Bailey v. Bly

Decision Date01 November 1967
Docket NumberGen. No. 10891
Citation231 N.E.2d 8,87 Ill.App.2d 259
PartiesRuth M. BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerold BLY, Cleo Bly and Vola Bly, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Hanagan & Dousman, Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

Robert Heckenkamp, Gillespie, Burke & Gillespie, Springfield, for appellees.

CRAVEN, Presiding Justice.

The plaintiff, Ruth Bailey, suffered personal injuries when she fell down the steps from the front porch of a house owned by her brother, Cleo Bly, and his wife, Vola Bly. Cleo's son, Jerold, lived next door to his parents and owned a dog that was knwon by the name of Lady. Plaintiff fell from the porch as a result of tripping over Lady who was lying in her path as she sought to exit from the house, across the porch and down the stairs. At the time of the event, the plaintiff was carrying a suitcase together with some clothing draped over the suitcase.

Plaintiff sued Cleo and Vola Bly and Jerold Bly. In each case, the action was predicated upon the applicability of ch. 8, sec. 12d, Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, which provides as follows:

'If a dog, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of the dog is liable in damages to the person so attacked or injured to the full amount of the injury sustained. The term 'owner' includes any person harboring or keeping a dog. The term 'dog' includes both male and female of the canine species.'

The allegations of the complaint were that Cleo and Vola were harborers or keepers of a dog which injured her and that Jerold was its owner. The theory of her action is that the dog statute imposes absolute liability on all of the defendants. Each of the defendants filed motions for summary judgment supported by filing in the trial court of the deposition of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

The trial court granted each of the defendant's motions for summary judgment, entered judgment accordingly, and this appeal is from that order. So far as here relevant, the deposition of the plaintiff establishes that the plaintiff was leaving the home of the defendants Cleo nd Vola Bly, her arms outstretched, and she was holding a suitcase in a flat position and had one suit and two dresses over the suitcase. She started to exit from the door of the house onto the porch and the dog Lady was lying at the door against the screen. She commanded Lady to move, which she did. As abstracted, the deposition of the plaintiff continues:

'I presumed she had moved off the porch but she had not. She had moved to the step which was three or four steps away and layed down. I did not see the dog laying on the top step before I tripped over it. I had no occasion to look down until I got to the steps, and as I assumed 'Lady' would get off the porch, I walked to the steps and tripped over 'Lady'. I tripped over her and threw my arms out and I fell to the pavement on the drive-way. I walked into the side or back of the dog, I don't know whether I hit the side or the back, she's a big dog and she just piles down about anywhere, and at the time I was walking I was still cradling the suitcase. * * *'

The trial court, in granting the motion for summary judgment, determined that the plaintiff was not attacked or injured by the dog in question and therefore the dog statute as above quoted was not applicable, and further found that Cleo Bly and Vola Bly were not harborers or keepers of the dog at the time of the occurrence alleged in the...

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20 cases
  • Johnson v. Johnson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 5, 2008
    ...impose strict liability without a factual and reasonable basis `other than as a pure penalty for [horse] ownership.' (Bailey v. Bly, (1967), 87 Ill.App.2d 259, 262.) Nothing in the language of the statute or in the history of the legislation makes it appear that the intent of the statute is......
  • Crosson v. Ruzich
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • July 31, 2018
    ...or passive force.’ " Coe v. Lewsader , 2016 IL App (4th) 150841, ¶ 15, 407 Ill.Dec. 1018, 64 N.E.3d 817 (quoting Bailey v. Bly , 87 Ill. App. 2d 259, 262, 231 N.E.2d 8 (1967) ). The dog must make some overt act toward the plaintiff in order for liability to attach. Coe , 2016 IL App (4th) 1......
  • Lewellin on Behalf of Heirs of Lewellin v. Huber, C5-90-75
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 25, 1991
    ...N.E.2d at 168 (construing an older, but substantially similar, version of the Illinois dog-bite statute). See also Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill.App.2d 259, 231 N.E.2d 8 (1967) (the court refused to apply the statute to a woman who tripped over defendant's dog, stating that there must be behavior o......
  • Vanderlei v. Heideman
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 15, 1980
    ...has been held not to apply in several situations where the plaintiff has brought himself within its express terms. In Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill.App.2d 259, 231 N.E.2d 8 (1967), the court refused to apply the statute to a woman who tripped over defendant's dog which lay down in front of her whil......
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