Bailey v. Bayles, No. 20010304.

• Court: Supreme Court of Utah
• Writing for the Court: RUSSON, Justice
• Citation: 52 P.3d 1158,2002 UT 58
• Decision Date: 25 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 20010304.
• Parties: Jeroldene BAILEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randee BAYLES, Defendant and Petitioner.

52 P.3d 1158
2002 UT 58

Jeroldene BAILEY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Randee BAYLES, Defendant and Petitioner

No. 20010304.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 25, 2002.

52 P.3d 1159

Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for plaintiff

Matthew Hilton, Springville, for defendant.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

RUSSON, Justice:

¶ 1 On writ of certiorari, defendant Randee Bayles ("Bayles") seeks reversal of the Utah Court of Appeals' affirmation of the issuance of a protective order against him on grounds and facts different than and supplemental to those found and relied upon by the trial court and annulment of the protective order.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Bayles was married to Jeroldene Bailey ("Bailey") for twenty-seven years. In January 1997, they separated and divorced. On July 7, 1998, Bailey filed a verified petition for a protective order and sought an ex parte protective order against Bayles. Bailey alleged that Bayles, for a period of a year and a half since their separation, had "been engaged in stalking" her. Bailey brought the request for an ex parte protective order and the verified petition on her own behalf but also named Jeff Bailey, her current husband, and Sharo Burtenshaw, one of Bailey's three

52 P.3d 1160

daughters from her marriage with Bayles, as persons within the scope of the protective order. The trial court issued an ex parte protective order based on the verified petition on the same day the petition was filed

¶ 3 Approximately six months later, Bayles moved the trial court to dismiss or deny the ex parte protective order on the basis that it had expired, that it was overly broad in its inclusion of Jeff Bailey and Sharo Burtenshaw, and that the facts did not demonstrate that a protective order was warranted. Bayles also moved the trial court in the alternative to strike Jeff Bailey and Sharo Burtenshaw, arguing that they did not come within the statutory provisions of the Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 to -14 (1999), the statute under which the ex parte order was issued and the verified petition was filed. In response to Bayles' motions, Bailey moved the trial court for a final hearing on her verified petition for a protective order and asked that the ex parte protective order be made permanent. Both parties submitted memoranda of law in connection with these motions and briefed the issues of law under the Cohabitant Abuse Act.

I. TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION

¶ 4 The trial court denied Bayles' motions and found that both Jeff Bailey and Sharo Burtenshaw fell within the Cohabitant Abuse Act's provisions as designated family members. At the same time, the trial court granted Bailey's motion for a final hearing and set a date for a bench trial.

¶ 5 The trial court heard testimony and accepted evidence over the course of three days. Both Bayles and Bailey were present and represented by counsel during the bench trial. In August 1999, the trial court issued a memorandum decision and ordered that the protective order against Bayles be made permanent. In its memorandum decision, the trial court concluded that Bayles had committed an act of domestic violence against Bailey by stalking her. The trial court explicitly relied on two statutory provisions in reaching its conclusion. First, the trial court looked to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (1999), the Utah criminal stalking statute, to determine that Bayles had been stalking Bailey. Having determined that Bayles' conduct met the requirements of that statute and that Bayles therefore had stalked Bailey, the trial court then relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(2)(i) (1999), the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, to conclude that Bayles had committed an act of domestic violence against Bailey by stalking her. The trial court did not explicitly rely on the provisions of the Cohabitant Abuse Act in its memorandum decision. The trial court supported its conclusions of law and its decision that the ex parte protective order should be made permanent with somewhat limited yet specific findings of fact.¹ Bayles appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.

52 P.3d 1161

II. COURT OF APPEALS DISPOSITION

¶ 6 On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Bayles challenged the sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact in support of its conclusion that Bayles had committed an act of domestic violence based on stalking. Bayles argued that the trial court had grounded its conclusion that he had stalked Bailey on the provision of the criminal stalking statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2), and that Bailey had failed to meet her burden of proof under that statute. In affirming the trial court's grant of a permanent protective order, the court of appeals, while agreeing with Bayles that the trial court had relied on the criminal stalking statute for its conclusion, decided that it did not need to reach the sufficiency of the evidence as to the trial court's conclusion on this ground. Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d 1129. Instead, the court of appeals decided to affirm the trial court's decision on alternate grounds under Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-2(1) (1999). Bailey, 2001 UT App 34 at ¶¶ 10-11, 18 P.3d 1129. Using this alternate ground, the court of appeals determined that the trial court's ultimate conclusion that a permanent protective order should issue was supported by the specific findings of the trial court and the undisputed evidence. Id. at ¶ 10.

III. WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¶ 7 Bayles filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this court, seeking review of the decision of the court of appeals. We granted the petition. In this appeal, Bayles raises two arguments. First, Bayles argues that the court of appeals deprived him of his rights of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution by denying him timely and adequate notice and opportunity to be heard when it affirmed the trial court's decision on alternate legal grounds and found and relied upon additional facts not found by the trial court. Second, Bayles similarly argues that the court of appeals in the same way and for the same reasons deprived him of his right of due course of law under article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. Bayles seeks to have the permanent protective order vacated.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 "When exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, `we review the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court.'" Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 17, 16 P.3d 1214 (quoting Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997)). We accord no particular deference to the court of appeals' ruling; we review for legal correctness. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, ¶ 4, 978 P.2d 460.

ANALYSIS

I. AFFIRM ON ANY GROUND

¶ 9 We first must address whether the court of appeals erred in affirming on alternate grounds and then whether the court of appeals denied Bayles due process of law by resorting to the "affirm on any ground" rule. Bayles contends that he was deprived of his fundamental right to timely and adequate notice and opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way when the court of appeals chose to affirm on alternate grounds the trial court's issuance of a permanent protective order against him. Bayles argues that he was unfairly surprised by and unable to adequately respond to the novel legal theory relied upon by the court of appeals when it affirmed on alternate grounds.

¶ 10 It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from

"if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court."

52 P.3d 1162

Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 n. 2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969) (citation and emphasis omitted)); see also Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (applying Limb); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 714 (1993) ("Generally, the appellate court may affirm the judgment where it is correct on any legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason, or theory adopted by the trial court."). Moreover, "[a] party to an appeal does not have a constitutional right to have a cause of action decided on a particular ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995)

¶ 11 Bayles raises in this appeal the same issue we previously decided in DeBry when he argues that the court of appeals denied him due process of law by affirming the trial court's decision on an alternate ground. In DeBry, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Id. The DeBrys argued before this court that they had been denied procedural due process because the court of appeals based its affirmance on an issue that was not briefed or presented to the court of appeals or to the trial court. Id. We rejected the DeBrys' due process argument and held that the "affirm on any ground" rule "does not deprive a party of due process."² Id.

¶ 12 Bayles has not provided us with any cogent reason to abandon our holding in DeBry, and he certainly has not met the "substantial burden of persuasion" we require of "[t]hose asking us to overturn prior precedent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). Therefore, we will not revisit our settled precedent on this point but simply apply it to the present case.

¶ 13 As an initial matter in the case at hand, we do not find that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order on alternate grounds. As the rule states, an appellate court may...