Baer v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 18 December 2014
• Docket Number: 1:11-cv-1168-SEB-TAB
• Parties: FREDRICK MICHAEL BAER, Petitioner, v. BILL WILSON, Superintendent, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

FREDRICK MICHAEL BAER, Petitioner, v. BILL WILSON, Superintendent, Respondent.

1:11-cv-1168-SEB-TAB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

December 18, 2014

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. Introduction

This cause is before the Court on the petition of Fredrick Michael Baer (ABaer@) for a writ of habeas corpus, on Respondent=s response to such petition, and on Baer's reply. The record has been appropriately expanded.

Whereupon, the Court, having read and considered said pleadings and having also considered the expanded record, finds that Baer's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED.

II. Background

Mr. Baer was convicted of murdering Cory and Jenna Clark, and of robbery, theft and attempted rape, for which crimes the jury recommended the death penalty and the trial court sentenced Baer to death on June 9, 2005. Baer's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Baer v. State, 866 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. 2007)(Baer I). Baer's second amended petition for post-conviction relief was denied and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that denial in Baer v. State, 942 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. 2011)(Baer II). The facts and circumstances surrounding Baer's offenses were succinctly summarized in the ruling on his direct appeal, as follows:

At about nine o'clock in the morning of February 25, 2004, in a rural Madison County residential neighborhood near Lapel High School, Cory Clark, age twenty-four, stepped onto the porch of her home as the defendant drove by. He turned his vehicle around and drove back, stopped in her driveway, and got out. Later that day, she and her four-year-old daughter Jenna were found murdered in their home, Cory in a bedroom nude from the waist down, lying in a pool of blood, her throat lacerated, and Jenna in another bedroom with spinal injuries and a severely lacerated throat that nearly decapitated her. Cory's purse containing three to four hundred dollars was missing from the house. Later that morning, after changing his clothes, the defendant returned to work. The defendant admitted committing the murders. There is no evidence that Cory and Jenna Clark were anything other than total strangers to the defendant.

Baer I, 866 N.E.2d at 764-65.

Baer's claims in his direct appeal were the following: 1) the prosecutor improperly urged jurors to consider the effect that guilty but mentally ill ("GBMI") verdicts might have on a death sentence in relation to issues raised on appeal; 2) the trial court erred in admitting recorded telephone calls from the jail; 3) the trial court erred by failing to administer an oath to each panel of prospective jurors; and 4) prosecutorial misconduct and trial errors rendered the jury's recommendation of death unreliable.

On appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition, Baer claimed that: 1) due to prosecutorial misconduct, he was denied a fair trial; 2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial; 3) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal; 4) the trial court's rejection of his guilty but mentally ill plea constituted structural error; 5) his severe mental illness reduced his culpability and precluded a death sentence; and 6) previously undiscovered evidence of his longstanding psychosis undermines confidence in and the reliability of his death sentence.

Baer's claims also include that his trial and appellate counsel in Baer I rendered ineffective assistance.

III. Standard of Review

A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996). Our Court of Appeals has explicated the standard to be applied in ruling on a petition seeking relief under this statute:

When a state court has ruled on the merits of a habeas claim, our review is circumscribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783-84, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). Under AEDPA, we may grant relief only if the state court's decision on the merits "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Plainly stated, these are demanding standards.

Atkins v. Zenk, 667 F.3d 939, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2012); See also Bailey v. Lemke, 735 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2013).

Review of Baer's habeas petition is governed by the AEDPA, as noted above. Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2004). The AEDPA "place[s] a new constraint" on the ability of a federal court to grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner "with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

The AEDPA was enacted "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases and 'to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.'" Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 436). The requirements of AEDPA "create an independent, high standard to be met before a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to set aside state-court rulings," Uttecht v. Brown, 555 U.S. 1, 10 (2007) (citations omitted) and reflect "the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary errorcorrection through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)).

Based on controlling case law precedent, the following guidelines apply to an AEDPA analysis:

! A state court=s decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-08.

! AA state court decision is contrary to clearly established law if it applies a legal standard inconsistent with governing Supreme Court precedent or contradicts the Supreme Court's treatment of a materially identical set of facts. A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if the state court identifies the correct legal rule but applies it in a way that is objectively unreasonable." Bynum v. Lemmon, 560 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2009)(internal citations omitted).

! AClearly established federal law@ means Athe governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.@ Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003).

! Under the "unreasonable application" prong of the AEDPA standard, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; see also Badelle v. Correll, 452 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2006). A[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.@ Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 845 (2010). The Seventh Circuit Ahas defined >objectively unreasonable= as lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion and will allow the state court's decision to stand if it is one of several equally plausible outcomes." Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2006)(international citations and quotations omitted).

! AUnder AEDPA, federal courts do not independently analyze the petitioner=s claims; federal courts are limited to reviewing the relevant state court ruling on the claims.@ Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2010).

! AThe habeas applicant has the burden of proof to show that the application of federal law was unreasonable.@ Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004)(citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)).

! With respect to § 2254(d)(2), state-court determinations of factual issues are "presumed correct" unless the petitioner can rebut the presumption "by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 643 (7thCir. 1996). To overcome the presumption, a habeas petitioner must proffer clear and convincing evidence to show that a factual determination is Aobjectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.@ Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 204 (3rd Cir. 2011)(footnote omitted) (citingMiller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

A defendant has the right under the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Id. For a petitioner to establish that "counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal" of a conviction or a sentence, he must make two showings: (1) deficient performance that (2) prejudiced his defense.

With respect to the first prong, A[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.@ Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). With respect to the prejudice requirement, the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Str...