E. Baggot Co. v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 17 December 1919
• Docket Number: No. 12834.,12834.
• Citation: 125 N.E. 254,290 Ill. 530
• Parties: E. BAGGOT CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

290 Ill. 530

125 N.E. 254

E. BAGGOT CO.

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 12834.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 17, 1919.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary C. Cripps, administratrix of the estate of Joseph C. Cripps, deceased, opposed by E. Baggot Company, employer. An award of the Industrial Commission was affirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Ralph F. Potter and Kenneth B. Hawkins, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Philip Sultan, of Chicago, for defendant in error.

THOMPSON, J.

This is a writ of error sued out by the E. Baggot Company to review a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county affirming an award of the Industrial Commission in favor of Mary C. Cripps, administratrix of the estate of Joseph C. Cripps, deceased; the circuit court having certified that the cause is one proper to be reviewed by this court.

Joseph C. Cripps, deceased, was a plumber employed by plaintiff in error. On September 26, 1917, deceased, with Michael Brodie, was engaged in his regular work upon a building under construction where plaintiff in error was the plumbing contractor. A part of the work consisted of lifting pipe from the ground to the sixth floor, where these men were working. The pipe was liftedby a hand derrick of the usual type, equipped with an arm over the end of which passed a rope attached to a windlass. At each end of the windlass was a handle, by means of which the rope was rolled upon the drum, lifting the pipe attached at the other end of the rope. The windlass was operated by the two men, deceased turning one handle and Brodie the other. The last load of pipe hauled up by these men weighed between 250 and 300 pounds. After the pipe was landed on the sixth floor, and while Brodie was untying the rope, deceased started to walk away from the windlass and was seen to be spitting blood. Brodie asked him what was the matter, but deceased was unable to talk. The latter then proceeded to the construction office of plaintiff in error, on the first floor of the building, where he requested the foreman, Edwin Schutz, to get a doctor. While in the office he had two hemorrhages and coughed up blood. When deceased first came into the office, the foreman noticed that he held over his mouth a bandkerchief saturated with blood and was coughing. Schutz asked deceased if he was hurt, to which deceased made no reply in words, but shook his head in the negative. Nothing unusual happened while the work of lifting this last load of pipe was in progress. The work was heavy, but it was the same kind of work that the two men had been doing for a couple of days. The hemorrhages recurred from time to time until October 8th, when deceased died. A post mortem examination disclosed a large longitudinal tear and several smaller transverse tears in the walls of the aorta. Prior to September 26th, deceased was a strong, healthy man and had never suffered from hemorrhages or any trouble with his heart or lungs.

Plaintiff in error contends that there is no evidence to support the award of the Industrial Commission, for the reason that there is no competent evidence to support a finding that deceased sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The word ‘accident’ is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning, and no legal definition has ever been given which has been found both exact and comprehensive as applied to all circumstances. stances. Anything that happens without design is commonly called an ‘accident,’ and, at least in the popular acceptation of the word, any event which is unforeseen and not expected by the person to whom it happens is included in the term. The words ‘accident’ and ‘accidental injury,’ as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois (Laws 1913, p. 335), were meant to include every injury suffered in the course of employment for which there was an existing right of action at the time the act was passed; also to extend the liability of the employer to make compensation for injuries for which he was not previously liable and to limit such compensation. If an injury can be traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, and the injury occurs in the course of the employment, the injury is accidental within the meaning of the act and the obligation to provide and pay compensation arises. Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249. Where a workman died from a pre-existing disease which was aggravated or accelerated under circumstances which can be said to have been accidental, his death may be said to have resulted from accidental injury. Peoria Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352, 116 N. E. 651;Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill. 279, 120 N. E. 774. In Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616, 160...