Bailey v. Tennessee Dept. of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 11 September 1963
• Citation: 370 S.W.2d 492,16 McCanless 422,212 Tenn. 422
• Parties: , 212 Tenn. 422 James Harvey BAILEY et al., Appellants, v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, L. B. Jennings in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Employment Security for the State of Tennessee, and Jefferson City Cabinet Company, Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 492

370 S.W.2d 492

16 McCanless 422, 212 Tenn. 422

James Harvey BAILEY et al., Appellants, v.TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, L. B. Jennings in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Employment Security for the State of Tennessee, and Jefferson City Cabinet Company, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Sept. 11, 1963.

Richard R. Ford, Knoxville, Morgan C. Stanford, Atlanta, Ga., Duncan & Ford, Knoxville, and Adair, Goldthwaite & Stanford, Atlanta, Ga., of counsel, for appellants.

W. L. Moore, Chief Counsel, Nashville, W. D. Dodson, Asst. Chief Counsel, Nashville, for Tenn. Dept. of Employment.

N. R. Coleman, Jr., Greeneville, Milligan, Silvers & Coleman, Greeneville, of counsel, for appellees.

HOLMES, Justice.

This is an appeal by the complainants from a decree of the Chancery Court of Jefferson County which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed in that Court by appellants.This petition for certiorari sought to review a decision of the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security which had denied the appellants' claims for unemployment compensation on the ground that they were disqualified because their unemployment was due to a labor dispute in active progress at the time covered by the claims of the appellants.

The record shows that the Jefferson City Cabinet Company owns and maintains manufacturing facilities at Jefferson City, Tennessee.On February 7, 1961 there was in existence between the Company and Local 748 of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers AFL-CIO a collective bargaining agreement which constituted the local union as the recognized bargaining agent for the appellants as employees of the Cabinet Company.On that date a dispute arose between the employees and the Jefferson City Cabinet Company which resulted in approximately 200 of the appellants walking off their jobs and setting up a picket line.The remaining appellants, approximately 600 in number, refused to cross the picket line and did not return to work on February 8, 1961.A few days later an injunction was issued which limited the number of pickets to one.

By letter dated February 13, 1961 the 200 employees who had walked off the job on February 7th were notified that they were discharged by the Cabinet Company.On receiving this notice of discharge, these appellants made application for unemployment benefits.By letter dated March 21, 1961 the remaining appellants were notified of their discharge by the Cabinet Company and these appellants then made application for unemployment benefits.The Cabinet Company continued to operate its plant, hiring new employees, and in August 1961 normal production was achieved.

The picketing of the Jefferson City Cabinet Company's plant continued until mid-October 1961.All of the appellants participated in the labor dispute which brought about their total unemployment and all belonged to the same grade or class of workers which participated in the strike and none of the claimants unconditionally offered to return to work.

The initial determination of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security was that the appellants were disqualified for unemployment benefits on the ground that the unemployment of the appellants was due to a labor dispute in active progress within the meaning of T.C.A. § 50-1324(D).Appeals from this ruling were taken by the appellants which were consolidated for a hearing before the Board of Review on September 21, 1961.The Board of Review first reversed the decision of the Commissioner and held the appellants were entitled to benefits from the date of their claim.An application for a rehearing was filed by the employer, which was granted, and the matter was further heard before the Board of Review on December 8, 1961.Following this hearing, the Board of Review rendered its findings, which are in part as follows:

'In the case at bar the labor dispute arose on the seventh day of February 1961, the company continued to operate, hiring a full staff of employees to fill the places left vacant by striking employees, who are claimants in this case.The letters of discharge were sent out as shown in the original decision, however, the record contains no evidence of action on the part of the bargaining unit or the individual claimant to end the dispute by positive action on their part or by offering to return to work and no testimony was offered in behalf of the claimants to the effect that the labor dispute had ceased.'

The Board of Review reversed its former decision and denied the appellants' claims 'from the date of filing under Section 50-1324(D) of the Code of Tennessee.'

The record further shows that on August 12, 1961 the union, which was the bargaining agent of the appellants, filed a suit against the employer in the United States District Court at Knoxville seeking arbitration of the dismissal of appellants.The record indicates this suit is still pending in that Court.Also, the union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board which were dismissed.

The scope of judicial review of the decision of the Board of Review is set forth in T.C.A. § 50-1325(I) as follows:

'In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the board of review as to the facts, if there be any evidence to support the same, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law.'

In view of this statute the question for determination by this Court is whether or not under a proper construction of our Employment Security Law, T.C.A. §§ 50-1301-50-1358, there is any evidence to support the findings of the Board of Review that the appellants were disqualified for benefits by reason of the provisions of T.C.A. § 50-1324(D).This Code Section provides:

'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: * * *

'D.For any week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in active progress at the factory establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed'.

With respect to this question, it is the contention of the defendants that the labor dispute continued to be in active progress at all relevant times and that the unemployment of appellants is due to this labor dispute.On the other hand, it is the contention of the appellants that from the date of the notices of their discharge by the employer, as a matter of law, the unemployment of these appellants ceased to be due to a labor dispute in active progress and became due to their discharge by the employer.

In support of their contention, appellants strongly rely upon the case of Milne Chair Company v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393.The facts in that case are that on April 21, 1947, for an asserted grievance, 157 employees left their jobs and formed a picket line around the employer's plant.This picket line was maintained through the time of the hearing of the claims by the Board of Review.All of these employees were members of a union which was their bargaining agent.At a meeting on April 23 between the representatives of the company and the union, the union proposed 'that the workers be returned to their jobs and that the difficulty be arbitrated.'The company took the position 'that the contract had been broken by the employees walking out and that it considered that they were no longer its employees.'On April 28 another meeting between the company and the union was held.In that meeting the union proposed 'that both sides should forget everything that happened and put the people back to work'.The company at that time continued its position that these people were no longer its employees.On May 26 the employees who had walked off of the job on April 21 filed claims for payment of unemployment benefits.The evidence as to the facts was not contradicted.

The Board of Review in that case found that these employees became involuntarily unemployed on May 20, 1947 and held that they were not disqualified for benefits under T.C.A. § 50-1324(D).

The Court, in the Milne Chair Company case, at this point of its opinion, stated:

'Accordingly, the conclusion of the Board of Review was that the unemployment of these people was attributable to their dismissal by the company for breaking their contract rather than to a labor dispute.'

The Court then pointed out that the ruling of the Board that a labor dispute could not exist in the absence of an employer-employee relationship was erroneous, stating:

'However, the relationship of employer-employee is not a prerequisite to the existence of a labor dispute in the application of our Employment...