Bailey v. Bayer Cropscience L.P.

Decision Date09 April 2009
Docket NumberNo. 07-3699.,07-3699.
Citation563 F.3d 302
PartiesCarl W. BAILEY, Appellant, v. BAYER CROPSCIENCE L.P.; Greg Moorer;<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Jamie Jackson, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Joni Suzanne Cole, argued, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Brian N. Woolley, argued, Jack D. Rowe, on the brief, Kansas City, MO, for appellee.

Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Carl W. Bailey, Sr. (Bailey) filed suit against Bayer CropScience (BCS) in Missouri state court, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). BCS removed the case to federal court. Bailey subsequently moved to amend the complaint by adding two additional defendants. Bailey did not notify the court such joinder would destroy diversity. The district court2 permitted joinder, and Bailey then moved to remand due to lack of jurisdiction. Upon learning the joinder destroyed diversity, the district court reconsidered its prior decision, and dismissed the joined defendants. BCS moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the motion. Bailey now appeals, alleging (1) the district court abused its discretion in dismissing a properly joined defendant, and (2) the district court erred in granting summary judgment. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Bailey, an African-American male, worked for BCS, a pesticide manufacturing facility located in Kansas City, Missouri, from August 1996 until December 2003. In August 2001, BCS moved Bailey from the production area to security. Bailey claims he was demoted due to a low score he received on an aptitude test. BCS contends Bailey was transferred, along with eight other employees, because there was not enough work on the production line. Bailey alleges he repeatedly asked to see his test score, but was not permitted to see his score until December 19, 2001. Bailey asserts the confrontation which led to this lawsuit occurred forty-five minutes after Bailey received his test score.

Both parties agree Gregory Moerer (Moerer), a BCS manager, and Jamie Jackson (Jackson), a Human Resources representative, contacted Bailey on December 19, 2001, and asked him to meet with them in the personnel office. During that meeting, Jackson and Moerer told Bailey someone accused Bailey of sexual harassment. Bailey became very upset and started frantically guessing who made the complaint. Jackson and Moerer then implied the person who made the allegation was not a female. In response, Bailey asked, "Are you trying to say I'm gay?" and Jackson allegedly shrugged his shoulders. Jackson and Moerer eventually informed Bailey another BCS employee, Michael Shipley (Shipley), made the allegation. During the course of this litigation, Shipley submitted an affidavit in which he denied ever making a complaint of sexual harassment against Bailey. The December 19, 2001, meeting lasted less than twenty minutes, and throughout the meeting, Bailey was emotional, which included yelling, swearing, and crying. When the meeting was over, BCS granted Bailey several days off work, with pay, to compose himself. Bailey alleges the purpose of the meeting was to punish him for demanding to see his test score.

Bailey claims when he returned to work, several co-workers knew something about the allegations despite Moerer's assurances the incident would remain confidential. Some of these co-workers were supportive, while others began to treat Bailey differently. On one occasion, Bailey felt as though he had to shower in a separate locker room to avoid the reaction of other male employees. Bailey also began regularly to suffer panic attacks. When Bailey sought treatment, he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). His symptoms included depression, fear, flashbacks, nightmares, memory loss, confusion, and psychotic episodes. Bailey continued to work at BCS and was later transferred, along with eight other employees, back to the production area. Bailey received the highest possible rating for his work performance when he was evaluated at the end of 2001.

In August 2002, Bailey suffered a severe panic attack while at work. As a result, the BCS medical department advised him to seek further treatment and not to return to work until he was released by his psychiatrist. Bailey continued with treatment and medication and was placed on paid medical leave. Bailey remained off work receiving company disability payments and other benefits until December 2003. At that time, Bailey's benefits expired and he was offered an open position at BCS. Bailey declined the offer to return to work and his employment was terminated.

Bailey initially filed suit against BCS on February 17, 2006, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County Missouri, alleging IIED.3 BCS, the only named defendant, removed the action to federal court. On March 15, 2007, over one year after the action was filed and removed, Bailey moved to amend his complaint by adding Jackson and Moerer as defendants. Bailey did not inform the district court such joinder would destroy diversity jurisdiction, and the court granted Bailey's motion to amend. Less than a month later, when Bailey moved for remand to state court, the district court learned Moerer's presence in the suit destroyed diversity jurisdiction. The district court reconsidered its earlier decision granting Bailey's motion to amend and denied the motion. Both Moerer and Jackson were dismissed without prejudice and Bailey was granted leave to join Jackson, so long as Jackson's presence would not destroy diversity. With diversity jurisdiction restored, the district court denied Bailey's motion to remand.

On August 15, 2007, BCS filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted BCS's motion, explaining Bailey failed to create a genuine issue of material fact to suggest the behavior of BCS employees rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Joinder

Bailey argues the district court abused its discretion by (1) reconsidering its previous joinder decision granting Bailey's motion to amend his complaint, (2) subsequently denying the motion, (3) dismissing Moerer and Jackson from the action, and (4) denying Bailey's motion to remand. When a plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint before trial, "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). "[P]ermission to amend may be withheld if the plaintiff ... is guilty of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or if permission to amend would unduly prejudice the opposing party." Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 224 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)). "The trial court's decision whether to allow amendment will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion." Id. "We review the district court's denial of the remand motion de novo." Menz v. New Holland North America, Inc., 440 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.2006).

First, we must consider whether the district court could reconsider Bailey's motion to amend his complaint. Several courts hold, when a trial court grants a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint by naming additional defendants, and the plaintiff fails to inform the court that one or more of those defendants will destroy diversity, the trial court may reconsider its earlier decision. See, e.g., Faye v. High's of Baltimore, 541 F.Supp.2d 752, 756-58 (D.Md.2008) (listing cases). In Le Duc v. Bujake, 777 F.Supp. 10, 11-12 (E.D.Mo. 1991) (citing Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir.1987)), the court explained,

Where, as here, the record indicates that the problem of the addition of the non-diverse defendant was not brought to the attention of the Court or recognized by the parties, the filing of the amended complaint should be considered a nullity and the Court given an opportunity to consider whether justice requires that [the plaintiff] be permitted to join [the additional] defendant.

In the present case, the district court granted Bailey's motion to amend his complaint and permitted Bailey to name two additional defendants without the court realizing such joinder destroyed the court's diversity jurisdiction. When the district court discovered the joinder defeated diversity jurisdiction, the court had discretionary authority to reconsider and reverse its previous joinder decision.

Second, we must determine whether the district court abused its discretion when, upon reconsideration, it denied Bailey's motion to amend. When an action is removed from state to federal court, and "after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Joinder would be required if the plaintiff satisfied Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 by showing that the new parties are necessary and indispensable to a full resolution of the case. The plaintiff must first satisfy Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a) by showing the new parties are necessary to a full resolution of the case. Joinder of Moerer and Jackson under Rule 19(a) is not required because their absence would not impair the court's ability to accord complete relief between Bailey and BCS, and neither Moerer nor Jackson have claimed an interest relating to the subject of the action.

Even if Moerer and Jackson were determined to be necessary parties under Rule 19(a), they are not indispensable parties pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). If a potential defendant, whose joinder would destroy jurisdiction, is determined to be indispensable, the district court must either permit joinder and grant remand under § 1447(e), or dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 19(b). Only when the potential defendant is deemed dispensable may the district court deny joinder and retain jurisdiction over the action. "The determination of whether or not a person is an...

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