Bailey v. North Carolina Dept. of Mental Health, 522

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRANCH; The scope of the reviewing court's inquiry in cases appealed from the Industrial Commission is succinctly stated by Ervin
• Citation: Bailey v. North Carolina Dept. of Mental Health, 159 S.E.2d 28, 272 N.C. 680 (N.C. 1968)
• Decision Date: 02 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 522,522
• Parties: Cullen Bunn BAILEY, Jr. v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH.

Page 28

159 S.E.2d 28

272 N.C. 680

Cullen Bunn BAILEY, Jr. v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH.

No. 522.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 2, 1968.

Douglas F. DeBank, Raleigh, for plaintiff.

Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Staff Atty. L. Philip Covington, Raleigh, for defendant.

BRANCH, Justice.

G.S. § 143--291 provides for payment of damages for personal injuries sustained by any person 'as a result of a negligent act of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, * * * under circumstances where the state of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liabel to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If the Commission finds that there was such negligence on the part of an officer, employee, * * * which was the proximate cause of the injury and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of claimant * * * the Commission shall determine the amount of damages which the claimant is entitled to be paid * * * but in no event shall the amount of damages awarded exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00).' (The 1965 legislature increased the amount of possible recovery to $12,000.00, effective July 1, 1965, and the 1967 legislature increased the amount to $15,000.00, effective July 1, 1967.)

G.S. § 143--293, which governs appeals from the Industrial Commission to Superior Court and the Supreme Court, in part provides:

'* * * Such appeal shall be for errors of law only under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions, and the findings of fact of the Commission shall be conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them * * *. Either party may appeal from the decision of the superior court to the Supreme Court as in ordinary civil actions.'

The Industrial Commission's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence, except for jurisdictional findings. This is true, even though there is evidence which would support findings to the contrary. English Mica Co. v. Avery County Board of Education, 246 N.C. 714, 100 S.E.2d 72; Nello L. Teer Co. v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 265 N.C. 1, 143 S.E.2d 247. However, where facts are found or where the Commission fails to find facts under a misapprehension of law, the court will, where the ends of justice require, remand the cause so that the evidence may be considered in its true legal light. Stanley v. Hyman-Michales Co., 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570.

The scope of the reviewing court's inquiry in cases appealed from the Industrial Commission is succinctly stated by Ervin, J., in the case of Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760, as follows:

'In passing upon an appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, the reviewing court is limited in its inquiry to two questions of law, namely: (1) Whether or not there was any competent evidence before the Commission to support its findings of fact; and (2) whether or not the findings of fact of the Commission justify its legal conclusions and decision. 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, section 530.'

The crucial findings of fact and conclusions of law by the hearing commissioner and adopted by the Full Commission are:

Finding of Fact: '8. That there is nothing in the testimony at the hearing to indicate the name of the State employee or employees that know anything about what caused the plaintiff's injury.'

Conclusion of Law: 'Since there is no showing in the record that a State employee was present or had any knowledge of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, it is not necessary to go into the question of nelgigence or contributory negligence.'

The uncontradicted testimony indicates that while claimant was a patient at Dorothea Dix Hospital on 3 December 1963, he was given a shock treatment resulting in injury. In this connection the record reveals testimony by claimant as follows:

'Q. When was the next time after that that you again received an electric shock treatment?

A. The evening of December 3, 1963. They gave me one in the evening instead of the regular time in the morning.

Q. Who administered that shock treatment?

A. Dr. Frierson, I understand his name is.'

'I recall the name of some of the attendants at the time I received the shock treatment--Mr. Smith and Mr. Stewart.'

A careful examination of the record compels the conclusion that this finding of fact made by the hearing commissioner, which was adopted and affirmed by the full Commission, was not supported by the evidence, and the conclusion of law and decision based on the finding was not justified. Upon reaching this conclusion it logically follows that the cause should be remanded for appropriate findings as to whether there was a negligent act of any named officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency, or authority which was the proximate cause of claimant's injury, and whether claimant was guilty of contributory negligence.

'Specific findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are required. These must cover the crucial...