Bahringer v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc.
Decision Date | 29 April 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 2:12–cv–1473–DCN.,2:12–cv–1473–DCN. |
Citation | 942 F.Supp.2d 585 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Parties | Thomas A. BAHRINGER, Plaintiff, v. ADT SECURITY SERVICES, INC., Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Brooks Roberts Fudenberg, Brooks R. Fudenberg Law Office, Geoffrey H. Waggoner, Geoffrey H. Waggoner Law Office, Mt. Pleasant, SC, for Plaintiff.
Diane Summers Clarke, II, Morris Dawes Cooke, Jr., Barnwell Whaley Patterson and Helms, Charleston, SC, for Defendant.
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment brought by defendant ADT Security Services, Inc. (“ADT”). For the reasons that follow, the court grants in part and denies in part ADT's motion.
On April 26, 2012, plaintiff Thomas Bahringer filed a civil complaint against ADT in the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County. ADT removed the action to this court on June 4, 2012, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. ADT moved to dismiss Bahringer's complaint on June 11, 2012, and Bahringer amended his complaint shortly thereafter. Bahringer's amended complaint alleges four causes of action against ADT: negligence, breach of contract, unfair trade practices under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (“SCUTPA”), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14–31. All of Bahringer's claims relate to a house fire that went undetected by ADT, his alarm services provider. Id. ¶¶ 6–8.
Bahringer is significantly handicapped and is confined to a wheelchair. Id. ¶ 4. On or around April 2, 2010, Bahringer purchased a security system and monitoring services from ADT. Id. At the time of purchase, Bahringer signed an alarm services contract with ADT's authorized dealer, Securewatch. Id.; Def.'s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings Ex. A. On July 9, 2011, Bahringer's home was partially destroyed by a fire. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Bahringer was rescued by neighbors, but suffered smoke inhalation injuries that required “two weeks of hospitalization and treatment.” Id. ¶ 7. Bahringer alleges that his ADT-monitored smoke detectors failed to alert either him or ADT to the fire; indeed, ADT was unaware of the fire until Bahri nger notified them after the fact. Id. ¶¶ 6–8. ADT did not receive any signals from the smoke detectors in Bahringer's house on the night of the fire. Def.'s Reply in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. Exs. B, C, D.
ADT timely answered the amended complaint. On October 26, 2012, ADT moved for motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the parties referenced important documents that were not attached to the pleadings, the court converted the motion into one for summary judgment and allowed time for additional briefing. ADT filed the instant motion for summary judgment on February 4, 2013, and Bahringer opposed the motion on February 18, 2013. A hearing was held on March 27, 2013, and the matter is now ripe for the court's review.
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
ADT contends that judgment must be granted in its favor on all four causes of action included in the amended complaint.
ADT argues that Bahringer's negligence claim must fail because ADT did not owe Bahringer any duty independent of the duties owed under the alarm services contract. Bahringer counters that a special relationship existed between the parties—and therefore an extra-contractual duty was owed—because he is a wheelchair-bound double amputee. At the very least, Bahringer argues, whether such a special relationship exists is a factual question that must be resolved at trial.
As an initial matter, the court notes that the question of whether a special relationship existed between Bahringer and ADT is not a factual one. The parties agree that Bahringer is paraplegic, and that he contracted with ADT for its alarm services. What must be determined is whether ADT's obligations to Bahringer constitute a “special relationship” under South Carolina law. That is a legal question reserved for the court.
Generally, under South Carolina law,
[A] negligence action will not lie when the parties are in privity of contract. When, however, there is a special relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the injured party not arising in contract, the breach of that duty of care will support a tort action.
Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C. 49, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1995). Examples of such special relationships include those between design professionals and general contractors who work under their supervision, id. at 89 ( ), between lawyers and their clients, Lloyd v. Walters, 276 S.C. 223, 277 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1981) ( ), and between corporate consultants and a state agency that is the subject of a report prepared by those consultants. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 346 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1986) ( ). “A buyer-seller relationship does not constitute a ‘special relationship....’ ” Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. v. Honeywell, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 1401, 1414 (D.S.C.1996), aff'd,113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir.1997).
In the examples above, the South Carolina Supreme Court has found a special relationship where the parties' relationship was one marked by professional duty, as in Lloyd or Booz–Allen & Hamilton, or by supervisor-supervisee relations, as in Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing. Bahringer's relationship with ADT does not fit into either of these categories. Moreover, other courts that have considered the issue have determined that a tort claim does not lie where an alarm services provider owes a contractual duty to monitor a plaintiff's premises. See, e.g., Spengler v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 505 F.3d 456, 458 (6th Cir.2007) ( ); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 10–cv–3066, 2011 WL 855874, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011) ( ).
The amended complaint alleges that ADT acted negligently by installing an alarm system that did not function properly, improperly installing and monitoring the alarm system, and failing to take proper action at the first sign that a fire had started in Mr. Bahringer's home. These allegations are all thinly veiled breach of contract claims which cannot stand as a separate negligence claim. SeeSeebaldt v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 269 S.C. 691, 239 S.E.2d 726, 727 (1977) (); Koontz v. Thomas, 333 S.C. 702, 511 S.E.2d 407, 412 (S.C.Ct.App.1999) ().
Bahringer has not explained how or why ADT's duties to him may be any different than they would be to an able-bodied customer. Because the court finds that no special relationship existed between the parties, Bahringer's negligence claim fails.
ADT contends that it did not breach its alarm services contract with Bahringer and that any relief offered to Bahringer must be capped by the liability limitations included in the contract.
The parties have not offered explanations as to how and why Bahringer's alarm system malfunctioned. As a result, questions of material fact persist as to whether ADT breached the alarm services contract with Bahringer and summary judgment is inappropriate. However, the contract clearly limits ADT's liability for any breach that it may have committed, and the court holds that ADT's liability is limited to $500, the amount identified in the alarm services contract.
South Carolina courts have generally upheld exculpatory contracts. However, contracts that seek to exculpate a party from liability for its own negligence are strictly construed against the party relying thereon. McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting Range, Inc., 364 S.C. 242, 612 S.E.2d 462, 465 (S.C.Ct.App.2005) (citingPride v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 244 S.C. 615, 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1964)). “An exculpatory clause will never be construed to exempt a party from liability for his own negligence ‘in the absence of explicit language clearly indicating that such was the intent of the parties.’ ” McCune, 612 S.E.2d at 465 (quoting S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 283 S.C. 182, 322 S.E.2d 453, 458 (S.C.Ct.A...
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