Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp.

Decision Date19 January 2007
Docket NumberNo. 102430.,102430.
PartiesSuzanne BAGENT, Appellee, v. BLESSING CARE CORPORATION, d/b/a Illini Community Hospital, et al., Appellants.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Stanley L. Tucker, of Hartzell Glidden Tucker & Hartzell, Carthage, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Plaintiff, Suzanne Bagent, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Pike County against defendants, Misty Young and her former employer, Blessing Care Corporation, doing business as Illini Community Hospital (Illini Hospital or hospital), under a theory of respondeat superior. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Illini Hospital. A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the judgment. 363 Ill.App.3d 916, 300 Ill.Dec. 471, 844 N.E.2d 469. We allowed Illini Hospital's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315(a). We now reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

The record, which includes Young's deposition testimony, contains the following pertinent evidence. In August 2001, Illini Hospital hired Young as a phlebotomist, i.e., a person trained in drawing blood. In February 2003, the hospital required employees, including Young, to attend a training session regarding the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.1936) and its privacy provisions. Young attended the session and signed the hospital's confidentiality policy and code of conduct, acknowledging in each document that she understood and accepted its terms. Attendees at the training session received a motto to remember: "What you see here, and what you hear here, remains here."

Young understood the hospital's confidentiality rules to mean that you "[b]asically don't say anything. Everything is private." She understood that the only persons to whom she could give confidential information were "[d]octors, nurses directly involved with that patient's care." She additionally understood that members of a patient's family were not so authorized. Rather, she was "supposed to tell the family members to get in contact with a nurse that's taking care of that patient."

Young received a fax from a facility that performs tests for Illini Hospital. The fax contained results of plaintiff's blood test, which indicated to Young that plaintiff was pregnant. Young made two copies, one for plaintiff's physician and one for hospital records.

On a subsequent weekend night, Young and several of her friends visited a local tavern. Plaintiff's sister, Sarah Bagent, was a waitress there and happened to be one of Young's best friends. According to Young's deposition: "I didn't plan on going into the bar and trying to find Sarah, you know. The only thing I was thinking at the moment is, hi, Sarah, how are you, how is your sister doing?" Young further recounted her conversation with Sarah as follows:

"Little chitchat here and there, hi, how are you, what's going on, how have you been, who are you seeing, stuff like that. And then how is your sister, Suzanne, and how is she feeling? And she's [Sarah] like what do you mean? I'm like I thought she was pregnant, you know. And she's like no. And from there on out, I told her, I said I'm really sorry. Actually, I told her I was sorry. I said please don't tell Suzanne I said that I told you. Because she told me she's like how did you find this out? And she was just asking me more and more questions. And I'm like, well, I seen her result. I said that I could get fired for this, I'm really sorry, I didn't realize that you didn't know. I just assumed. And she's like, no, its okay, it's all right. She's like Suzanne won't care, blah, blah, blah."

Young explained that, as soon as she said it, she "instantly knew" that she had made a mistake.

Further, Young explained her disclosure as follows:

"[T]he only reason why I said something that evening was because [Sarah] was a friend of mine, and I was assuming that, one of my best friends and her twin and being sisters, that they would speak to each other about this. And I just assumed. And assuming makes an ass out of me."

That was the only conversation Young had with Sarah. Young testified in her deposition that they had subsequently avoided each other.

On October 13, 2003, plaintiff telephoned Connie Schroeder, chief executive officer of Illini Hospital, to complain that plaintiff's patient confidentiality had been violated. Upon investigation, Schroeder learned that Young had disclosed the information. On December 14, 2003, Young accepted the hospital's offer of resignation in lieu of termination.

Plaintiff timely filed a complaint, in which she pled separate counts not only against Young, but also against Illini Hospital under a theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff alleged breach of health-care practitioner/patient confidentiality, invasion of privacy, negligent infliction of emotional distress and, against Young alone, intentional infliction of emotional distress, all based on a violation of the Hospital Licensing Act (210 ILCS 85/1 et seq. (West 2004)), the Managed Care Reform and Patient Rights Act (215 ILCS 134/1 et seq. (West 2004)), and article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 12). Plaintiff also pled common law negligent infliction of emotional distress and, against Young alone, common law intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In its answer, Illini Hospital admitted that Young discovered certain information about plaintiff from reviewing plaintiff's medical records and revealed that information to plaintiff's sister at a tavern. Illini Hospital further alleged, however, that when Young revealed the information, she was acting outside the scope of her employment with the hospital.

In her answer, Young alleged as follows. At the time the lawsuit arose, she was an employee of Illini Hospital. Young admitted that, in the course of her duties, she saw certain medical records pertaining to plaintiff. Young further admitted that she inadvertently revealed one of plaintiff's test results in a private conversation with plaintiff's twin sister when asking the sister how plaintiff was feeling.

Discovery adduced the above-recited evidence in the form of depositions and affidavits with attached documents. Illini Hospital moved for summary judgment against plaintiff. The hospital contended, inter alia: that the Illinois Constitution and statutes do not authorize a private right of action; and that the hospital was not vicariously liable for Young's actions because, when Young breached plaintiff's confidentiality, she was acting outside the scope of her employment. Young filed a motion for summary judgment, in which she joined in the hospital's summary judgment motion as it pertained to those counts pled against her. Also, plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment against Young only on the issue of liability, leaving the issue of damages for trial.

Following a hearing, the circuit court ruled as follows. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Illini Hospital and Young on those counts alleging statutory causes of action, ruling that those statutes do not authorize a private right of action. Nonetheless, the court found that a common law right of privacy exists to allow plaintiff to bring an action against Young for violation of plaintiff's common law right to privacy. The court granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment against Young regarding whether Young improperly revealed plaintiff's confidential information, but the court ruled that issues as to negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress and damages were to be determined at trial.

Further, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Illini Hospital. The court found that Young's disclosure to plaintiff's sister was not made in the course of or within the scope of Young's employment, and that no jury could find that Young made the disclosure to serve the purposes of Young's employer, i.e., the hospital. In its ruling, the circuit court expressly observed that plaintiff did not claim that the hospital was directly liable based on any allegations of negligent hiring or training but, rather, plaintiff claimed that the hospital was vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior. The court observed that although there could be a cause of action for negligent hiring or negligent training, by its ruling it was not addressing or deciding that issue. Also, the court noted that its ruling would not prohibit or preclude plaintiff from refiling her complaint to include allegations of negligent hiring or training. The circuit court expressly found that this was a final judgment as to Illini Hospital, and that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the judgment. See 210 Ill.2d R. 304(a).

Plaintiff's sole contention before the appellate court was that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Illini Hospital. Plaintiff argued that the hospital was vicariously liable for Young's violation of plaintiff's common law right to privacy under a theory of respondeat superior. A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the hospital. 363 Ill.App.3d 916, 300 Ill.Dec. 471...

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