Baeszler v. Baeszler

Decision Date06 July 2021
Docket NumberA-4669-18
PartiesDAWN M. BAESZLER, Plaintiff-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant, v. WILLIAM J. BAESZLER, Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Respondent.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Argued May 3, 2021

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No FM-13-0473-08.

Michael Gunteski argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Senoff & Enis, attorneys Michael J. Gunteski, on the briefs).

Dawn M. Baeszler, respondent/cross-appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Before Judges Hoffman and Smith.

PER CURIAM.

These cross-appeals follow nearly a decade of post-judgment divorce litigation between plaintiff Dawn B. Baeszler and defendant William J. Baeszler. On appeal, defendant challenges three Family Part orders: an October 20, 2017 order denying his motion to reopen a June 9, 2017 arbitration award (the Award); a June 29, 2018 order denying reconsideration; and a June 24, 2019 order denying his motion to modify his child support obligations. Plaintiff cross-appeals, challenging the Family Part orders entered on June 24, 25, and 26, 2019 denying various requests for relief made by plaintiff in multiple motions, including her own motion to vacate the Award.

Based upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we discern no basis to disturb any of the challenged decisions with one exception. Because defendant presented a material change of circumstances, we vacate the portion of the June 24, 2019 order that denied defendant's motion to modify his child support obligations and remand that issue to the trial court for further proceedings. We affirm the balance of the orders under review.

I.

The parties married in September 1994. Two children were born of the marriage, a daughter born in 1999 and a son born in 2003. In August 2008, the parties divorced upon the entry of a Dual Judgment of Divorce incorporating the parties' Memorandum of Understanding dated August 7, 2008.

Shortly thereafter, the parties engaged in litigation regarding their daughter's education expenses. On July 30, 2010, the trial court found defendant in contempt of court for failing to comply with orders to - among other things - pay fifty percent of the daughter's tuition and related expenses. Because of defendant's refusal to cooperate, on August 14, 2015, the court awarded plaintiff sole custody of both children.

Also on August 14, 2015, the trial court found defendant in contempt for failing to provide discovery. Discovery ultimately revealed defendant's Fidelity Profit Sharing Plan and Money Purchase Plan accounts (the Fidelity accounts), represented by defendant as having a value of $360, 000 when plaintiff filed her divorce complaint, had an the actual value of $450, 000 at that time. Therefore, plaintiff's fifty percent share of the Fidelity accounts was understated by $45, 000. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's request to receive an additional $45, 000 from the Fidelity accounts.

The parties continued to contest numerous outstanding post-judgment issues regarding, among other things, child support and the distribution of retirement assets. For example, on March 29, 2016, the trial court awarded plaintiff "forty percent (40%) of the Keogh Money Purchase Plan contributions of [d]efendant . . . or the taxable sum of $146, 152, which contributions were erroneously and inequitably excluded from (d)efendant's available income for support purposes in the 2008 divorce judgment." The court had preserved the order pending a plenary hearing to allow defendant to produce an expert report on the matter, but he never did; in addition, defendant failed to appear at the plenary hearing.

On January 22, 2017, the parties agreed to retain Matthew Abatemarco (the Arbitrator) to arbitrate outstanding post-judgment issues and entered a consent order to arbitrate on February 2, 2017. The Arbitrator had previously conducted an unsuccessful mediation between the parties.

At the conclusion of arbitration proceedings, on June 8, 2017, the Arbitrator issued the Award that is the primary focus of this appeal. Central to the appeal and cross-appeal, the Award obligated defendant to pay $3, 442 per month in child support, sixty percent of the tuition and related expenses for the parties' son, and the additional $45, 000 for plaintiff's half of the Fidelity accounts.

On August 8, 2017, defendant moved "to reopen arbitration award with regards to counsel fees." Plaintiff filed a cross-motion requesting "the court to deem the Arbitration Award moot and to allow plaintiff to make a motion to tell her side of this litigation."[1] Notwithstanding these pending motions, on September 22, 2017, the parties submitted to the trial court and the court signed a Consent Order to Confirm Arbitration Award, wherein they confirmed they "voluntarily desire[] to confirm the Amended Arbitration Award" and agreed to "fully and promptly comply with the provisions of said order."

On April 11, 2018, the court granted plaintiff's request to send their son to boarding school in Pennsylvania. In response, defendant moved to modify his child support obligation, arguing that their son living away from home for the school year was a material change in circumstances. The court denied the motion on June 24, 2019, finding the "Arbitration Award so ingrains child support with other payments and expenses that to disturb that figure would disrupt many other aspects of the award." The same day, the court denied plaintiff's motions for various modifications of the Arbitration Award and on June 25, 2019, the court specifically denied plaintiff's motion to modify the Award to receive $146, 152 of defendant's Keogh Money Purchase Plan, finding plaintiff had the opportunity to object to the denial of the relief at arbitration and failed to do so. Plaintiff again moved to vacate the Award, arguing the arbitrator inappropriately acted as both mediator and arbitrator and made various errors in calculating her relief. The court denied the motion on June 26, 2019, finding no errors warranting reconsideration because plaintiff provided no newly discovered information and the denial of any relief was justified by the Arbitrator.

On appeal, defendant challenges multiple orders regarding the Award, asserting the following arguments:

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION TO VACATE THE $45, 000 AWARD AND NOTICE OF MOTION TO REOPEN COUNSEL FEES AS A RESULT OF PLAINTIFF'S MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS TO THE ARBITRATOR.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION TO VACATE THE $45, 000 AWARD WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S REQUEST IN ITS OCTOBER 20, [2017] ORDER.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE OCTOBER 20, [2017] ORDER BY FAILING TO CONSIDER [PLAINTIFF'S] MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD UPON THE COURT AND ARBITRATOR.
POINT IV
THE OCTOBER 20, [2017] AND JUNE 29, 2018 ORDERS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION TO VACATE THE $45, 000 AWARD AND RE-OPEN ARBITRATION REGARDING COUNSEL FEES WITHOUT HOLDING A PLENARY HEARING TO ADDRESS THE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACTS.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT IN THE COURT'S JUNE 24, 2019 ORDER.

On her cross-appeal, plaintiff argues:

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FOR FAILURE TO ENFORCE DISCOVERY OR FACT FIND WHEN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO MERIT FOR A RECONSIDERATION TO VACATE THE AWARD.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FOR FAILURE TO ANSWER COMPLAINTS THAT THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HIS POWERS AS ACTING AS BOTH MEDIATOR AND ARBITRATOR WITHOUT SIGNING WAIVERS OR DISCLOSURES.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN STATING THAT THERE WERE NO ERRORS IN THE ARBITRATION REPORT.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MY MOTION TO VACATE THE ARBITRATION AWARD.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MY MOTION ON A HEARING ON THE $146, 500.
II.

We review the trial court's denial of motions to vacate an arbitration award de novo. Manger v. Manger, 417 N.J.Super. 370, 376 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted). But, "there is a strong preference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards," Middletown Tp. PBA Loc. 124 v. Township of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1, 10 (2007), and we give such awards "considerable deference," Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013).

"[I]n the absence of an express designation in an agreement, the [Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32] governs the arbitration." Manger, 417 N.J. Super at 375. The Act states a court may vacate an arbitration award only upon proof:

(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15 of this act, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23.]

A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears the burden of demonstrating "fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrator." Tretina v Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 135 N.J. 349, 358 (1994) (internal...

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