Bahalim v. Ferring Pharms., Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16 C 8335 |
| Parties | RAHIMA KASHIF BAHALIM and KATIE MCDONALD, Plaintiffs, v. FERRING PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and STERICYCLE, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Judge Amy J. St. Eve
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On August 25, 2016, Defendant Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Ferring") removed this lawsuit from the Circuit Court of Cook County based on the Court's diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1446. Before the Court is Plaintiffs Rahima Kashif Bahalim's and Katie McDonald's motion to remand brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Although there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Ferring's removal was improper because Defendant Stericycle, Inc. ("Stericycle") is a forum defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Also before the Court is Defendants Stericycle's and Ferring's motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Ferring's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.
For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiffs' § 1447(c) motion to remand because Plaintiffs fraudulently joined Defendant Stericycle under the circumstances of this case. The Court further grants Stericycle's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and grants Defendant Ferring's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss because the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant Ferring.
Plaintiffs originally filed this lawsuit on July 14, 2016, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Law Division, Case No. 2016-L-006938. Plaintiffs' lawsuit arises out of the recall of the prescription drug Bravelle©, which is the brand name version of the generic drug urofollitropin designed to treat infertility in women. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Ferring manufactures and distributes Bravelle and that Ferring recalled multiple lots of Bravelle because quality monitoring revealed that these lots did not meet potency specifications. (Id. ¶ 1.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that they consumed Bravelle that was part of the recalled lots. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Stericycle administered the Bravelle recall and had the duty to issue a proper and prompt warning to Plaintiffs about the allegedly defective Bravelle, yet failed to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 23-25.) Based on this recall and the Bravelle potency issues, Plaintiffs also bring claims sounding in negligence, strict liability, product liability, and express and implied warranties against Defendant Ferring seeking medical expenses, out-of pocket expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of income, along with other compensatory damages. (Id. ¶¶ 14-22, 27.) Also, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages. (Id. ¶ 28.)
In its Notice of Removal, Defendant Ferring asserts that, based on Plaintiffs' state court complaint, Plaintiff Bahalim is a citizen of Texas and Plaintiff McDonald is a citizen of Utah. Further, Defendant Ferring alleges that it is a citizen of Delaware and New Jersey for purpose of diversity of citizenship purposes. Defendant Stericycle, on the other hand, is a citizen of Illinois and Delaware. Plaintiffs do not dispute these diversity jurisdiction allegations.
"Defendants may remove a civil action from state court to the federal district court located in the place where such action is pending, as long as the federal district court had original jurisdiction over the case." Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 708 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "A defendant removing a case on diversity grounds must not only demonstrate that the case satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), but must also clear the 'additional hurdle' of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), or the 'forum defendant rule.'" Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2013). "The party seeking removal bears the burden of proving the propriety of removal; doubts regarding removal are resolved in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum in state court." Id. at 668; see also Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009) ().
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) tests whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); Central States v. Phencorp. Reins. Co., 440 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 2006). "The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction." Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2014). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss based on the submission of written materials, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See Northern Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014). In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing, courts accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and resolve any factual disputes in the parties' affidavits in plaintiff's favor. See Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012); Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). That being said, the Court "accept[s] as true any facts contained in the defendant's affidavits that remain unrefuted by the plaintiff." GCIU-Employer Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1020 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009).
"A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under the federal pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When determining the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts must "accept all well- pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor." Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).
The parties do not dispute that there is complete diversity of citizenship in this matter and that Defendant Stericycle is a citizen of Illinois. Instead, Plaintiffs maintain that under the forum defendant rule pursuant to § 1441(b)(2), removal was improper. "The forum defendant rule is 'designed to preserve the plaintiff's choice of forum, under circumstances where it is arguably less urgent to provide a federal forum to prevent prejudice against an out-of-state party.'" Morris, 718 F.3d at 665 (citation omitted); see also Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2000) (). Put differently, "the forum defendant rule disallows federal removal premised on diversity in cases where the primary rationale for diversity jurisdiction - to protect defendants against presumed bias of local courts - is not a concern because at least one defendant is a citizen of the forum state." Morris, 718 F.3d at 665; see also Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP, 796 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2015).
In response to Plaintiffs' motion to remand, Defendant Ferring argues that removal was proper based on the fraudulent joinder doctrine. "To establish fraudulent joinder, a removing defendant 'must show that, after resolving all issues of fact and law in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant.'" Morris, 718 F.3d at 666 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Thornton, 796 F.3d at 765 (). In Morris, the Seventh Circuit considered whether to extend the fraudulent joinder doctrine to a defendant whose "presence triggers the forum defendant rule but does not compromise the parties' complete diversity." Id. at 666. In concluding that the fraudulent joinder doctrine did not apply in the context of the forum defendant rule, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it was "reluctant to expand the fraudulent joinder doctrine absent a better understanding of the need to do so" because "[s]uch a move would be in tension with long-established precedent that the removal statutes are to be strictly construed to preserve the limited jurisdiction of federal courts." Id. at 670. Although the Morris decision did not extend the fraudulent joinder doctrine to forum defendants, the Seventh Circuit left the question open for "a more thorough and more able presentation of the relevant balance of interests," including the...
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