Baessler v. Freier
Decision Date | 30 April 2011 |
Parties | PAUL BAESSLER, as personal representative for the ESTATE OF CAROL ANN MUNKBERG, Deceased; and KAREN R. SCHMID, as personal representative for the ESTATE OF JOHN ALLAN MUNKBERG, Deceased, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. DOUG FREIER and DENNY FREIER, husband and wife, individually and d/b/a STOCKMAN'S BAR and the SMOKEHOUSE SALOON, Wyoming Partnerships in Fact, Appellees (Defendants). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Big Horn County
The Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge
Representing Appellants:
Larry B. Jones and William L. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, The Cody, Wyoming division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh and Jardine, P.C., Cody, Wyoming; and Patrick J. Crank of Nicholas & Crank, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Jones.
Representing Appellees:
Ryan P. Healy of Healy Law Firm, Sheridan, Wyoming.
Representing Wyoming Attorney General in his official capacity:
Jay Jerde, Deputy Attorney General.
Before KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
*This case was reassigned to Justice Voigt on July 19, 2011.
[¶1] The district court dismissed the appellants' civil action against the appellees for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The dismissal and this appeal raise issues of statutory construction and the constitutionality of a statute, with the focal question being the liability of a provider of alcohol for damages caused to a third person by the person to whom alcohol was provided.1 We affirm.
[¶2] 1. Does the word "legally" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) (LexisNexis 2011) encompass legal enactments beyond Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes such as the municipal ordinances at issue in this case?
2. If Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) prohibits liability under municipal ordinances, is the statute unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution?
3. If Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) prohibits liability under municipal ordinances, is the statute unconstitutional as violative of the special law provisions of article 3, section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution?
[¶3] § 12-8-301. Limitation of liability.
[¶4] The appellants are the personal representatives of the estates of a husband and wife, Allan and Carol Ann Munkberg, who were killed in a motor vehicle accident caused by Randall LaBrie, who also died in the accident. Prior to the accident, LaBrie became intoxicated as a result of consuming alcoholic beverages at the Stockman's Bar in Basin, Wyoming, and the Smokehouse Saloon in Greybull, Wyoming, both of which establishments are owned by the individually named appellees. LaBrie's conduct at both establishments showed that he was highly intoxicated, and such conduct was obvious and noticeable to anyone in his presence. Nevertheless, the appellees' employees at both establishments continued to serve alcoholic beverages to LaBrie.
[¶5] The appellants filed a wrongful death/negligence complaint against the appellees, in which they also sought a judgment declaring § 12-8-301 unconstitutional if, as a matter of law, the statute provided immunity to the appellees for their tortious conduct. The appellees responded with a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After additional briefing and argument, the district court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that this Court had already found the statute to be constitutional in Greenwalt v. Ram Restaurant Corporation of Wyoming, 2003 WY 77, 71 P.3d 717 (Wyo. 2003). This appeal followed.
Does the word "legally" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) (LexisNexis 2011) encompass legal enactments beyond Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes such as the municipal ordinances at issue in this case?
[¶6] As applicable to the issues now before the Court, we have described our standard for the review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as follows:
Our review is de novo, and we employ the same standards and examine the same materials as the district court. We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dismissal is appropriate only if it is certain on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that create entitlement to relief.
Swinney v. Jones, 2008 WY 150, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo. 2008). Statutory construction is also a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Sponsel v. Park County, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 9, 126 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 2006).
[¶7] The issue of statutory construction presently before the Court is whether the limitation of liability provided in § 12-8-301(a) extends to any provider who has not violated a provision of Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes or, to the contrary, extends to any provider who has not violated a provision of Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes or any other provision of law that may apply to the sale or providing of alcohol. Specifically, if the appellees did not violate Title 12 in providing alcohol to LaBrie, but did violate the provisions of local ordinances, do they lose the limitation on liability provided by the statute? Stated differently, and in terms related to a negligence cause of action, is the standard of care under the phrase "legally provided" limited to adherence to the provisions of Title 12, or can the standard of care under the statutory language be determined by the existence of a municipal ordinance?
[¶9] The post-McClellan 1985 legislation provided as follows:
1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 205, § 1 at 342.
[¶10] We will not repeat Greenwalt's lengthy analysis of the 1985 legislation. Suffice it to say for the purpose of our current analysis that the statute recognized two types of licensee liability: in subsection (a), liability for selling or providing alcohol to an intoxicated person under certain circumstances, and in subsection (d), liability for selling or providing alcohol in violation of Title 12. Clearly, the legislature viewed the type of liability recognized in subsection (a) as being legislative business within its police powers. As stated in Greenwalt, the legislation "had enacted a full and comprehensive regulatory scheme expressing the state's social policy in the problematic area of liquor provider liability." Greenwalt, 2003 WY 77, ¶ 25, 71 P.3d at 727.
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