Bailey v. State
| Decision Date | 05 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S02-1204-CR-234,49S02-1204-CR-234 |
| Parties | ELMER J. BAILEY, Appellant (Defendant ), v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
ELMER J. BAILEY, Appellant (Defendant),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. 49S02-1204-CR-234
Indiana Supreme Court
November 5, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Bernice A. N. Corley
Ruth A. Johnson
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory F. Zoeller
Attorney General of Indiana
Joseph Y. Ho
James B. Martin
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Massa, Justice.
When a husband shoves his wife and pokes her in the forehead repeatedly, causing her pain, is that pain alone sufficient evidence to prove the "bodily injury" element of the husband's conviction for domestic battery? One panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals thought not, but we disagree.
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In 2011, Elmer and Farrenquai Bailey had been married for eleven years and in a relationship for another nine years prior to that. On the evening of January 22, 2011, Elmer came home from work and began drinking with Farrenquai. Each consumed about three beers. Farrenquai testified that Elmer then began threatening her, calling her vulgar names, and "putting his hands on [her]." Tr. at 7. He poked her repeatedly in the forehead with his finger, hard enough to push her head back. Farrenquai testified that this contact caused her pain. She eventually called the police, and Elmer left.
The police arrived at the Baileys' home, and while the officers were present, Elmer called Farrenquai on her phone three times. Each time, the police spoke to him. After the police left, Elmer returned to the house, shoving Farrenquai out of the way to get inside. She testified that this shove hurt as well. He became verbally abusive again, and Farrenquai called the police a second time.
The police returned to the Baileys' home, instructed Elmer to leave, and directed Farrenquai to lock the door so that Elmer could not re-enter. Minutes after the police departed, Elmer returned, and Farrenquai unlocked the door because she feared Elmer would kick it down or break a window to get back in. Again, Elmer began verbally abusing Farrenquai and poking her in the head, causing her pain. When Farrenquai called the police a third time, they returned and again instructed Elmer to leave. Farrenquai then asked the officers, "How you going to keep letting him just leave. And he'll come back. What's going to have to happen? Somebody going to have to get hurt?" Tr. at 13. At that point, the officers arrested Elmer.
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Elmer was charged with battery and domestic battery, both as class A misdemeanors.1 Both charges were enhanced to class D felonies because Elmer had previously been convicted of domestic battery against Farrenquai.2 At his bench trial, the only evidence put forth by the State in support of either charge was Farrenquai's testimony. Elmer denied putting his hands on Farrenquai in any way and specifically denied poking her in the forehead and shoving her. The judge found Elmer guilty of domestic battery and sentenced him to two years in prison.3
Elmer appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished decision. Bailey v. State, No. 49A02-1106-CR-487, 2012 WL 360735, slip op. at 9 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2012). The court first held that, in order for Farrenquai to have suffered "bodily injury" sufficient to justify Elmer's conviction, her pain "must be sufficient to rise to a level of 'impairment of physical condition.'" Id., at 7 (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-1-4 (2008) (recodified at § 35-31.5-2-29) (2012)).4 It then found that Farrenquai's testimony was insufficient evidence of this requirement. Id. at 9.5
Six days later, a different panel of the Court of Appeals presented a different view of what level of pain constitutes "bodily injury" under Indiana's criminal provisions, this time in a
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published decision. Toney v. State, 961 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).6 Because "bodily injury" is a concept that arises in a number of ways throughout Indiana's criminal code, we granted transfer in Bailey to clarify its meaning, thereby vacating the unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals.7 Bailey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1033 (Ind. 2012) (table); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Elmer first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for domestic battery. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. 2005). The evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction. Rohr v. State, 866 N.E.2d 242, 248 (Ind. 2007). "[W]e affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004). A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a
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single witness, even when that witness is the victim. Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Ind. 1991).
Indiana's domestic battery statute provides that "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally touches an individual who . . . is or was a spouse of the other person . . . in a rude, insolent, or angry manner that results in bodily injury to the person . . . commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor." Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). The offense is elevated to a class D felony if the accused has a prior domestic battery conviction. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(1). A lesser-included offense for domestic battery is simple battery, a class B misdemeanor which has only the elements that the accused "knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent or angry manner." Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a). There is no bodily injury requirement for simple battery.8 Bodily injury, in turn, is defined by statute as "any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain." Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-29.
Elmer specifically argues that there was insufficient evidence that Farrenquai suffered bodily injury as a result of the poking and shoving.9 Elmer acknowledges that Indiana courts
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have held that to find bodily injury, "it is enough that the evidence shows that a person experienced physical pain, even if no permanent or lingering injuries were sustained." Appellant's Br. at 9 (citing Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). But he argues that when compared to the facts of other cases addressing bodily injury, Farrenquai's testimony that it hurt when she was poked in the forehead and shoved was insufficient.
The State, by its turn, argues that "[t]he law does not require the pain Farrenquai suffered to be uncommon, excruciating, or extraordinary." Appellee's Br. at 5. Farrenquai's testimony as to the pain she felt from Elmer's shoves and pokes is sufficient to sustain his conviction, the State says, because "the language of the statute is clear—pain is bodily injury." Appellee's Br. at 7.
Thus, though Elmer's argument sounds as one claiming the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, it has spurred a question of statutory interpretation with respect to Indiana Code § 35-41-1-4's definition of bodily injury. Specifically, is pain alone—regardless of severity or duration—sufficient to constitute an impairment of physical condition, or must the pain first rise to some unstated level?
The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals created just such a threshold requirement by rejecting the premise that "any level of physical pain, no matter how slight and fleeting, constitutes bodily injury." Bailey, slip op. at 5. Rather, it concluded that "for physical pain to constitute bodily injury for purposes of Indiana Code Section 35-41-1-4, the physical pain must be sufficient to rise to a level of 'impairment of physical condition.'" Bailey, slip op. at 7. It did not dispute that Farrenquai suffered pain as a result of Elmer's conduct, but compared Elmer's conduct (and the resulting effects on Farrenquai) with the conduct of the defendants in other "bodily injury" cases and the resulting effects on those victims. After finding the defendants' conduct in those other cases resulted in a comparatively higher degree of injury to their respective victims, the Court of Appeals weighed Farrenquai's pain, measured it, and found it wanting.
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We think this is the wrong approach. Nothing in our prior treatment of this statute implies such a hurdle, despite the facts of the particular cases. Rather, our prior treatment establishes a structure that mirrors statutes from other states and the Model Penal Code by creating a very low threshold for "bodily injury" while maintaining a much more rigorous standard for "serious bodily injury."
A. Under Our Precedent, Any Physical Pain is Enough to Constitute Bodily Injury.
We begin just a few years after the bodily injury statute was enacted, with our decision in Rogers v. State, 272 Ind. 65, 396 N.E.2d 348 (1979). Rogers and...
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