Bailey v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 09 July 1872
• Citation: 25 Mich. 185
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Ann Bailey v. John A. Bailey and others

25 Mich. 185

Ann Bailey v. John A. Bailey and others

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 9, 1872

Heard May 2, 1872

Error to Ingham Circuit.

This was an appeal by Ann Bailey, from the order of distribution of the estate of Joseph C. Bailey, deceased, granted by the Probate Court for Ingham County. On the trial of the appeal in the circuit court, the order of the probate court was affirmed, and the cause is brought to this court on writ of error.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

S. F Seager and J. D. Conely, for plaintiff in error.

Dart & Wiley and G. V. N. Lothrop, for defendants in error.

Campbell J. Christiancy, Ch. J., and Cooley, J., concurred. Graves J., did not sit in this case.

OPINION

Campbell, J.

The question presented by the record arises under the will of the deceased, and it becomes necessary to determine whether the widow of the testator is entitled to take an interest in his property not specifically devised, as in case of intestacy, or whether her claim is confined to the property and interests distinctly and expressly given to her. The whole controversy turns on the construction of the will, and the present appeal is from an order of distribution made contrary to the claim of the widow.

The testator left a widow, but no descendants. Under the statutes in force at the time of his death, she would have been entitled, in case of intestacy, to a life interest in the lands of the deceased, and an absolute right to his personal property after payment of debts. The personal property here is said to be exhausted, and the real estate is the only property to be affected.

The will contains a few bequests and devises which are as follows:

First. A devise is made to the widow, of a homestead in Lansing, consisting of eleven city lots, "for and during her natural life, and thereafter to my lawful heirs." It is stated tat the title is held under a certificate of purchase from the State, and not fully paid for. The executors are directed to pay the balance out of money or personal property, if sufficient, and if not sufficient, out of the avails of other real estate, "and that thereupon a patent be issued to my said wife during her natural life, as aforesaid, with remainder to my lawful heirs, my executor paying the taxes thereon, and upon the property above described, at all times."

Second. A lot is devised to testator's sister, Azuah Russell, "for and during her natural life, or so long as she shall live in and occupy the same as a residence, as at present, but no longer."

Third. Testator bequeaths to his widow, "all my household furniture, and all the personal property therein, together with all my wearing apparel." And out of the remainder of his real and personal property, after payment of debts and expenses, he bequeaths to her an annuity of four hundred dollars per year, for life, the first quarterly payment to be at the end of three months from his death.

Fourth. He gives his sister, Elizabeth Bailey, an annuity of two hundred dollars per year, for life, to be in lieu of any obligation she may hold against him. Then follows the clause in controversy, as follows: "Leaving the rest, residue and remainder of all my estate and effects, real and personal, as aforesaid, after payment of debts, legacies and funeral expenses, and other charges, to descend to my lawful heirs according to law."

The facts supposed to bear upon the will, and aid in determining the intent of the testator, were the age of the testator and wife--she being forty-nine and he fifty-two years old; the proximity of his kindred, being brothers and sisters, and issue of deceased brothers and sisters; and the value of the estate, estimated at from fifty to seventy-five thousand dollars.

Mrs. Bailey has received the annuity and occupied the homestead. The personal property was not sufficient to pay debts, and some real estate has been sold for that purpose.

There is not much in these circumstances to throw light on the will. And we are compelled, in seeking the intention of the testator, to derive it mainly if not entirely, from the tenor of the instrument itself. In reading that document we are bound, if possible, to carry out the real design of the testator, as derived from a comparison of all its parts, and the meaning of all its words and phrases must, if possible, be harmonized. Beyond this a court can not lawfully wander into conjectures. We can only determine what the testator meant, by what he said.

The word "heirs" is not, taken by itself, conclusive as to the persons intended to take. It may, doubtless, have a broad or a narrow meaning, according as the one or the other is indicated by the context. The definitions in the text books are broad enough to include such a life...