Bailey v. Lafler
Decision Date | 20 September 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 1:09-cv-460,1:09-cv-460 |
Parties | Mark David BAILEY #201511, Plaintiff, v. Blaine C. LAFLER, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Helen C. Nieuwenhuis, Nieuwenhuis Law Offices PC, Grand Rapids, MI, for Plaintiff.
Bruce H. Edwards, Laura Moody, MI Dept. Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
"There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 271–82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (citing Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ).
As framed by the State, this case presents questions that ordinarily have easy answers in a Brady analysis.
Can evidence excluding a defendant from "Murder 1" be "exculpatory" in a trial for an unrelated "Murder 2"? Likewise, can "prejudice ensue" when the State suppresses exculpatory evidence from "Murder 1" in a trial for "Murder 2"?
The answer to both questions is ordinarily "no," as evidence from one crime is rarely relevant to another crime.
But the facts in this case are far from ordinary.
In this case, an FBI profile report linked "Murder 1" with "Murder 2" early on; and the report concluded that one suspect was likely responsible for both murders because the "signatures" left at each crime scene (both in a rural West Michigan town) were eerily similar.
Nearly two decades after the profile report was prepared, Petitioner Mark David Bailey was charged for "Murder 2." Mr. Bailey sought to introduce the profile report, along with the fact that he was ten-years-old at the time of "Murder 1," as evidence which would, in his view, cast a reasonable doubt as to his own responsibility for "Murder 2."
The trial court excluded the report and all references to the earlier murder—without any legal analysis or explanation—and the issue was preserved for appeal.
On appeal, the State argued that the profile report actually supported a conclusion that Mr. Bailey, despite his age, committed "Murder 1."
The Michigan Court of Appeals, while acknowledging Mr. Bailey's right to introduce evidence of third-party guilt and conceding the issue on appeal was "arguable," ultimately concluded that the profile report amounted to "mere suspicion" or a "conjectural inference," and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence.
Troublingly, unbeknownst to Mr. Bailey, his lawyer, and all state judges who grappled with the evidentiary issues to that point, the State, while investigating Mr. Bailey for "Murder 2," had requested and received a fingerprint analysis of latent prints found at the scene of "Murder 1" that excluded Mr. Bailey as a suspect in "Murder 1"—even though the State knew he was only ten at the time of that crime.
As framed by the facts, the Brady questions in this case, therefore, are much more precise than those the State contends are presented.
Was the evidence that excluded Mr. Bailey as a suspect in "Murder 1" "exculpatory" for Mr. Bailey's trial for "Murder 2"—when the State's own evidence (partially disclosed and partially suppressed) together suggested that a suspect other than Mr. Bailey likely committed "Murder 2"? Likewise, did "prejudice ensue" when the State suppressed the exculpatory evidence from "Murder 1" prior to Bailey's trial for "Murder 2"—when the effect of the suppression was to partially blind the state judges' analysis of important evidentiary questions and ultimately violate Bailey's right to present a complete defense by introducing probative evidence of third-party guilt?
The answer to both questions is "yes"; Mr. Bailey, therefore, is entitled to a new trial.
Plaintiff Mark David Bailey, a prisoner under the control of the Michigan Department of Corrections, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Magistrate Judge Philip J. Green issued a report and recommendation recommending that Petitioner's claims in Grounds I to IV be denied on the merits and claim under Ground V be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.
The facts themselves are beyond genuine dispute, as reported by the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's summary facts contained in his report, with the exception of a few omitted facts and his characterization of certain facts that lead to erroneous legal conclusions. (See ECF No. 83 at PageID.946–60.) The Court will highlight and add relevant facts as it sees fit throughout this opinion.
To begin, however, establishing a timeline of this case is helpful.
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