Bailey v. Oakbourne Country Club, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 6:14-2546
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
• Parties: BECKY LIVINGS BAILEY v. OAKBOURNE COUNTRY CLUB, INC., ET AL.

BECKY LIVINGS BAILEY v. OAKBOURNE COUNTRY CLUB, INC., ET AL.

CIVIL NO. 6:14-2546

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

July 29, 2015

JUDGE DOHERTY

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HILL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the undersigned for report and recommendation is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(6). [rec. doc. 14]. The plaintiff, Becky Livings Bailey ("Bailey"), has filed Opposition. [rec. doc. 19]. The defendants have also filed a post-hearing supplemental memorandum. [rec. doc. 24]. By this Motion, the defendants, the Oakbourne Country Club, Inc. (Oakbourne"), Annette Stansbury ("Stansbury") and Paul Gibson ("Gibson") seek dismissal of Bailey's Title VII lawsuit based on res judicata.

For those reasons set out below, it is recommended that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted and, accordingly, that this lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

On June 20, 2014, Bailey filed a lawsuit in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court purportedly asserting Louisiana state law claims for race and gender discrimination and negligence against the same defendants named in the instant lawsuit, arising out of Bailey's termination from her employment as an Assistant Chef at Oakbourne Country Club. [rec. doc. 14-2]. The lawsuit does not contain a citation to the statute under which Bailey was proceeding. However, during oral argument, counsel clarified that Bailey's claims were asserted solely under Louisiana law. In her Petition, Bailey alleged that after she attempted to resign, Stansbury, Gibson's supervisor, requested that she remain. Accordingly, she withdrew her resignation. Thereafter, Gibson, Bailey's supervisor, cited Bailey'sattempt to resign as a negative infraction on her work record. On February 6, 2014, Gibson approved Bailey's request for personal leave beginning February 22, 2014 through March 5, 2014. On February 21, 2014, Gibson informed Bailey that she would be scheduled to work on March 3, 2014. When Bailey advised that she could not work that date, Gibson cited this incident as a negative infraction on her work record. On February 28, 2014, Gibson informed Bailey that she had been scheduled to work on March 4, 2014. When Bailey advised that she could not return to work until March 5, 2014, Gibson informed Bailey that her employment at Oakbourne had been terminated.

The defendants' moved to dismiss all of Bailey's claims pursuant to a Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action. [rec. doc. 14-3]. In response, Bailey filed a Voluntary Motion to Dismiss in which she consented to the grant of the defendants' exception of no cause of action and the dismissal of her claims against the defendants with prejudice. [rec. doc. 14-4]. By Order dated September 9, 2014, Judge Broussard of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court granted Bailey's Voluntary Motion to Dismiss and accordingly, dismissed Bailey's claims against Oakbourne, Stansbury and Gibson with prejudice. [rec. doc. 14-5].

On August 21, 2014, Bailey filed the instant action, against Oakbourne, Stansbury and Gibson. This lawsuit alleges race and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.¹ [rec. docs. 1 and 27]. The allegations in the Complaint and Amended Complaint filed in this Court are virtually identical to the allegations set forth in the Petition previously filed by Bailey in Louisiana state court. Moreover, Bailey has sued the same defendants -Oakbourne, Stansbury and Gibson. [rec. docs. 1 and 27].

By the instant Motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the defendants move to dismiss all of Bailey's Title VII claims on the basis that the claims are barred by res judicata, because they should have been brought in her previously filed Louisiana state court lawsuit which was voluntarily dismissed by Bailey with prejudice.

For the reasons which follow, the undersigned recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted and, accordingly, that this lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice on grounds that plaintiff's claims against Oakbourne, Stansbury and Gibson are barred by res judicata.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5^th Cir. 2000); F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Moreover, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may permissibly refer to matters of public record. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 fn.6 (5^th Cir. 1994); Funk v. Stryker Corp, 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5^th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he district court took appropriate judicial notice of publicly-available documents and transcripts . . . which were matters of public record directly relevant to the issue at hand."); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 fn. 3 (5^th Cir. 1995).² Thus, while res judicata is generally an affirmative defense to be pleaded in a defendant's answer, because all relevant facts, which are admitted and uncontroverted, are contained in public records of which this court takes notice, the defense of res judicata may be determined on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Id.; see also Meyers v. Textron, Inc., 540 Fed. Appx. 408, 409-410 (5^th Cir. 2013) quoting Clifton v. Warnaco, Inc., 53 F.3d 1280, 1995 WL295863, at *6 fn. 13 (5^th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished).

Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5^th Cir. 2001). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he 'court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5^th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted) quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5^th Cir. 2004). In other words, a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim "admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiff's rights to relief based upon those facts." Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161-162 quoting Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5^th Cir. 1992).

Generally, this Court "must assess whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)." United States v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d 255, 257 (5^th Cir. 2014) quoting Spitzberg v. Hous. Am. Energy Corp., 758 F.3d 676, 683 (5^th Cir. 2014).

Thus, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Kopp v. Klein, 722 F.3d 327, 333 (5^th Cir. 2013). Stated differently, "the pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Twombley, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 at fn. 27 (5^th Cir. 2009). If a plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to "nudge[] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint mustbe dismissed." Twombley, 127 S.Ct. at 1974; Malik v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 305 Fed. Appx. 165, 167 (5^th Cir. 2008); Mitchell v. Johnson, 2008 WL 3244283, *2 (5^th Cir. 2008).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Res Judicata

The purpose of both federal and state law on res judicata is essentially the same, that is, to promote judicial efficiency and final resolution of disputes by preventing needless relitigation. Terrebone Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 666 So.2d 624, 631 (La. 1996). The doctrine of res judicata embraces the notion of "extinguishment" of causes of action and therefore forecloses relitigation of claims that were, or could have been, raised in a prior action. Id.; Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 312-313 (5^th Cir. 2004) citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

To determine the preclusive effect of a prior Louisiana state court judgment, if any, a federal court must apply Louisiana law. Lafreniere Park Foundation v. Broussard, 221 F.3d 804, 808 (5^th Cir. 2000). The Louisiana doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Revised Statute 13:4231, which in provides in pertinent part "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a valid final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review to the following extent: . . . (2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of the final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action of those causes of action . . . ." La.R.S. 13:4231. "The consequence of this statute is that 'all actions arising out of the same transaction or occurrence must be brought together or be subject to a plea of res judicata.'" Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 79 F.3d 1143 (5^th Cir. 1996) quoting Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1238 (La. 1993).

Under § 4231, a Louisiana state court judgment dismissing an action with prejudice will bar a subsequent federal lawsuit, if five elements are met: (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties to the two actions are the same; (4) the cause of action asserted in the federal suit existed at the time of the prior state court judgment; and (5) the cause of action asserted in the federal suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of...