Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 10 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1474,97-1474
• Citation: Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998)
• Parties: 8 A.D. Cases 973, 13 NDLR P 65 Gary BAERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUCLID BEVERAGE, LIMITED, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 626

149 F.3d 626

8 A.D. Cases 973, 13 NDLR P 65

Gary BAERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUCLID BEVERAGE, LIMITED, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-1474.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 11, 1997.

Decided July 10, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1998.

Stephen G. Daday (argued), Stitt, Klein, Daday & Aretos, Arlington Heights, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William R. Sullivan, Jr., Terrence T. Creamer (argued), Franczek, Sullivan, Mann, Crement, Hein & Relias, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Gary Baert, a truck driver who lost his job when he was diagnosed with insulin-dependent diabetes, sued his employer under the Americans With Disabilities Act for failing to reasonably accommodate him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that Baert was not a "qualified individual" as defined by the ADA. Although we agree that Baert was no longer qualified for his job as a truck driver due to federal and state laws which prohibited him from holding a commercial driver's license, we reverse because he may have been a qualified individual with respect to other positions which the employer could have offered as a reasonable accommodation.

I.

Gary Baert was a Route Driver Salesman for Euclid Beverage, Ltd, at the time he was diagnosed with insulin-dependent diabetes. ¹ In that position, Baert drove a 32-ton truck to deliver beer to retail customers. Federal and state regulations required Baert to hold a commercial driver's license in order to drive a truck of that size, but after his diagnosis, those same regulations prohibited him from holding the necessary license. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 383.5, 383.23, 383.71; see also 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 ("[a] person is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that person ... [h]as no established medical history or clinical diagnosis of diabetes mellitus currently requiring insulin for control"); 625 ILCS 5/18b-105(b)(c)(7) (adopting federal regulation 49 C.F.R § 391.41 in whole, with an exception for certain intrastate drivers who were insulin-dependent diabetics before the federal regulation went into effect in 1986). In January 1993, shortly after his diagnosis, Euclid placed Baert on medical leave status. After one year of leave, Euclid terminated Baert and offered him a job as a Warehouseman at a substantially reduced salary and with a loss of seniority. ² Baert responded to the offer by suing Euclid under the Americans With Disabilities Act for discrimination and for failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. ³

Euclid moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. Baert v. Euclid Beverage Ltd., 954 F.Supp. 170 (N.D.Ill.1997). The district court found that Baert was not a "qualified individual" as defined by the ADA because federal and state law prohibited him from holding a commercial driver's license, a necessary prerequisite to the job of Driver. The court also determined that, even assuming Baert was disabled, Euclid fulfilled its obligation to reasonably accommodate Baert by offering him the Warehouseman position at the end of his year of medical leave. The court rejected Baert's claim that the company should have accommodated him by offering him the position of Helper or Warehouseman much earlier, which would have allowed him to retain his seniority. ⁴

II.

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir.1996). We construe all of the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence in a light most favorable to Baert, the party opposing summary judgment. Id. Baert alleges that Euclid failed to reasonably accommodate his disability, and instead terminated him in violation of the ADA. To overcome Euclid's bid for summary judgment, Baert must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether he is disabled, whether he is a qualified individual, and whether Euclid failed to reasonably accommodate him. Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1283. Because he agrees that he was no longer qualified to perform the essential duties of the Driver position, Baert must raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Euclid was obliged to offer him another position, and whether he was responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process with Euclid to determine a reasonable accommodation.

A.

The district court declined to decide whether Baert had come forward with enough evidence to overcome summary judgment on the issue of whether he is disabled, instead finding that he was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA. Because we find that Baert has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether he was a qualified individual, we must also resolve whether he is disabled for the purposes of the ADA. The ADA defines the term "disability" as (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Baert's claimed disability is insulin-dependent diabetes, which was diagnosed in January 1993 when he became ill and was hospitalized. He was also diagnosed with pancreatitis at that time. He purports to qualify as an individual with a disability under parts (a) and (c) of the statutory definition cited above. Euclid contends that Baert provided insufficient evidence of a disability because the record does not show that Baert's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Euclid focuses on the effect of Baert's diabetes on his ability to work. Euclid believes it is determinative that Baert has stated that he is perfectly healthy and that his diabetes does not affect his day-to-day activities.

Euclid misapprehends the nature of the disability analysis. We determine whether a condition constitutes an impairment, and the extent to which the impairment limits an individual's major life activities, without regard to the availability of mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices. Roth v. Lutheran General Hospital, 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir.1995). See also Arnold v. United Parcel Service, 136 F.3d 854, 861 and 863-64 (1st Cir.1998) (evaluation of an impairment and whether that impairment substantially affects major life activities should be made without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines or assistive or prosthetic devices); Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3rd Cir.1997) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 693, 139 L.Ed.2d 638 (1998) (same); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir.1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1349, 137 L.Ed.2d 506 (1997); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 697 n. 1 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 211 (1996) (noting EEOC regulations that indicate that a person with insulin-dependent diabetes is substantially limited in major life activities because such a person would lapse into a coma without medication). But see Arnold, 136 F.3d at 865 (collecting cases holding or otherwise indicating that ameliorative measures should be taken into account in determining disability). We evaluate Baert's condition without regard, therefore, to the fact that he is apparently able to control the effects of the disease with insulin. That he feels "perfectly healthy" when he is taking insulin is utterly irrelevant to the assessment of disability for the purposes of the ADA.

At oral argument, Euclid asserted that even if we assess Baert's disability without regard to the effect of medication on his condition, Baert has failed to put any evidence into the record about the consequences of his condition if he fails to take medication. We must assess, then, whether Baert has come forward with enough evidence to show that an insulin-dependent diabetic is substantially limited in a major life activity when not treated with insulin. "Major life activities" include functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, breathing, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, learning and working. Roth, 57 F.3d at 1454; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Using the above as criteria, it would seem as if an insulin-dependent diabetic, who would likely lapse into a coma and die without insulin, would be "substantially limited" in all life activities, indeed would be deprived of life itself. Yet that is where Euclid rests its case, and so we must consider whether Baert has come forward with enough evidence of disability to overcome summary judgment. Baert is, of course, entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, and if a rational jury could infer that an insulin-dependent diabetic would be substantially limited in a major life activity without the benefit of insulin, then Baert survives summary judgment. See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1134. But we need not limit the analysis to the diagnosis alone because Baert has come forward with more than his mere diagnosis. The record reveals that his illness resulted in a 5-day hospitalization, after which his doctor instructed him to take insulin every day. At the time of his deposition, Baert had taken insulin every day since his release from the hospital. Euclid does not dispute these facts, and in fact, most of them can be found in Euclid's Rule 12(m) statement of material, undisputed facts. Nor does Euclid dispute that Baert's condition is permanent, absent some major advancement in medical science.

We believe these facts are enough to support an inference that Baert is disabled. The parties have focused on whether Baert's diabetes...