Baggett v. Program Resources, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1163,86-1163 |
| Citation | 806 F.2d 178 |
| Parties | 42 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 648, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,679 Mary BAGGETT, Appellee, v. PROGRAM RESOURCES, INC., Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Bruce R. Lindsey, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Jim Hunter Birch, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and FAGG, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Program Resources, Inc. (PRI) brings this appeal from the district court's 1 order awarding appellee Mary Baggett $10,710.00 in backpay upon a finding that PRI discriminated against Baggett on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. PRI contends that the district court erred (1) in holding that PRI failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring Baggett, (2) in relying on hiring decisions made in 1981 and 1982 by a decisionmaker other than the decisionmaker who made the hiring decisions regarding Baggett, and (3) in including impermissible periods of time in calculating the backpay award. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Mary Baggett, a female, was employed by the University of Arkansas on August 15, 1977, as a Diet Preparation Technician on the Diet Prep Project directed by Hugh Campbell and contracted by the National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR). Baggett was hired and supervised by Neil Jones. On July 1, 1978, PRI took over the contract from the University of Arkansas, retaining all of the University's employees. However, on August 18, 1978, Baggett, another female and two males, were laid off pursuant to PRI's decision that a reduction in the work force was necessary. There is no documentation in Baggett's personnel file revealing any warnings or discipline for either work performance or attendance during her employment by PRI. Baggett's personnel file indicates that when she applied for unemployment benefits she was told by the Arkansas Employment Security Division that she was laid off because "work was slow and had to cut back."
After her layoff, Baggett made several inquiries with PRI regarding vacancies in the Diet Prep Project. The qualifications for a diet prep technician were that the person be over age eighteen, have a high school diploma and be willing to work under adverse working conditions. Baggett met all of these qualifications. Baggett applied for a diet prep technician position in August of 1979. That position was filled by Eddie Stephens, a twenty-one year old male with a high school diploma. He had not previously worked for PRI and had less total work experience than Baggett. Baggett also applied for a similar position in September of 1979. That position was filled by Barry Parker who was seventeen years and eleven months old when he began work with PRI. At that time he had not finished high school and was working on his high school equivalency diploma which he expected to complete in April or May of 1980. His prior work experience consisted of being a bagger at a grocery store for several weeks before being laid off. He was the brother of a clerical worker at PRI.
Neil Jones acknowledged that Baggett's qualifications were considered when openings in the Diet Prep Project became available. He, however, stated that Baggett was not rehired because she had difficulty following instructions, was disruptive of other employees, left her work area when work was slack and complained about the lifting required in the job. The first three reasons all related to her leaving the work area when work was slow. None of these reasons was ever documented and placed in Baggett's personnel file. The evidence at trial was that Baggett did not leave the work area more often than her fellow employees.
Baggett brought this suit claiming that PRI discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. and claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 The district court held that Baggett established a prima facie case of sex discrimination and that PRI failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to rehire Baggett. The district court further held that even assuming that PRI had established a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to rehire, Baggett has established that said reason was pretextual. Baggett was awarded $10,710.00 in backpay. The court dismissed her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
PRI concedes that Baggett established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the analysis of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). It, however, argues that the district court erred in finding that PRI failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to rehire Baggett because it demonstrated that the reason Baggett was not rehired was due to a personality conflict. In his testimony at trial, however, Campbell stated that Baggett was not rehired because she had difficulty following instructions, was disruptive of other employees, left her work area when work was slack and complained about the lifting requirements of her job. The district court did not find these reasons to be credible given (1) that none of these reasons was documented in Baggett's personnel file, (2) the different treatment afforded Tackett, (3) the promotions of Bland and Payton, and (4) the fact that Payton was the only female supervisor in the program. In reviewing a district court's findings of fact, the court is bound by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and by prior case law interpreting the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. It is not the appellate court's function to decide factual issues de novo. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Moreover, "[c]redibility findings are uniquely within the province of the trier of fact * * * ". Weber v. Block, 784 F.2d 313, 316 (8th Cir.1986). The test is not whether review of the evidence would lead us to the same conclusion as that reached by the district court, but whether the district court has demonstrated any clear error in its conclusion. Our review of the record satisfies us that the district court's finding that PRI failed to establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its refusal to rehire Baggett is not clearly erroneous. Further, the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that, assuming PRI articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, said reason is...
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