Bailey v. Canan

Citation82 F.Supp.2d 966
Decision Date25 January 2000
Docket NumberNo. IP97-1483-CM/S.,IP97-1483-CM/S.
PartiesDonald BAILEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Dan CANAN, Mayor, City of Muncie, individually and in his official capacity, Joseph Winkle, Chief of Police, individually and in his official capacity, and The City of Muncie, Indiana, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
82 F.Supp.2d 966
Donald BAILEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
Dan CANAN, Mayor, City of Muncie, individually and in his official capacity, Joseph Winkle, Chief of Police, individually and in his official capacity, and The City of Muncie, Indiana, Defendants.
No. IP97-1483-CM/S.
United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
January 25, 2000.

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Steven C. Smith, Smith Ragains & Cotton, Anderson, IN, for Plaintiff.

Donald S. Smith, Pamela G. Schneeman, Riley Bennett & Egloff, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.


McKINNEY, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on motion for summary judgment of defendants, Dan Canan, Mayor, City of Muncie (the "City"), Joseph Winkle, Chief of Police, and the City of Muncie, Indiana (collectively "Defendants"). The Defendants have also filed a motion that the court accept all of Defendants' statements of material fact as true and uncontroverted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(g) because the plaintiff, Donald Bailey ("Bailey"), failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Local Rule 56.1(f)(2). In addition, the Defendants have moved to strike certain factual assertions made by Bailey in his brief in opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Court has reviewed the materials submitted by the parties and for the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants' motion to accept their statements of material fact as true and uncontroverted. In addition, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants' motion to strike various factual assertions in Bailey's brief in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Finally, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.


Bailey filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on March 20, 1997 and he received notice that his charge was dismissed along with a right to sue letter that was dated June 6, 1997. Bailey filed his original action on September 5, 1997.1 Bailey asserts that the Court has jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 and 623, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).

Bailey filed a second amended complaint on September 30, 1998 alleging that the City had discriminated against him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bailey also alleged that under color of state law Muncie Mayor Dan Canan ("Mayor Canan") and Muncie Chief of Police Joseph Winkle ("Chief Winkle") had violated his right to due process guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by suspending him for ten days without opportunity for a hearing and by denying him the opportunity to appeal his superior's determination to invoke the suspension. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on August 5, 1999 asserting there are no genuine issues of material fact on the questions of whether the City had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decisions involving Bailey, and whether Bailey had a legally protected interest in a suspension of less than ten days, and therefore, no right to a hearing either before or after such a suspension. Having reviewed the procedural background, the Court now

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turns to a brief overview of the standards governing its decision.


Summary judgment is granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A disputed fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law. Id.

The moving party has the initial burden to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Schroeder v. Barth, 969 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir.1992). This burden does not entail producing evidence to negate claims on which the opposing party has the burden of proof. See Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 & n. 3 (7th Cir.1994). The party opposing a summary judgment motion bears an affirmative burden of presenting evidence that a disputed issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 975 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1992). The opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and set forth specific facts to show that a genuine issue exists. See Hong v. Children's Mem. Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S.Ct. 1372, 128 L.Ed.2d 48 (1994). This burden cannot be met with conclusory statements or speculation, see Weihaupt v. American Med. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 428 (7th Cir. 1989), but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence. See Local Rule 56.1; Brasic v. Heinemann's Inc., Bakeries, 121 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir.1997); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923-24 (7th Cir.1994). Evidence sufficient to support every essential element of the claims on which the opposing party bears the burden of proof must be cited. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw all reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable" to the opposing party. Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992). If a reasonable fact finder could find for the opposing party, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.1992). When the standard embraced in Rule 56(c) is met, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Shields Enters., 975 F.2d at 1294.

The summary judgment standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases because of the crucial role played by motive, intent and credibility in resolving such cases. Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir.1999). However, even when discriminatory intent is at issue, the evidence must not only address the issue of intent, but also relate to the specific employment decision in question. Cowan v. Glenbrook Security Serv., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 443 (7th Cir.1997). Further, the non-movant will not defeat summary judgment merely by pointing to self-serving allegations or conclusory statements in affidavits without other evidentiary support. Cliff v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir.1994) (citing McDonnell v. Cournia, 990 F.2d 963, 969 (7th Cir.1993)). Accord Chapple v. National Starch & Chem. Co., 178 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir.1999).

Pursuant to Southern District of Indiana Local Rule 56.1 ("L.R. 56.1"), the moving party is required to submit a Statement of Material Fact that complies with L.R. 56.1(f). L.R. 56.1(a)(1). Similarly, the non-moving party is required to provide a Response to Statement of Material Facts

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that complies with the same section. See L.R. 56.1(b)(1). In addition, any facts that the non-moving party wishes to add to the Statement of Material Fact must be filed as a separate Statement of Additional Material Fact, that must also comply with L.R. 56.1(f). L.R. 56.1(b)(1). Section (f) provides in pertinent part:

(f) Requirements for Factual Statements and Responses Thereto.

(1) Format and Numbering. The Statement of Material Facts shall consist of numbered sentences. The Response to Statement of Material Facts must be numbered to correspond with the sentence numbers of the Statement of Material Facts, preferably with each respective factual statement repeated therein. Any Statement of Additional Material Facts must consist of numbered sentences and start with the next number after the last numbered sentence in the Statement of Material Facts....

(2) Format of Factual Assertions. Each material fact set forth in a Statement of Material Facts, Response to Statement of Material Facts, Statement of Additional Material Facts must consist of concise, numbered sentences with the contents of each sentence limited as far as practicable to a single factual proposition. Each stated material fact shall be substantiated by specific citation to record evidence....

(3) Format of Objections to Asserted Material Facts or Cited Evidence. Objections to material facts and/or cited evidence shall (to the extent practicable) set forth the grounds for the objection in a concise, single sentence, with citation to appropriate authorities.

L.R. 56.1(f)(1)-(3). Finally, the rule also provides that "[i]n determining the motion for summary judgment, the Court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are specifically controverted or objected to in compliance with L.R. 56.1(f)." L.R. 56.1(g).

The Court may use its discretion in deciding how strictly to enforce compliance with L.R. 56.1. See L.R. 56.1(k); see also Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.1998) (finding that the district court in that case "was within its discretion to insist on compliance with [L.R.] 56.1").


The majority of the facts set out herein were provided by the Defendants. Defendants set out 161 individual statements of material fact in a section of their brief. Defs.' Br. In Supp...

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