Baez v. Town of Brookline
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-1278 |
| Citation | 44 F.4th 79 |
| Parties | Juana BAEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Cruz Sanabria, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Rogelio Rodas, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Demetrius Oviedo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Jose Alberto Nunez-Guerrero, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. TOWN OF BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS Brookline Police Commissioners, Defendant, Appellee, Neil Wishinsky, in his individual and official capacities; Nancy Daly, in her individual and official capacities; Ben Franco, in his individual and official capacities; Nancy Heller, in her individual and official capacities; Bernard Greene, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Brooks A. Ames, with whom Brookline Justice League was on brief, for appellants.
Joseph A. Padolsky, with whom Michael Downey, Douglas I. Louison, and Louison, Costello, Condon & Pfaff, LLP were on brief, for appellee.
Before Kayatta, Lipez, and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
The five named plaintiffs in this case argue that between 2014 and 2015, the Brookline police violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by treating them differently because they are Hispanic. Rather than suing any of the individual officers, plaintiffs pursued claims against the Town of Brookline and its Selectmen (who are also the Town's Police Commissioners). Plaintiffs say that the Town caused their allegedly unconstitutional mistreatment by its "deliberate indifference" to complaints of racial discrimination by Brookline police. In granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants, the district court found that the record would not allow any reasonable jury to conclude that the Town of Brookline was deliberately indifferent to complaints of unlawful discrimination by police officers. Baez v. Town of Brookline, No. CV 17-10661, 2021 WL 1209743, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2021).1 For the following reasons, we agree.
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. Alston v. Town of Brookline, 997 F.3d 23, 35 (1st Cir. 2021). In so doing, "we evaluate the facts of record in the light most flattering to the nonmovant[s]" -- here, plaintiffs -- "and draw all reasonable inferences in [their] favor." Id. Summary judgment is warranted only if, after reviewing the record in the manner just described, we determine "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
We begin with a review of the applicable law. To prevail in this action against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must prove that they suffered a violation of a constitutional right as a result of a "policy or custom" of the Town of Brookline. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In plaintiffs’ favor, we will assume without deciding that a jury could reasonably find that Brookline police officers violated plaintiffs’ equal-protection rights. We train our attention, instead, on whether the evidence would support a finding that those (assumed) constitutional violations were the result of an official policy or custom.
Not surprisingly, there is no evidence that the Town has a formal or express policy instructing police officials to discriminate based on race or ethnicity. But "[o]fficial municipal policy" need not be so explicit -- it also includes, inter alia, "the acts of [a government's] policymaking officials[ ] and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011). Put another way, a municipality can be held liable if an unlawful "custom or practice" is " ’so well settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality can be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice.’ "
Whitfield v. Meléndez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989) ). Thus, "[i]n limited circumstances," a municipality's decision not to act "may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983." Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350 ().
Pointing to these principles, plaintiffs in this case seek to establish liability by showing that they suffered constitutional injury as "the direct result of poor ... supervision of" Brookline police officers, "stemming from ’deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [police] come into contact.’ " Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Hayden v. Grayson, 134 F.3d 449, 456 (1st Cir. 1998) ). "Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (cleaned up) (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) ). "A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Brown, 520 U.S. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382.
To make this required showing of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs advance a single argument on appeal: "The Town's failure to take meaningful action to independently investigate racial discrimination complaints and impose appropriate discipline on offending officers constitutes deliberate indifference to racial discrimination." See Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 331–32 (2d Cir. 1986) (). Plaintiffs allege that by failing to properly address complaints, the Town "turned a blind-eye" to "a pattern of discriminatory behavior" and "tacitly encouraged" discriminatory police conduct. Plaintiffs further argue that but for the Town's deficient handling of racial discrimination complaints, plaintiffs would not themselves have suffered constitutional injury by Brookline police officers. Plaintiffs focus in particular on the actions of the Police Commissioners, who we will assume are policymaking officials for the purposes of section 1983 liability.
Plaintiffs are correct that "deliberate indifference may be inferred" if a municipality receives "repeated complaints of civil rights violations ... followed by no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall further incidents." Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) ; see also Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 506 (8th Cir. 1987) (). Taking nominal action will not shield a local government from liability. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (3d Cir. 1996) (). Deliberate indifference can be predicated on actions shown to be "meaningless or blatantly inadequate." Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 196 (2d Cir. 2007) (). That said, responsive measures do not necessarily establish deliberate indifference just because they ultimately prove ineffective. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) ().
Having explained the applicable law, we turn to evaluating whether plaintiffs’ evidence might suffice to establish municipal liability under that law. More specifically, we look to the Town's handling of relevant complaints (formal and otherwise) during the years surrounding plaintiffs’ interactions with Brookline police to discern whether the Town's actions could support a finding of deliberate indifference.
Plaintiffs’ own relevant interactions with Brookline police occurred in 2014 and 2015.2 Those interactions led three plaintiffs to file complaints against Brookline police officers. The Police Department's procedures for handling such complaints track their relevant origins to 2008, when the Town's Board of Selectmen charged a committee with reviewing the Police Department's then-existing complaint procedures and recommending improvements. This review was prompted by a contentious incident at Town Hall the previous year, which led to a complaint alleging racial discrimination by Brookline police officers. The nine-member review committee was chaired by Patrick J. King, a member of the Massachusetts State Ethics Commission who had been a trial attorney in the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice before serving as a superior court judge and working in alternative dispute resolution. The committee met eleven times in as many months, holding two meetings for public comment. One committee member wrote that "in over 30 years of community involvement, [he] recall[ed] no committee more willing to hear from the public." The committee also heard from experts, who underscored the importance of using procedures to "compensate for the reality" that "[i]n all police jurisdictions[,] the internal dynamic leans in favor of the police." The committee ultimately recommended various reforms, and the...
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