Bailey v. Bell-Rich Transp., LLC
| Decision Date | 23 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-461-J-34JBT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | WESLEY N. BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. BELL-RICH TRANSPORTATION, LLC, and G&P TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Defendants. |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant G&P Trucking Company, Inc.'s, Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 36; Second Motion to Dismiss) filed on December 29, 2019. In the Second Motion to Dismiss, G&P Trucking Company, Inc. (G&P) seeks dismissal of Counts IV and V of Plaintiff Wesley N. Bailey's (Bailey) Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 35; Second Amended Complaint), which he filed on December 19, 2019. See generally Second Motion to Dismiss. Bailey filed Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant G&P Trucking Company, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 29; Response) on January 31, 2020. Accordingly, the matter is ripe for review.
Bailey's claims arise from a motor vehicle collision involving a tractor-trailer and an automobile that occurred in Lawtey, Bradford County, Florida, on June 11, 2015. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 11, 12. Bailey was a passenger in the automobile at the time of the collision. Id. Defendant Bell-Rich Transportation, LLC (Bell-Rich) owned the tractor, which was driven by Terry A. Hall (Hall). Id. at 6. G&P owned the trailer. Id. at 7, 8. According to Bailey, Defendants Bell-Rich and G&P "were contracted to deliver goods from South Carolina to Florida." Id. ¶ 5.
To recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the collision, Bailey initially filed suit against Bell-Rich and Hall on September 14, 2018, in Florida state court. See Notice of Removal, State Court Other Documents (Doc. 1-6; State Court Documents) at 1-4 (Original Complaint).2 After engaging in some discovery, on February 25, 2019, Bailey moved to file an amended complaint to add G&P as a defendant in the state court action. See State Court Other Documents at 46-47 (Motion to Amend Original Complaint) ¶¶ 2-4. On March 26, 2019, the state court granted Bailey's Motion to Amend Original Complaint. See Notice of Removal, State Court Docket Sheet (Doc. 1-5) at 1; State Court Other Documents at 82. In his state court Amended Complaint, Bailey alleged various Florida common law claims against Bell-Rich and G&P. See generally Amended Complaint (Doc. 3; Amended Complaint). With regard to G&P specifically, Bailey asserteda claim of respondeat superior in Count III, claims of negligence and vicarious liability in Count IV, and claims of negligent selection, hiring, and training in Count V. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 19-30.
On April 22, 2019, G&P removed the case to this Court, invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1).3 Then, on April 29, 2019, G&P filed a motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See generally Defendant G&P Trucking's Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 6; First Motion to Dismiss). In its First Motion to Dismiss, G&P presented two arguments under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). See generally id. First, G&P argued that Bailey failed to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6), because the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), preempted all of his claims. See First Motion to Dismiss at 1, 2-6. Second, G&P asserted that Counts IV and V of Bailey's Amended Complaint impermissibly violated Rule 10, and that Count V additionally violated Rule 8. See id. at 6-8. As to Rule 10, G&P noted that in Count IV, Bailey improperly commingled claims of direct negligence and vicarious liability, and as to Count V, G&P argued that Bailey impermissibly commingled distinct claims of negligent selection, hiring, and training. See id. at 6-7. Regarding Rule 8, G&P pointed out that Bailey failed to identify any actions taken by G&P which would support his claims of negligent selection, hiring, and training. See id. at 8.
See First Response at 7. In an Order entered October 29, 2019, the Court advised Bailey that the inclusion of a request for affirmative relief in a response rather than filing a motion requesting that relief was improper. See Doc. 28 at 1. Accordingly, the Court denied the First Response to the extent Bailey sought affirmative relief, and expressly directed Bailey to file an appropriate motion under the Rules if he believed that a second amended complaint would cure the alleged deficiencies identified by G&P.4 See id. at 2. However, Bailey elected not to file a motion for leave to amend his Amended Complaint.
The Court set a hearing on G&P's First Motion to Dismiss for December 11, 2019. See Notice of Hearing (Doc. 29). Bailey's counsel who had drafted the Amended Complaint and who had responded to the First Motion to Dismiss did not attend the hearing and instead sent another attorney. See Transcript of Motion Hearing held on December 11, 2019 (Doc. 49; Hearing Tr.) at 4:3-7, 11-22; see also Amended Complaint at 7. Early in the proceeding, the attorney present at the hearing explained he had only recently begun working on the case. See id. at 5:6-13. In response, and anticipating that Bailey's primary counsel would ultimately be addressing the pleading deficiencies to be discussed in thehearing, the Court suggested to Bailey's counsel who attended the hearing that he take "very, very, very careful notes, or that [he] order a transcript from the hearing." See id. at 5:25-6:3.5
The Court then engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding the substantial pleading deficiencies of the Amended Complaint. See generally Hearing Tr. For example, the Court noted that Count III of the Amended Complaint was "nothing more than two legal conclusions unsupported by any well-pled allegations of fact and an allegation of damages," and as such failed to state any plausible claim. Id. at 11:15-18. Indeed, the Court agreed with G&P's assessment that the Amended Complaint was a hodgepodge of conclusory allegations and labels with no factual support, such that G&P could not begin to frame a responsive pleading. Id. at 10:3-9. Additionally, the Court determined that Count IV of the Amended Complaint was "even more problematic," because in addition to failing to include any factual allegations, see id. at 12:7-25, 13:1-2; 15:16-22, "Count IV commingle[d] a claim of direct negligence against [] G&P and a claim of vicarious liability in a single count, and those are two very different legal theories of relief that require different elements of proof," id. at 11:19-23. The Court explained that in pleading the Amended Complaint in this manner, Bailey had "run[] afoul of the Eleventh Circuit's shotgun pleading case law," and accordingly referred counsel to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's discussion of shotgun pleadings in Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015). Then, with regard to Count V, the Court noted that it suffered from the same deficiencies. See Hearing Tr. at 15:19-20. "You also have the problem that you've got multiple different claims pled in there that require different elementsof proof, but there still aren't any facts." Id. at 15:19-22. All in all, the Court concluded that there were "no allegations of fact in this complaint that would support any claim against G&P." Id. at 16:9-21.
At this same hearing, the Court also briefly addressed the preemption defense raised by G&P. First, the Court emphasized the importance of knowing the specific role G&P played with regard to the vehicle involved in the accident. See id. at 14:22-25, 15:1-6, 23-25, 16:1-6. Next, the Court explained that it could not conduct a proper preemption analysis because Bailey did not adequately state any claims in the Amended Complaint. Id. at 20:18-23. In this regard, the Court had earlier explained:
[p]reliminarily, although the Defendant leads with the preemption argument, we can't start with preemption. The Eleventh Circuit in Mink v. Smith & Nephew, which is found at 860 F.3d 1319, page 1328 [11th Cir. 2017] instructs that: Because preemption is a principle derived from the supremacy clause, a court must first analyze whether each claim can stand under state law and only then decide the preemption question. And so we first have to determine whether Mr. Bailey has adequately alleged viable claims under Florida law, and only then go to preemption.
Id. at 8:18-25, 9:1-2.
Based on the pleading deficiencies in the Amended Complaint and applicable Eleventh Circuit authority, the Court noted that it considered dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice because Bailey did not seek leave to amend the Amended Complaint—even after the Court expressly advised Bailey that if he wanted to amend his complaint he must file a proper motion seeking leave to do so. See id. at 17:5-18 (citing Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also Doc. 28 at 1-2. Nevertheless, the Court allowed Bailey to file a second amended complaint. In doing so, the Court directed Bailey to file a proper second amended complaint, one "that is not just legal conclusions." Id. at 17:25-18:1-6. Further, the Court "caution[ed] counselthat in...
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