Baggett Transp. Co. v. Barnes

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: RUSSELL; FELTON
• Citation: Baggett Transp. Co. v. Barnes, 132 S.E.2d 229, 108 Ga.App. 68 (Ga. App. 1963)
• Decision Date: 04 June 1963
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 40183,40183,1
• Parties: BAGGETT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. M. E. BARNES

Page 229

132 S.E.2d 229

108 Ga.App. 68

BAGGETT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. M. E. BARNES.

No. 40183.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

June 4, 1963.

Rehearing Denied June 19, 1963.

Mitchell, Clark, Pate & Anderson, William M. Pate, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

William V. George, Forest Park, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

RUSSELL, Judge.

This is a Workmen's Compensation case in which the only questions raised (one filed by the claimant and another by the employer) are as to the award of the full board affirming an award of a deputy director. The procedure follows the Act of 1963 (Ga.L.1963, p. 141 at p. 156, approved March 15, 1963) attempting to repeal the former Code § 114-710 and to provide a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals from such award. ¹ Prior thereto Code § 114-710 provided for appeals to the superior Courts, and writ of error from superior Courts to this court. ²

Although neither party has raised any question of the jurisdiction of this court, it is always the primary duty of the court, with or without motion, to examine into its own jurisdiction if the question presents any doubt. Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 214 Ga. 75, 103 S.E.2d 108; Williams v. Williams, 203 Ga. 231 (3), 46 S.E.2d 65; Brockett v. Maxwell, 200 Ga. 213(1), 36 S.E.2d 638; Henderson v. Anderson, 188 Ga. 18, 3 S.E.2d 97; Freeman v. Atlanta Police Relief Ass'n, 62 Ga.App. 523, 8 S.E.2d 711; Hobbs v. New England Ins. Co., 93 Ga.App. 687, 92 S.E.2d 636. In determining such jurisdiction, it is also the duty of the Court of Appeals to apply to statutory enactments the unquestioned and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution of this State (Dade County v. State of Georgia, 201 Ga. 241(2-a), 39 S.E.2d 473) as interpreted by prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia. In so doing, if it appears that an insoluble conflict results between the statute and the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution are fundamental and must control. Copland v. Wohlwender, 197 Ga. 782(4), 30 S.E.2d 462.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is set out in Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VIII of the Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-3708). ³

Prior to the establishment of this Court in 1906, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction 'for the trial and correction of errors of law from the superior Courts and the city courts of Atlanta and Savannah, and such other like courts as have been or may hereafter be established in other cities.' Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. V, Constitution of 1877. The provision is jurisdictional, and it was held in Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 40 S.E. 857, that a court which was not a 'like court' to those named was not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that a bill of exceptions from such a court (in that case a criminal court established in the City of Atlanta where a constitutional court already existed, and therefore not one which the General Assembly had power to create as a 'like court' to a constitutional court) was not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and would necessarily have to be dismissed for the reason that the Supreme Court had no constitutional authority to review a judgment directly from such court even though the procedure was authorized by the statute creating the court.

In 1906 the Georgia Constitution was amended by changing Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. V of the Constitution of 1877 (Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV of the Constitution of 1945; Code Ann. § 2-3704) relating to the jurisdiction of the Surpeme Court and adding Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IX (now Par. VIII, Code Ann. § 2-3708) defining the jurisdiction of the newly created Court of Appeals. Reference to the 1906 Senate and House Journals at this point is most enlightening on a question here at issue, which is the meaning of the constitutional provision giving the Court of Appeals jurisdiction for the trial and correction of errors of law from the superior courts, certain constitutional courts, and other like courts where jurisdiction is not conferred specifically on the Supreme Court 'in such other cases as may hereafter be prescribed by law.' The original substitute bill in the House of Representatives specified that the Supreme Court 'shall be a court alone for the trial and correction of errors from the superior courts in all civil cases, whether legal or equitable, originating therein, and in all cases of felony' (Journal of the House of Representatives, 1906, p. 466,Sec. 2), and that the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction for 'the trial and correction of errors from the superior courts in all cases in which such jurisdiction is not conferred by this Constitution on the Supreme Court, and from the city courts of Atlanta and Savannah, and such other like courts as have been or may be hereafter established in other cities' (id. Sec. 3, p. 467). Thereafter the Senate amended the proposed amendment by adding the italicized portions quoted below: (Supreme Court) 'from the superior courts in all civil cases whether legal or equitable, originating therein or carried thereto from the court of ordinary, and in all cases of conviction of a capital felony' (Senate Journal, 1906, p. 339) and (Court of Appeals) 'from the superior courts in all cases in which such jurisdiction is not conferred by this Constitution on the Supreme Court, and from the city courts of Atlanta and Savannah, and such other like courts as have been or may be hereafter established in other cities and in such other cases as may hereafter be prescribed by law' (Id. p. 341). It is obvious from the context of the amendment that the language 'such other cases as may hereafter be prescribed by law' refers to the type of case over which the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, its jurisdiction in all events being complementary to that of the Supreme Court, and both courts together having that total jurisdiction which the Supreme Court had in the first instance, which was limited in extent to all cases coming, however, from only specified courts, that is, the superior Courts of this State, the city courts of Atlanta and Savannah which were the only constitutional courts existing at that time, and 'other like courts.' This jurisdiction was divided between two appellate courts without enlargement, and then by the Senate amendment, which changed the jurisdictional distribution, provision was also made for further changes in allocation of types of cases between the two courts. While the language of the amendment would suggest that these further changes might have come within the purview of the General Assembly, it nevertheless has not acted upon the authority conferred, and when the jurisdiction was further changed by extending the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to certain cases originating in the superior courts, constitutional courts, and other like courts, such as negligence cases, this was also done by constitutional amendment. (Ga.L.1916, p. 19, ratified Nov. 7, 1916). That this is so is made abundantly clear in Griffin v. Sisson, 146 Ga. 661, 92 S.E. 278; Taylor v. Stovall, 155 Ga. 894, 118 S.E. 715 and Inman Grocery Co. v. Williams, 155 Ga. 900, 118 S.E. 718. The latter case specifically deals with the constitutional language 'such other cases as may hereafter be prescribed by law' and holds that '[s]uch quoted words were not intended to extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to writs of error from courts that do not fall within the class of 'superior courts, and the city courts of Atlanta and Savannah, and such other like courts as have been or may hereafter be established in other cities.'' Following these cases, and also in answer to a certified question from this court, the Supreme Court in Boswell v. Roberts, 157 Ga. 585, 122 S.E. 216 held that the City Court of Greensboro, which was created by statute and had a provision that 'a writ of error shall lie from said city court to the Court of Appeals, or to the Supreme Court of this state upon a bill of exceptions filed under the same rules and regulations as govern and control the issue of writs of error and filing of bills of exceptions in the superior courts of this state,' was not a 'like court' to the courts from which writs of error would lie to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, for which reason this court had no jurisdiction over the bill of exceptions and the only proper judgment would be a judgment of dismissal.

The State Board of Workmen's Compensation is not only not a 'like court'; it is not a court at all but is an administrative body with only those powers and duties given it by statute. Plummer v. State, 90 Ga.App. 773, 84 S.E.2d 202; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Haney, 92 Ga.App. 319, 88 S.E.2d 492; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Stephens, 76 Ga.App. 723, 47 S.E.2d 108; City of Hapeville v. Preston, 67 Ga.App. 350, 20 S.E.2d 202; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 172 Ga. 258, 157 S.E. 449. The Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of which is fixed by the Constitution, has no power to entertain a direct appeal from the board, and the General Assembly has no power by legislation to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court...