Baehr v. Wolf

• Decision Date: 30 June 1871
• Citation: 1871 WL 8066,59 Ill. 470
• Parties: HENRY BAEHRv.CHRISTIAN WOLF et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

59 Ill. 470

1871 WL 8066 (Ill.)

HENRY BAEHR

v.CHRISTIAN WOLF et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June Term, 1871.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. JOSEPH GILLESPIE, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. G. & G. A. KŒRNER, for the appellant.

Mr. WM. H. UNDERWOOD, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

At the March term, 1860, of the St. Clair circuit court, three indictments were presented against the appellee Wolf, for complicity in an assault upon, and in the murder of, Andrew Koenig, and at the same term of the court Wolf entered into three separate recognizances in the sum of $300 each, with the appellant, Baehr, as his surety, for his appearance at the next term of the circuit court, to answer unto the indictments.

It is alleged in the bill that in July following, Wolf, for the purpose of indemnifying and saving harmless the appellant as his surety, conveyed to him a certain tract of land which he had purchased of one Price, and also delivered to him a bond for a deed to another tract of land which he held from Carpenter. Previous to these transfers, Wolf had been in the occupancy of these lands, and had made some improvements on the forty acres purchased of Carpenter.

It is further alleged that, at the same time, Wolf transferred to the appellant a large amount of personal property, and some growing crops upon the lands transferred and on certain leased lands, for the purpose of having the same applied to the payment of certain debts owing by the appellee Wolf. Soon after making the transfers of the real and personal property, Wolf fled from the country, and it does not appear that he ever returned until the year 1862 or 1863.

It appears that other parties were indicted at the same term of the court for the same crime, two of whom were sent to the penitentiary. Wolf forfeited his recognizance, and judgment was subsequently rendered against appellant, Baehr, for $600, no part of which was ever paid by any one. For some reason, the prosecution against Wolf was dismissed.

The object of the bill is to compel a reconveyance of these lands, and for an account of the rents and profits, and also an account of the personal property. It satisfactorily appears from the master's report, which is fully sustained by the evidence in the record, that all the personal property was taken out of the possession of Baehr for the payment of the debts of Wolf. It was attached and sold by the officers of the law. It is insisted that Baehr agreed to sell the property at public sale and apply the proceeds to the payment of Wolf's debts, and it is sought to charge him with neglect in that regard. If such was the agreement, Baehr was prevented from performing the contract without any fault on his part. Immediately upon the flight of Wolf, the property was seized by his creditors under legal process, and it would be inequitable to charge Baehr with the value of the property or for any sacrifice that was caused by the forced sales. It was not in his power to prevent the sales or the sacrifices on the property.

The grave questions in the case arise on the relief sought as to the two tracts of land.

The grounds upon which the appellee Wolf predicates his right to relief are, that the appellant is a mortgagee in possession; that the deed of the 2d of July, 1860, for what is known as the Price land, was not intended to be an absolute deed, but only as a security to save the appellant harmless as surety on the several recognizances, and that the Carpenter bond was transferred and delivered for a like purpose. On the other hand, the appellant insists that he took the property described in the deed, absolutely, and subject to no defeasance whatever, and that he acquired the other tract of land from Carpenter by a subsequent purchase, as he lawfully might.

The evidence is of such a character that it leaves no doubt on the mind that the deed for the Price land was not intended by the parties to be an absolute deed, and that the land was to be reconveyed in case the appellant did not have to pay the recognizances. Such, we think, is the only fair construction that can be given to the evidence.

It is insisted, however, that the contract was made with a view to assist Wolf to flee from justice, and hence that it was against public policy and therefore void. Doubtless, if it was made with that view, and both parties equally participated in the unlawful transaction, it would be against a sound public policy and a court of equity would not interfere to relieve either party from the consequences that might flow from such an unlawful act. The law would leave the parties in the situation where they placed themselves, and to the consequences of their own corrupt conduct.

It is said that any contract that can impede or prevent the course of justice, is void. Chitty on Contracts, 674. It should, however, always distinctly appear that the parties are in pari delicto. Mr. Story, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, says: “In cases where both parties are in delicto concerning an illegal act, it does not always follow that they stand in pari delicto, for there may be, and often are, different degrees in their guilt. One party may act under circumstances of oppression, imposition, hardship, undue influence, or great inequality of condition or age, so that his guilt may be far less in degree than that of his associate in the offense.” 1 Story Eq. Jur. sec. 300.

The doctrine of the text rests on principles of sound reasoning and authority. Osborne v. Williams, 18 Ves. 378; Pinkston v. Brown, 3 Jones Eq. R. 494; Phalon v. Clark, 19 Conn. 420.

One party may not make use of his peculiar power over another to procure a contract which, in itself, is illegal, and contrary to public policy, and then invoke the aid of the law to enable him to retain that which he has obtained through fraudulent practices and artifices. It would contravene the settled law that the courts will protect the citizen against all such acts of oppression and deceit.

In the case under consideration, the conveyance was not made at the time the recognizances were entered into. At that date there is nothing in all the record that would indicate that Wolf had the slightest intention to flee from justice. It was not deemed necessary, in the first instance, to give any indemnity to the appellant as the bail of Wolf. It was a subsequent suggestion. The evidence tends most strongly to establish the conclusion that the appellant and his wife operated on the fears of Wolf, and...