Baggs v. City of South Pasadena

• Decision Date: 25 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-492-CIV-T-17-C.,94-492-CIV-T-17-C.
• Citation: 947 F.Supp. 1580
• Parties: Michael J. BAGGS and Judy S. Baggs, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SOUTH PASADENA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Page 1580

947 F.Supp. 1580

Michael J. BAGGS and Judy S. Baggs, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SOUTH PASADENA, Defendant.

No. 94-492-CIV-T-17-C.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

November 25, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ruthann O'Brien O'Neill, Law Office of Ruthann O. O'Neill, St. Petersburg, FL, for plaintiffs.

Alan S. Zimmet, Tew, Zinober, Barnes, Zimmet & Unice, Clearwater, FL, for defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant CITY OF SOUTH PASADENA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 49) and supporting Memorandum of Law (Docket No. 50), and Plaintiffs MICHAEL J. BAGGS and JUDY S. BAGGS' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 51).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about April 13, 1993, the Defendant issued a violation notice to the Plaintiffs that they were in violation of the City of South Pasadena's (Defendant) Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance 108-19D(2). The Plaintiff's received another violation notice on July 15, 1993 to comply with the ordinance within thirty (30) days.

On September 21, 1993, the City's Code Enforcement Board held that the Plaintiffs were violating the ordinance and the board granted the Plaintiff 90 days to comply with the ordinance. The Plaintiffs filed a suit in state court to appeal the order of the City's Code Enforcement Board. The complaint contained counts for injunction and declaratory relief pursuant to Florida Statute § 162.11. The Plaintiffs filed an application for a flood variance with the Defendant on October 1, 1993. The City Commission denied the Plaintiffs' variance request on January 25, 1994. The Plaintiffs then had their original action dismissed without prejudice and filed the present lawsuit in the Sixth Judicial Circuit. The Plaintiffs' complaint consisted of four (4) counts: (1) declaratory judgment, (2) injunction, (3) certiorari review of the denial of the variance, and (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendant removed the case to this court on March 25, 1994. This Court then remanded to the state circuit court the petition for writ of certiorari.

On October 9, 1995, the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County, Florida denied the petition for certiorari. The court also found that the Plaintiffs were afforded procedural due process and that the denial of the variance request complied with the essential requirements of law and was supported by competent substantial evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment should only be entered when the moving party has sustained its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact when all of the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 656 (11th Cir.1983). Issues of fact are genuine only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Facts are material only if they will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Hence, the substantive law of the case determines which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Id.

The United States Supreme Court held in Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) that the plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates summary judgment after "adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to establish the existence of an essential element to the party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden at trial." The Court also held that Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings in establishing whether there are specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the district court acknowledges that "credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

DISCUSSION

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court interprets this clause to provide both procedural and substantive due process protection. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). Violations of either procedural or substantive due process provide the basis of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc).

The Plaintiffs have brought a count against the Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege that the Defendant has violated the Plaintiffs' due process rights. Specifically, they allege that the Defendant refused to grant them a variance and continued to impose fines against them. The state circuit court found there was no procedural due process violation when the City denied the Plaintiffs' variance request.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim because a "United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may only be had in the United States Supreme Court." District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Thus, federal district courts are without jurisdiction to "decide federal issues that are `inextricably intertwined' with a state court's judgment." Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison County, 891 F.2d 1542, 1545 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315 n. 16). If a state court upholds a decision of a state agency, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies since challenging the agency's decision would involve challenging the state court's judgment. Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1994). See also Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016 (11th Cir.1988) (district court did not have jurisdiction to review county agency's decision because state court of appeals upheld agency's decision). Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction to "redetermine" whether the Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were violated. The Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is hereby DISMISSED.

The Plaintiffs also allege under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Defendant has violated the Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights by enforcing the city ordinance in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner, and in refusing to grant the Plaintiffs' variance request. Essentially, the Plaintiffs are claiming a property right in a variance from the city ordinance in question. While the Plaintiff argues the ordinance is created by federal law and therefore the Plaintiffs are entitled to substantive due process protection, this argument is without merit. The Plaintiffs are actually claiming a property right in a variance from the ordinance, not a property right in the ordinance itself. City Code § 108-17H states the conditions under which the City Commission may grant a variance. A city ordinance is a part of state law. Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, Georgia, 505 F.Supp. 880 (S.D.Ga. 1981) (Plaintiffs' state law claim grounded in the city ordinances); Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. of Baltimore v. Collins Park & B.R. Co., 99 F. 1812 (N.D.Ga.1900) (City ordinance granting a franchise is a law of the state). Therefore, whether a variance may be granted under City Code § 108-17 is a determination under state law. "[S]ubstantive rights ... created only by state law are not subject to substantive due process protection under the Due Process Clause because `substantive due process rights are created by the Constitution.'" McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229, 106 S.Ct. 507, 515, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995). In addition, "[t]he Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). In the present case, the substantive right to the variance is created by state law. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have no substantive due process under the Due Process Clause since their substantive right to the variance is created by state law, rather than the Constitution. Since the Plaintiffs have asserted no fundamental right within the substantive due process doctrine, summary judgment is appropriate as to this said claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is hereby GRANTED.

The Plaintiffs claim sections 108-19D(2) and 108-5 are unconstitutionally vague. This argument is essentially a claim that the Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights have been violated. Waltz, M.D. v. Herlihy, J.R., M.D., 682 F.Supp. 501, 507 (S.D.Ala.1988). The Court has already determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the violation of the Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights concerning the city-created variance. This Court finds no genuine issue of material fact regarding any substantive due process violation by the ordinances. The Court rejects the Plaintiffs' contention that the ordinances and the variance requirements are a creation of federal law. The Tenth amendment of the...