Baier v. Rohr-Mont Motors, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 12 C 8234
• Citation: 175 F.Supp.3d 1000
• Parties: Terry A. Baier, Plaintiff, v. Rohr-Mont Motors, Inc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

175 F.Supp.3d 1000

Terry A. Baier, Plaintiff,
v.
Rohr-Mont Motors, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 12 C 8234

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 30, 2016

175 F.Supp.3d 1005

Annemarie Elizabeth Kill, Avery Camerlingo Kill, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Glenn R. Gaffney, Jolianne Stacey-Leigh Walters, Justin R. Gaffney, Gaffney & Gaffney PC, Glendale Heights, IL, James P. Buchholz, Tourkow Crell Rosenblatt & Johnson, LLP, Diana Carol Bauer, Trier Law Office, Fort Wayne, IN, William George Hutul, William G. Hutul, P.C., Carol Stream, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John Robert Blakey, United States District Judge

This matter concerns an employment dispute between Plaintiff Terry Baier and his former employer.¹ It was resolved by a jury trial ending June 12, 2015. Currently

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before the Court are: (1) Defendants' motion for remittitur and for judgment as a matter of law, [136]; (2) Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the verdict, [139]; (3) Plaintiff's motion for equitable relief, [140]; (4) Plaintiff's petition for attorneys' fees and costs, [138]; and (5) Plaintiff's motion to strike, [189].

I. Background

On October 15, 2012, Plaintiff sued his former employer, Oakbrook Toyota, and two former supervisors, John Barrett and Alex Syed. See [1]. That lawsuit sought to address several incidents that occurred during Plaintiff's employment with Oakbrook Toyota; and it eventually went to trial in June of 2015. Plaintiff raised the following causes of action with the jury: (1) violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) for failure to provide notice; (2) violation of the FMLA for failure to allow a reduced leave schedule; (3) retaliation under the FMLA; (4) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and (5) defamation. After a two-week trial, the jury found:

The parties filed their post-trial motions on July 7, 2015. Those motions are now fully briefed and will be addressed in turn below.

II. Defendants' Motion for Remittitur and Judgment as a Matter of Law

This motion makes two requests. First, Defendant Oakbrook Toyota seeks a remittitur lowering the damage award for Plaintiff's successful ADA claim. The Court construes that request as a motion to alter judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. , 532 U.S. 424, 433, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001) (it is the district court's job to “determine, by reference to federal standards developed under Rule 59, whether a...remittitur should be ordered”). Second, Defendant Barrett requests judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a) and (b) regarding Plaintiff's defamation claim. The Court will address each issue separately.

A. Remittitur

The jury awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages and $1,300,000 in punitive

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damages on Plaintiff's ADA claim. Defendant Oakbrook Toyota requests a remittitur capping those damages at either $50,000 or $100,000, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows for post-trial motions to alter or amend a judgment, including by way of remittitur. See Degorski v. Wilson , No. 04 CV 3367, 2014 WL 3511220, at *1 (N.D.Ill. July 16, 2014). Rule 59(e) motions, however, may not be used to present new theories or arguments that could and should have been presented earlier, or to present evidence for the first time that was available earlier. LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. , 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir.1995) ; U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Custom Companies, Inc. , No. 02 C 3768, 2007 WL 1810495, at *1 (N.D.Ill. June 21, 2007).

In deciding Rule 59(e) motions, the Seventh Amendment requires that the Court “accord substantial deference to the jury's assessment” of damages. Spina v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty. , 207 F.Supp.2d 764, 771 (N.D.Ill.2002) (citing Ramsey v. Am. Air Filter Co. , 772 F.2d 1303, 1313 (7th Cir.1985) ). Nevertheless, “the court must also ensure that the award is supported by competent evidence.” Ramsey , 772 F.2d at 1313. If the Court finds that damages are excessive, the proper remedy is remittitur rather than a new trial. RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 563 F.Supp.2d 832, 835 (N.D.Ill.2008).²

Defendant Oakbrook Toyota argues for a remittitur based on the statutory cap on damages found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Section 1981a(b)(3) imposes the following limits on total punitive and compensatory damages available for claims of intentional discrimination under the ADA: (1) for a respondent with 15-100 employees, damages shall not exceed $50,000; (2) for a respondent with 101-200 employees, damages shall not exceed $100,000; (3) for a respondent with 201-500 employees, damages shall not exceed $200,000; and (4) for a respondent with more than 500 employees, damages shall not exceed $300,000. Plaintiff agrees that Section 1981a(b)(3) governs the damage award here, but disputes the number of employees at issue.

Defendants claim that Oakbrook Toyota had either 15-100 or 101-200 employees. Plaintiff disagrees, advancing an argument it has not yet presented throughout the course of this litigation. Plaintiff argues that, under Worth v. Tyer , 276 F.3d 249, 259–60 (7th Cir.2001) and other cases, all the employees of the Bob Rohrman Auto Group (“BRAG”) should be considered employees of Oakbrook Toyota because BRAG directed the misconduct of Oakbrook Toyota. Plaintiff therefore claims that Oakbrook Toyota had more than 500 employees for purposes of the statutory cap.

Plaintiff's argument fails because it includes new theories and evidence that were not presented at any time prior to judgment in this matter. See Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, Ill. , 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir.2007). Section 1981a(b)(3) caps damages based on the employees of the “respondent.” Under Section 1981a, the “respondent” is the entity against whom the “action [is] brought by a complaining party.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a). Here, Plaintiff did not name BRAG as a respondent, or give any other indication that BRAG's relationship to Oakbrook Toyota would be significant. Plaintiff named Oakbrook Toyota as the respondent in both his EEOC Charge of Discrimination, [14] at Ex. A,

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and his Complaint. [14] at ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff did not name BRAG in either document, nor did he give any indication that BRAG's alleged role would be relevant in any way. Id . Further, Plaintiff specifically noted in his Complaint that Oakbrook Toyota had over 100 employees; and in his EEOC Charge he wrote that it had 15-100 employees. Id . Plaintiff provided no information about the number of BRAG employees. Id . In fact, at no point in this litigation did Plaintiff give any indication that the role of BRAG in directing the conduct complained of, or the number of BRAG employees, would be at issue. The argument that Oakbrook Toyota's employees should include those of BRAG was raised for the first time in Plaintiff's post-trial pleadings. Because Plaintiff gave no indication that the alleged role of BRAG would be relevant, Defendants had no opportunity in discovery to develop evidence negating Plaintiff's argument. To allow Plaintiff to aggregate employees here, when Defendants have had no chance or reason to develop evidence in support of a counter-argument, would be contrary to law and patently unfair.

Additionally, the authority relied on by Plaintiff to support his aggregation argument is distinguishable from the facts here. In those cases, both the parent company and the subsidiary/affiliate were specifically named as defendants in the lawsuit. See Worth , 276 F.3d at 259–260 ; Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc. , 166 F.3d 937, 940–942 (7th Cir.1999) ; Custom Companies, Inc. , 2007 WL 1810495, at *11–17. Plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that he should be allowed to add a new respondent after the verdict when: (1) he gave no prior indication he would seek to aggregate the employees of the new respondent; and (2) Defendants had no opportunity to develop evidence countering Plaintiff's aggregation approach.

In fact, persuasive case law from other Circuits squarely forbids Plaintiff's approach here. See Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc. , 680 F.Supp.2d 544 (S.D.N.Y.2010) ; Parrish v. Sollecito , 280 F.Supp.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y.2003). In both Mugavero and Parrish, the plaintiffs sought to aggregate the employees of non-defendant affiliates at the post-trial motion stage for purposes of Section 1981a. The court in each instance denied that argument, holding that it was unfair to add a new “respondent” in the post-trial briefs. Id .

Without aggregation, Defendants argue that Oakbrook Toyota had 95-116 employees during the relevant time frame. In their Answer, however, the Defendants admitted that they had more than 100 employees. [33] at ¶ 7. They are bound by their judicial admission and may not introduce evidence to the contrary. Help at Home, Inc. v. Medical Capital, L.L.C. , 260 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir.2001) ; Spina v. Forest Pres. of Cook Cty. , No. 98 C 1393, 2001 WL 1491524,...