Bahr v. Lombard

• Citation: 53 N.J.L. 233,21 A. 190
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
• Decision Date: 02 February 1890
• Parties: BAHR v. LOMBARD et al.

21 A. 190

53 N.J.L. 233

BAHR

v. LOMBARD et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 2, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to circuit court, Hudson county.

William F. Abbett and Leon Abbett, for plaintiff.

Bedle, Muirheid & McGee, for defendants.

GARRISON, J. The plaintiff was a servant of the defendants in the business of refining crude oil, and, while at work upon his employers' premises, received injuries, to recover damages for which this action was brought. The occurrence by which he was injured is thus described by the plaintiff, the only witness thereto: "On August 21, 1882, a pipe which was being fixed exploded, and threw me into the yard. I came around from the stills. If the stills don't run properly I have to see to the fires, and open the drafts. I saw two men standing there, but I didn't take any notice of what they were doing. I didn't hear that these men said anything to me. When I went into the tail-house I had a thermometer with me. Just as I was going to put it down, there was a terrible explosion, like the report of a gun, and threw me out of the tail-house, and the cap from my head, and my hair and my beard and everything was burned away. I didn't know then what I was doing. I ran out in my great fear, and the fire came flying out of the building." Upon cross-examination these questions were put and answered:

"Question. What was the pipe that exploded used for?

"Answer. Used for conducting the oil from the crude stills to the other stills.

"Q. Did the pipe which exploded run into the still-house where you were working?

"A. No.

"Q. Did your work have anything to do with that pipe?

"A. Nothing at all.

"Q. You have said that this pipe exploded; how do you know that?

"A. The walls had been thrown away, and one of the tanks was moved.

"Q. You mean that there was an explosion, but you don't know that the pipe exploded, do you?

"A. Perhaps somebody else would know that.

"Q. Did you see it?

"A. No, I didn't see that.

"Q. Don't you know that the pipe was not broken?

"A. I don't know whether it was broken.

"Q. Then you do not feel sure just what was the immediate cause of the accident, do you?

"A. I heard that the pipe exploded. Some people told me that this pipe exploded, and that it had been taken away from its original position and put into another position.

"Q. Then all you know about the explosion is that an explosion occurred, and somebody told you that this pipe exploded, and therefore you think that was so?

"A. Yes.

"Q. If oil leaks into the ground it generally forms a gas, don't it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And that gas, if it comes in contact with the fire, will explode?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Those pipes frequently get to leaking, don't they?

"A. They don't leak very often; sometimes, yes, a little.

"Q. Were not these two men that you speak of trying to find out what was the matter, and where the leak was?

"A. I didn't see anything about that.

"Q. Who were these two men?

"A. Tom Winter and Mike Bernard.

"Q. Isn't it likely that the explosion was caused by gas formed from the oil which saturated the earth, and which gas came in contact with the fire, and then exploded?

"A. I cannot insist upon that."

The foregoing is all of the testimony which, at the close of the plaintiff's case, had been given as to the occurrence of the accident, or that in any way bore upon the negligence of the defendants in respect to it.

In this state of the proofs the trial court directed a nonsuit, upon the ground that a judgment against the defendants could not be sustained by this evidence. The main stress of the argument before us to take off this nonsuit was upon the duty which an employer owes to his servants, a subject to which plaintiff's brief was almost wholly directed, and in respect to which conclusions were reached in entire harmony with the accepted rule of law, viz., that employers must adopt and maintain all reasonable means for the safety of their servants while at work. The plaintiff's case, however, was withdrawn from the jury not from any misapprehension as to this rule of law, but because there was, in the opinion of the trial court, no testimony as to any fact by which the conduct of these employers towards this servant could be ascertained. When, in an action for negligence, the standard of duty can be predicated as matter of law, the only question for the jury is whether the conduct of the defendant fell short of that standard. What the conduct of the defendant was must appear in the case. If, from the facts in evidence, two inferences as to the defendants' conduct may legitimately be drawn, one favorable and the other unfavorable to its negligence, a question is presented which calls for the opinion of a jury. If, however, there is no proof of any fact by which the conduct of the defendant can be ascertained, there is nothing for a jury to pass upon. In the present case, giving to the plaintiff's testimony its fullest significance, the only inculpatory circumstance is that an explosion occurred which injured the plaintiff while he was at work upon the defendants' premises. The case, therefore, presents in the most direct manner the question whether proof of the occurrence of an accident raises a presumption of negligence.

The principle is quite institutional that whenever a right of action springs from the conduct of a defendant the plaintiff must present proof of the facts necessary to the recovery which he seeks. It is furthermore the general rule of law that the mere proof of the occurrence of an accident raises no presumption of negligence. These doctrines, which, if strictly applied, would lead to a nonsuit in every case in which the plaintiff's proof failed to demonstrate the specific act of negligence which he deemed the proximate cause of his injuries, have in practice an application which, while not losing sight of their normal character, leads to an intelligent adaptation in keeping with the requirements of the modern law of negligence. It may safely be asserted that no other department of jurisprudence presents so marked an illustration of the growth of a simple rule of conduct into a principle so wide-spread in its application to relationships which have grown and must continue to become more and more complex. A single illustration will suffice: The employment of each new mechanical force in commerce or manufacture must tend not only to increase the already existing complexity of these relationships, but also to give rise to new and peculiar duties, which, in turn, must be met by rules of law characterized not by novelty in principle, but by flexibility in application. That the development of the law of negligence has been, in these respects, both harmonious and consistent, evinces the soundness of the foundations upon which it rests. Keeping pace with the law whose function it is thus to declare the nature of the duties arising from these new relationships, there has been a corresponding growth in the...