Baerga v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 30 January 2023
• Docket Number: 21-CV-05762 (PAC)
• Parties: JUSTIN BAERGA, STEVEN GREENE, GIOVANNA SANCHEZ ESQUIVEL, and SARAH ARVIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and COMMUNITY ACCESS, INC., NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS OF NEW YORK CITY, INC., and CORRECT CRISIS INTERVENTION TODAY-NYC, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, BILL DE BLASIO; DERMOT F. SHEA; NYPD POLICE OFFICER RZYSZTOF WNOROWSKI; NYPD POLICE OFFICER SHERON; NYPD POLICE OFFICER MCDOWELL; NYPD POLICE SERGEANT NATHAN MOLE; NYPD POLICE OFFICER MARTIN HABER; NYPD POLICE SERGEANT CARRKU GBAIN, NYPD POLICE OFFICER VIKRAM PRASAD; NYPD POLICE OFFICER ANDRE DAWKINS; NYPD POLICE OFFICER TYRONE FISHER; NYPD POLICE OFFICER DEVINDRA RAMAYYA; NYPD POLICE OFFICER JULIAN TORRES; NYPD OFFICER APRIL SANCHEZ, and NYPD OFFICERS JOHN and JANE DOES # 1-40, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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JUSTIN BAERGA, STEVEN GREENE, GIOVANNA SANCHEZ ESQUIVEL, and SARAH ARVIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and COMMUNITY ACCESS, INC., NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS OF NEW YORK CITY, INC., and CORRECT CRISIS INTERVENTION TODAY-NYC, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, BILL DE BLASIO; DERMOT F. SHEA; NYPD POLICE OFFICER RZYSZTOF WNOROWSKI; NYPD POLICE OFFICER SHERON; NYPD POLICE OFFICER MCDOWELL; NYPD POLICE SERGEANT NATHAN MOLE; NYPD POLICE OFFICER MARTIN HABER; NYPD POLICE SERGEANT CARRKU GBAIN, NYPD POLICE OFFICER VIKRAM PRASAD; NYPD POLICE OFFICER ANDRE DAWKINS; NYPD POLICE OFFICER TYRONE FISHER; NYPD POLICE OFFICER DEVINDRA RAMAYYA; NYPD POLICE OFFICER JULIAN TORRES; NYPD OFFICER APRIL SANCHEZ, and NYPD OFFICERS JOHN and JANE DOES # 1-40, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-05762 (PAC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

January 30, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery. ECF Nos. 108-09,121. Defendants oppose both motions and argue that Plaintiffs lack standing. The Court agrees and accordingly DENIES Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and expedited discovery.^[1]

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs consist of two different groups: Individual Plaintiffs^[2] and Organizational Plaintiffs,^[3] (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Individuals Plaintiffs are several New York residents who allege they were unconstitutionally detained by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) while in mental health crises between 2019 and 2020. Organizational Plaintiffs are focused on mental health advocacy in New York City. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint seeks to certify a class of people who, “because of their mental disability or perceived mental disability, have been, could have been, or will be seized, detained, and/or subjected to force in interactions with NYPD officers ...” First Am Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 253, ECF No. 21. Defendants are New York City (“the City”) and numerous City employees sued in both their individual and official capacities.^[4] On July 5, 2021, Individual Plaintiff Justin Baerga commenced this action, alleging numerous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 state common law, and both the United States and New York constitutions related to a mental health arrest that occurred August 19, 2019. ECF No. 1. On December 29, 2021, Plaintiff Baerga filed the Fir st Amended Complaint, adding the rest of the Plaintiffs (both Individual and Organizational) and seeking certification of the claims against the City and its officers as a class action. See generally FAC. On September 13, 2022, Defendants collectively moved to dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 101. The motion to dismiss is pending.

On November 29, 2022, Mayor Eric Adams held a press conference to discuss the involuntary hospitalizations of mentally ill people in New York City. See Moore Decl., Ex. 2 (“Adams Conf.”), ECF No. 112. He spoke at length about “[p]eople with severe and untreated mental illness who live out in the open, on the streets, in our subways, in danger and in need ... [t]hese New Yorkers and hundreds of others like them are in urgent need of treatment, yet often refused it when offered. The very nature of their illnesses keeps them from realizing they need intervention and support.” Id. at 2. After announcing an “11 point legislative agenda” to address the issue, Mayor Adams noted that he “issued a new directive” to the NYPD and several other municipal actors. Id. at 3. According to Mayor Adams,

This directive lays out an expedited step by step process for involuntarily transporting a person experiencing a mental health crisis to a hospital for evaluation. It explicitly states that it is appropriate to use this process when a person refuses voluntary assistance and it appears that they are suffering from mental illness and are a danger to themselves due to an inability to meet their basic needs. We believe this is the first time that a mayoral administration has given this direction on the basic needs standard and official guidance. Id. at 2.

That same day, the City issued a directive titled “Mental Health Involuntary Removals” (“the Directive”). Moore Decl., Ex. 1, ECF No. 112. The Directive “clarifies” the roles and responsibilities of first responders to mental health crises under existing New York Mental Hygiene law. Id. Specifically, it directs mental health providers and NYPD officers to act in accordance with New York Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.41 and 9.58. Id. Plaintiffs challenge only the provisions instructing NYPD officers pursuant to Section 9.41.

Section 9.41 provides that a police officer “may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.” N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.41. From this provision, officers derive their authority to involuntarily hospitalize individuals in mental health crisis. See Surpris v. Montefiore Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 21-CV-7654 (LTS), 2021 WL 5853583, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2021) (“In New York, involuntary hospitalizations are governed by the Mental Hygiene Law.”).

The Directive states that section 9.41 “authorize[s] the removal of a person who appears to be mentally ill and displays an inability to meet basic living needs, even when no recent dangerous act has been observed.” Directive at 2. It further notes that “if the circumstances support an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the person appears to have a mental illness and cannot support their basic human needs to an extent that causes them harm, they may be removed for an evaluation.” Id.

In response to Mayor Adams' press conference and to the Directive, Plaintiffs did not amend their pleadings, but instead filed an emergency application for a temporary restraining order, including a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion for expedited discovery. ECF Nos. 108, 109. The Court converted the emergency application to a motion for a preliminary injunction alone and denied the application for a temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 115, 119. The Court then solicited briefing on Plaintiffs' motion for expedited discovery. ECF No. 119. In opposition to expedited discovery, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a preliminary injunction in the first place. Defs.' Opp. at 13-21, ECF No. 131. Plaintiffs' lack of standing necessarily implicates the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court must consider the matter as a threshold issue. See Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2004) (denying injunctive relief where the plaintiff failed to properly allege standing); Tilton v. S.E.C., No. 15-CV-2472 RA, 2015 WL 4006165, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30,2015), aff'dsub nom. Tilton v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The threshold issue in this case-and, ultimately, the dispositive one for purposes of the present motion-is whether subject matter jurisdiction exists for this Court to consider Plaintiffs' claims.”). Thus, the Court must address the issue on this motion and determines that it cannot provide relief absent a sufficient showing of standing.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

When a preliminary injunction is sought, a plaintiff s burden to demonstrate standing “will normally be no less than that required on a motion for summary judgment.” Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Accordingly, to establish standing for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff cannot “rest on such mere allegations, as would be appropriate at the pleading stage, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts,” which will be taken as true for the purposes of the motion. Id. (cleaned up), “To satisfy this jurisdictional requirement, (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct at issue; and (3) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Medina v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-9412 (AJN), 2020 WL 7028688, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (quoting Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 239 (2d Cir. 2016)). “For purposes of Article III standing, an ‘injury in fact' is ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized[ ] and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'” Lacewell v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 999 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “An allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,' or there is a ‘substantial risk' that the harm will occur.'” Id. (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149,158 (2014)). A plaintiff must personally have standing to represent a class. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996). Only one named plaintiff needs to establish standing. Hyland v. Navient Corp., 48 F.4th 110,117 (2d Cir. 2022).

Plaintiffs rely on two affidavits to establish standing: one for an individual Plaintiff, Steven Greene, and one for an organizational Plaintiff, the Steering Committee of Correct Crisis Intervention Today - NYC (“CCIT-NYC”). Greene Aff., ECF 110; Guzman Aff., ECF No. 111. The Court holds neither affidavit is sufficient to establish standing to enjoin the Directive.

II. Individual Standing

First the Court addresses Plaintiff Greene's standing to challenge the Directive. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in a civil rights action must establish standing through (1) the existence of an unconstitutional official policy or its equivalent and (2) a likelihood of future harm under that policy. Shain, 356 F.3d at 216. “[A] plaintiffs ...