Bailey v. Napolitano
| Decision Date | 11 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-1110-L |
| Parties | RICHARD BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary Department of Homeland Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court are Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss, filed August 1, 2011, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 24, 2012. After carefully considering the motions, responses, replies, appendices, and applicable law, the court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies as moot Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss.
On May 26, 2011, Richard Bailey ("Bailey" or "Plaintiff") filed Plaintiff['s] Original Complaint against Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security ("Defendant").1 Bailey contends that Defendant discriminated against him on the bases of race, sex, age, and disability, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C § 2000e, et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et. seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et. seq.
Richard Bailey was hired by the Federal Aviation Administration on April 7, 2002, as a Federal Air Marshal ("FAM"). The duties of a FAM include responding to hostile acts aboardU.S. air carriers, along with investigating, apprehending, or detaining individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against criminal laws in relation to U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews. In 2005, the Federal Air Marshal Service ("FAMS") was transferred to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration ("TSA" or "Agency"), where Bailey is currently employed as a FAM. While on duty in April 2004, Plaintiff injured his left knee and received a limited or light duty2 assignment at that time. Plaintiff reinjured his left knee while on duty on January 15, 2008. In January 2008, Plaintiff requested a limited or light duty assignment; Plaintiff was denied limited or light duty work. According to Plaintiff, he was informed that there was not a limited or light duty policy. According to Defendant, the local policy of the Dallas Field Office ("DFO") at the time of Plaintiff's injury was that limited duty assignments (for employees injured on the job) and light duty assignments (for employees suffering nonwork-related injuries or illnesses) were dependent upon work being available and the available duty functions the employee was capable of performing. If no limited or light duty work was available, the employee was required to take sick leave.
All medical documentation received from Plaintiff's treating physician during January 2008 indicated that Plaintiff was unable to resume his duties as a FAM, and there was no indication that he could work in a limited duty capacity. Plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits was accepted, and he was granted such benefits. Worker's compensation benefits include rehabilitation, medical, surgical, and necessary expenses. Plaintiff received continuation of pay in the amount of his full salary for forty-five days, from January 16, 2008,through February 29, 2008; he was then placed on leave without pay while receiving worker's compensation benefits for the remaining time he was off work. On February 26, 2008, Plaintiff's physician cleared him for limited duty work beginning March 1, 2008.
On April 1, 2008, FAMS headquarters directed the DFO to provide limited or light duty for all FAMs who were out of the office due to injury or illness but able to perform limited or light duty work. FAMs were assigned to answer office telephones, perform basic computer entry and typing, make photocopies, and screen visitors for entry. On April 24, 2008, Bailey returned to work in a limited duty capacity and was assigned to work in the reception area because the DFO was fully staffed and there was little productive work available. Plaintiff was cleared to return to full duty on May 24, 2008, and has been on full duty status since that time.
Plaintiff first contacted the TSA's Office of Civil Rights and Liberties regarding his Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") claims on December 3, 2009. He then filed a formal "Individual Complaint of Employment Discrimination" (hereinafter, "EEO Complaint" or "Administrative Charge") on March 30, 2010. A formal EEO investigation was conducted, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued a decision in favor of TSA, finding no discrimination on the bases of age, race, or sex.
Defendant moves to dismiss the following claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim, set forth in Count One of Plaintiff['s] Original Complaint; and (2) Plaintiff's race and sex discrimination claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, set forth in Counts Three and Four of Plaintiff['s] Original Complaint. Count One of Plaintiff['s] Original Complaint is a claim alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112. With respect to Plaintiff's disabilitydiscrimination claim, Defendant asserts that this claim should be dismissed because the ADA does not provide a private right of action against the federal government. Defendant also contends that even if Plaintiff invoked the correct statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, his claim would still be barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his disability discrimination claim. With respect to Plaintiff's race and sex discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Defendant asserts that these claims should be dismissed because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity under section 1981 and, thus, no right of action against the federal government.
Regarding his disability claim, Plaintiff has amended his complaint and replaced his ADA claim with a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.). The court also notes that Defendant fully incorporates its arguments regarding Plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies into Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Regarding his section 1981 discrimination claims, Plaintiff has amended his complaint and no longer alleges claims under this section.3 As Defendant's requests to dismiss Plaintiff's claims are either made moot by the filing of Plaintiff['s] First Amended Original Complaint or are incorporated into its motion for summary judgment, the court denies as moot Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss.
Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v.Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under thegoverning laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues that are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's claims for race, sex, age, and disability discrimination. Plaintiff contends he was discriminated against when the DFO denied his request for limited duty after he sustained a knee injury in January 2008. Plaintiff asserts that while he was denied limited or light duty work, such work was granted to females, African-Americans, and individuals under the age of forty. Defe...
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