Bailey v. Sullivan

Decision Date10 March 1982
Docket NumberNo. 1-481A127,1-481A127
Citation432 N.E.2d 75
PartiesHubert BAILEY, Claimant-Appellant, v. Mary SULLIVAN, As Administrator of the Estate of Nora Wright, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

John A. Kesler, II, Kesler & Stark, Terre Haute, for claimant-appellant.

RATLIFF, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the Estate of Nora Wright on the claim of Hubert Bailey against the estate. We dismiss the appeal for Bailey's failure to file a timely praecipe under Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 2(A).

The case was tried before the Honorable Harold J. Bitzegaio, regular judge of the Vigo Superior Court, Division One, on August 6, 1980. On November 12, 1980, judgment adverse to the claimant was entered. On January 19, 1981, Bailey filed a motion to correct errors which was overruled on January 16th by Judge Bitzegaio. Bailey filed a praecipe for a complete transcript on March 10, 1981, more than thirty (30) days after the ruling on the motion to correct errors. However, Judge Bitzegaio was defeated in the November 1980 general election and no longer was the judge of the court on January 16, 1981, but was a private attorney on that date. On April 14, 1981, Bailey filed a motion with the Vigo Superior Court asserting that Judge Bitzegaio had no authority on January 16, 1981, to rule on the motion to correct errors and requested the new judge to rule thereon. Accordingly, the new judge entered an order overruling the motion to correct errors on April 14, 1981. An amended praecipe was then filed by Bailey on April 15, 1981, and this appeal ensued.

The obvious issue in this case is whether or not Judge Bitzegaio had the authority to rule on the motion to correct errors on January 16, 1981, when he was no longer the regular judge. If he did, Bailey's praecipe was filed too late, and this appeal must be dismissed.

Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 63(A) provides in relevant part:

"(A) Disability and unavailability after the trial or hearing. The judge who presides at the trial of a cause or a hearing at which evidence is received shall, if available, hear motions and make all decisions and rulings required to be made by the court relating to the evidence and the conduct of the trial or hearing after the trial or hearing is concluded...."

We believe the holding of our supreme court in State v. Smith, (1973) 260 Ind. 555, 297 N.E.2d 809, compels us to hold that Judge Bitzegaio properly ruled on the motion to correct errors. In State v. Smith, supra, an eminent domain case, Judge Barger, the regular judge of the Shelby Circuit Court, granted a summary judgment on December 17, 1970. Barger's term expired on December 31st. On January 20, 1971, the state filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment. Judge Ellison, then the circuit judge, transferred the matter to Barger who was at that time a private attorney. Chief Justice Arterburn writing for our supreme court stated:

"Appellant asserts that the trial court, by Judge Ellison, erred in transferring the hearing on the appellant's motion to set aside the summary judgment to Judge Barger, at the time a private attorney.... The words of the rule are plain.

'The judge who presides at the trial of a cause or a hearing at which evidence is received shall, if available, hear motions and make all decisions and rulings required to be made by the court relating to the evidence and the conduct of the trial or hearing after the trial or hearing is concluded ...'

"A summary judgment hearing is without doubt part of a 'trial of a cause.' The principle behind Trial Rule 63 is obviously that a judge who has directed a trial is, if available, the best person to rule on post-trial motions. The former Supreme Court Rules I-8 and I-9 also adopted this principle, State ex rel. Hodshire v. Bingham, Judge (1941), 218 Ind. 490, 33 N.E.2d 771. The theory underlying the Rule is that the trial judge has continuing jurisdiction as if he had been appointed special judge, cf. State of Indiana ex rel. Williams E. Harp v. Vanderburgh Circuit Court (1949), 227 Ind. 353, 85 N.E.2d 254."

260 Ind. at 557-558, 297 N.E.2d 809.

We believe the holding in the Smith case is clear. Judge Bitzegaio was the proper person to rule on the motion if he were available. That he was available is manifest from the fact that he did rule on the motion.

It is also our opinion that the second ruling on the motion to correct errors entered on April 14, 1981, was of no effect and did not revive Bailey's right to file a praecipe within the time constraints of Appellate Rule 2(A). In Wadkins v. Thornton, (1972) 151 Ind.App. 380, 279 N.E.2d 849, the record revealed that the trial court overruled the motion to correct errors on May 26, 1971. No transcript was filed with this court within ninety days of that date as required by Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 3(B). On August 13, 1971, the trial court reentered its order of May 26, 1971, in these words: "By agreement, the order over-ruling (sic) the Motion to correct errors is now re-entered as of July 1, 1971." 151 Ind.App. at 382, 279 N.E.2d 849. No explanation or reason was given for the August 13 entry. This court dismissed the appeal holding the trial court did not have power subsequent to overruling the motion to correct errors to change the date of that ruling to a later date without good cause being shown. Judge Buchanan writing for this court stated:

"Wadkins has made no effort to obtain from this court an extension of time within which to file his Transcript. The nugatory action of the trial court on August 13, 1971, reentering its judgment of May 26, 1971 to July 1, 1971, was an attempted feat of legerdemain which did not toll the time within which to perfect an appeal; nor was it aided by the agreement of the parties and our...

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11 cases
  • State ex rel. Newton v. Board of School Trustees of Metropolitan School Dist. of Wabash County
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 7, 1984
    ...the judiciary did not render the former judge "unavailable" under Trial Rule 63(A). Id. 297 N.E.2d at 812. See also Bailey v. Sullivan (1982), Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 75, 76. "The theory ... is that the trial judge has continuing jurisdiction." 297 N.E.2d at We find the 1975 School Board analo......
  • CNA Ins. Companies (CNA) v. Vellucci
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 21, 1992
    ...the appeal. Dixon v. State (1991), Ind.App., 566 N.E.2d 594; Hughes v. Morgan County (1983), Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 447; Bailey v. Sullivan (1982), Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 75. We find the case of In re Estate of Moore (1973), 155 Ind.App. 92, 291 N.E.2d 566 (per curiam) to be particularly german......
  • Vehslage v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • February 25, 1985
    ...proper person to rule on a motion to set aside a summary judgment despite the fact that he was no longer a judge. See Bailey v. Sullivan, (1982) Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 75. The Newton court noted that the policy behind T.R. 63(A) (as well as Smith ) is that "parties are entitled to have issues......
  • Marriage of Huth, In re, 1-481A146
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 27, 1982
    ...no longer serving as the regular judge of the court was the proper judge to rule on the motion to correct errors. Bailey v. Sullivan, (1982) Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 75. However, neither party has raised any issue concerning the propriety of the successor judge ruling on the motion to correct e......
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