of its occurrence by only fifteen words it is used again. In its second use we are asked to hold that it has an entirely different and more limited meaning. To do so would require some stronger reason than a rule of construction which is merely an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. It seems unlikely that the legislature would have used the same word in such close juxtaposition with such widely different meanings. 'It is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope or meaning in other parts or portions of the law and particularly of the same section thereof.' Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Woodhams, 29 Cal.App. , 359, 360, 156 P. 62. We are satisfied that the word 'property' in this section is broad enough to cover the case of a motor truck in a dangerous or defective condition. Cf. Huff v. Compton City Grammar School Dist., 92 Cal.App. 44, 267 P. 918; Dawson v. Tulare Union High School, 98 Cal.App. 138, 276 P. 424.'

In Smith v. County of San Mateo, 62 Cal.App.2d 122, at page 129, 144 P.2d 33, at page 37, the court stated: 'The title and body of our statute [Public Liability Act of 1923] clearly show that the liability imposed thereby was intended to be quite broad in its scope. It imposes liability upon counties for injuries 'resulting from the dangerous or defective condition' of certain public places including parks and play grounds 'in all cases' where the officers or employees 'having authority to remedy such condition, had knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition' and had failed to remedy the condition within a reasonable time after acquiring such knowledge or notice. There is no indication in the statute that it was intended to be limited in the same manner as was the liability of a private landowner at common law and there is every indication to the contrary. The liability imposed is predicated solely upon (1) the existence of a dangerous or defective condition (2) the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such condition, and (3) the failure to remedy such condition within a reasonable time after acquiring such knowledge. While the statute does not evidence an intention on the part of the legislature to make public corporations liable for all injuries resulting from natural conditions upon the public domain, it seems entirely clear that the legislature intended to impose liability upon a public corporation which might maintain for an unreasonable time a known dangerous but remediable condition in a park or playground regardless of whether such dangerous condition was attributable to natural or artificial causes.'

Liability has been imposed upon a local agency under the act for maintaining or permitting the maintenance of the following kinds of property in a defective or dangerous condition: an incinerator in which trash was burned on school grounds, Huff v. Compton City Grammar School Dist., 92 ...

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  • Turner v. Evers
    • United States
    • California Superior Court
    • 3 Enero 1973
    ...legislature would have used the same word in such close juxtaposition with . . . widely different meanings.' (Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 326, 273 P.2d 941, 945.) The Ponsonby definition has been applied in a variety of circumstances, E.g., to the definition of the word 'est......
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