Bailey v. Bayles
Decision Date | 01 February 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 990765-CA.,990765-CA. |
Citation | 2001 UT App 34,18 P.3d 1129 |
Parties | Jeroldene BAILEY, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Randee BAYLES, Respondent and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Matthew Hilton, Springville, for Appellant.
Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and THORNE.
¶ 1 Respondent/Appellant Randee Bayles appeals the trial court's decision granting Petitioner/Appellee Jeroldene Bailey's petition for a permanent protective order. We affirm.
¶ 2 In January of 1997, Bayles and Bailey, after twenty-seven years of marriage, separated and ultimately divorced. Bailey subsequently filed a Verified Petition for a Protective Order against Bayles. In the petition, Bailey alleged that following their separation Bayles had initiated a pattern of behavior intended to intimidate and cause her fear. Bailey's petition listed several specific incidents, which covered nearly four pages, and included repeated examples of unwanted and unnecessary contact initiated by Bayles.1 Bailey characterized Bayles's behavior as stalking, however, at no point did she file a criminal Stalking complaint against Bayles.2
¶ 3 In addition, Bailey's petition asserted that throughout the parties' marriage Bayles had physically, emotionally, and mentally abused her. In support of this claim, Bailey provided specific examples of abuse, including allegations that Bayles had at least twice threatened to kill her.
¶ 4 The trial court, after conducting several hearings concerning Bailey's petition, concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Bayles had "been stalking [Bailey] by intentionally or knowingly engaging in a course of conduct directed at [Bailey] that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress herself."
¶ 5 The trial court issued the following specific factual findings in support of its grant of the petition:
¶ 6 The trial court, after granting Bailey's petition, used the standard protective order form, and restricted Bayles from the following: (1) attempting, threatening, or committing any further domestic abuse against Bailey; (2) attempting, threatening, or committing further violence against Bailey's husband; (3) contacting, harassing, telephoning or otherwise communicating with Bailey; (4) trespassing at Bailey's place of residence; and (5) interfering with or appearing at Bailey's workplace.
¶ 7 Bayles appeals from the trial court's grant of a protective order.
¶ 8 Bayles argues that, because the trial court relied on Utah's criminal Stalking statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999), the trial court's findings do not satisfy the requisite burden of proof to prove that Bayles Stalked Bailey, and therefore, the order should be reversed and Bailey's petition dismissed.
¶ 9 However, while we agree that the trial court concluded Bayles had been Stalking Bailey, pursuant to section 76-5-106.5, we need not address the sufficiency of this conclusion. "It is well-established that [we] may affirm a `judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969)); see also Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah Ct. App.1990).3
¶ 10 Bayles argues that the trial court's factual findings do not support its conclusion that he had been Stalking Bailey following the parties separation and divorce. However, we need not address this argument. The issue now before this court is whether the trial court's decision to grant Bailey's petition for a protective order is supported by either the trial court's specific findings or the undisputed evidence. See Bagshaw, 788 P.2d at 1060.
¶ 11 Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-2(1) (1999) sets forth the requirements that a party must meet to obtain a protective order. In pertinent part, section 30-6-2(1) states:
Strollo, 828 P.2d at 534 (quoting Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989)).
¶ 12 Therefore, to obtain a protective order, Bailey was required only to demonstrate, (1) she is or was a cohabitant of the respondent, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(1) (1998)5; (2) she had suffered physical abuse or domestic violence, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1 (1999); and (3) she had an imminent fear of physical harm or, put another way, "`a present fear of future abuse.'" See Strollo, 828 P.2d at 534 (citation omitted).
¶ 13 In March and April of 1999, the trial court held evidentiary hearings on Bailey's petition for a protective order, after which the trial court concluded that, over the course of their twenty-seven year marriage, Bayles had pursued a pattern of physical violence that included pushing, slapping, and punching Bailey. The trial court also found that Bayles had both verbally and emotionally abused Bailey during their marriage— abuse that included Bayles putting a gun to Bailey's neck and telling her he could kill her at any time. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that Bayles had subjected Bailey to physical abuse and domestic violence.
¶ 14 The trial court also found that after the separation, (1) Bayles had repeatedly followed Bailey in his car, both while she was on foot and in her vehicle; and (2) Bayles had also repeatedly followed Bailey's current husband, conduct that included a potentially volatile incident on an isolated and deserted stretch of highway. Further, the trial court found that Bayles had twice threatened Bailey's life. Finally, in both her petition and during her testimony, Bailey clearly indicated to the trial court that she experienced a constant fear of Bayles, a fear that was aggravated with every incident. Based on Bailey's testimony, the trial court correctly concluded in its memorandum decision that Bailey's emotional distress was reasonable.
¶ 15 From the record before us, we conclude that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Bayles abused Bailey during their marriage. We further conclude Bailey presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that, following their separation, Bayles intentionally created in Bailey an imminent fear of physical harm. Finally, we conclude that Bayles's conduct—repeatedly following Bailey, following Bailey's husband, repeatedly calling Bailey's home and workplace, coupled with the evidence of past abuse—was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Bailey's fear was both reasonable and real. See Strollo, 828 P.2d at 535.
¶ 16 Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Bailey's petition and issuing the requested protective order.
¶ 18 Today we decide a case that was not presented to the trial court, not argued to the trial court, not decided by the trial court, and not briefed or argued to this court.6 The majority affirms the judgment of the trial court based on this court's power to "affirm on any ground." The genesis of the "affirm on any ground" approach in Utah is unclear,7 and current statements of...
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