Bailey v. Truby

Decision Date11 July 1984
Docket NumberNos. 16155,16140,s. 16155
Citation321 S.E.2d 302,174 W.Va. 8
Parties, 20 Ed. Law Rep. 980 Penelope P. BAILEY, Wilma A. Beckett, George E. Lantz, William R. Leachman and Susan L. Lowther, individually and as members of the Wood County Board of Education v. Roy TRUBY, as State Superintendent of Schools and The West Virginia Board of Education, a corporation. Rodney A. MYLES, a person under the age of eighteen (18) years who sues by Ruth Ella Myles, his mother and next friend v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the COUNTY OF KANAWHA, a corporation.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The State Board of Education's promulgation of a rule requiring students to maintain a 2.0 grade point average in order to participate in nonacademic extracurricular activities is a legitimate exercise of its power of "general supervision" over the state's educational system under Article XII, § 2 of the West Virginia Constitution in furtherance of the fundamental educational goal of academic excellence.

2. The Kanawha County Board of Education's promulgation of a rule requiring students to receive passing grades in all of their classes, in addition to the State Board of Education's 2.0 grade point average rule, is a legitimate exercise of its power of "control, supervision and regulation" of nonacademic extracurricular activities under West Virginia Code § 18-2-25 (1984 Replacement Vol.); does not violate students' rights to procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection; and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against special laws or invade the province of the State Board of Education to establish basic educational policy.

George E. Lantz, David G. Palmer, Lantz, Rudolph & Palmer, Parkersburg, for petitioners in No. 16155.

Marianne K. Hoover, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondents in No. 16155.

Charles A. Riffee, II, Thomas & Riffee, St. Albans, for appellants in No. 16140.

John O. Kizer and Howard G. Salisbury, Jr., Love, Wise & Woodroe, Charleston, for appellee in No. 16140.

McGRAW, Justice:

These two actions, consolidated for decision and disposition, concern the validity of academic eligibility requirements for participation in nonacademic extracurricular activities. The first is a petition for a writ of mandamus by the Wood County Board of Education, and its individual members, seeking to compel the withdrawal of a rule promulgated by the State Board of Education that requires students to maintain a 2.0, or "C," grade point average in order to participate in extracurricular activities. The second is an appeal by Rodney A. Myles, who is a student at St. Albans High School, through his mother and next friend, Ruth Ella Myles, from the denial of injunctive relief sought in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to prohibit enforcement of a Kanawha County Board of Education rule requiring students to receive passing grades in all of their classes, in addition to the requirement that they maintain a 2.0 grade point average, in order to participate in nonacademic extracurricular activities. Because the Myles appeal involves a heightened standard of academic achievement as a prerequisite to participation in extracurricular activities, we will first address the Wood County Board of Education challenge to the State Board of Education's basic 2.0 grade point average policy.

I.

On August 12, 1983, the State Board of Education adopted a new policy governing academic and attendance requirements for participation in extracurricular activities. This policy was filed in the Secretary of State's office on November 1, 1983, to take effect at the end of the first semester of the 1983-84 school year. It is but one part of a series of policies adopted by the State Board of Education categorized under the heading "Educational Program Development."

"Extracurricular activities" are defined in the rule as "those student activities which extend beyond class instruction and include a variety of special interest groups and events, e.g., student government, class officers, student publications, drama productions, music productions, debate tournaments, interscholastic athletics, and cheerleading." Despite this broad definition of the term "extracurricular activities," we expressly limit our holdings in these actions to "nonacademic" extracurricular activities, such as interscholastic athletics and cheerleading. On the other hand, because they are closely related to identifiable academic courses of study, and serve to complement academic curricular activities, students may not be excluded, on the basis of grade point average, from vocational, linguistic, mathematic, scientific, forensic, theatrical, musical, journalistic, and other similar academic extracurricular activities. * In order to emphasize this point, we will refer to "nonacademic extracurricular activities" throughout the opinion when appropriate.

The eligibility section of the rule promulgated by the State Board of Education reads as follows:

In order to participate in the extracurricular activities to which this policy applies, a student must:

(1) maintain a 2.0 average

a. A 2.0 average is defined as a grade-point average (GPA) of 2.0 or better on a scale where an "A" mark earns 4 points, a "B" is awarded 3 points, a "C" is worth 2 points, a "D" is given a value of 1 point, and an "F" is worth 0 points.

b. In computing a student's "grade-point average" (GPA) for purposes of this policy, all subjects undertaken by the student and for which a final grade is recorded are to be considered. The total number of classes taken is divided into the total number of "grade points" earned to determine the GPA. Classes for which a pass/fail is awarded will be included in computing the GPA only if the student failed the class.

c. The student's eligibility will be determined for each semester by his or her GPA the previous semester.

d. In the case of handicapped students, grades received from placements in regular classrooms and special education classrooms should be included when computing the GPA. For handicapped students placed in ungraded programs, consideration should be given to their achievement in those programs.

AND

(2) meet state and local attendance requirements

a. Students must meet the attendance requirement in Graduation Requirements for West Virginia Public Schools: Adolescent Education (Grades 9-12) of a full day for students in the first three years of grades 9-12 and at least four class periods in the fourth year of grades 9-12.

b. Students must meet the attendance requirements of local boards of education.

This rule applies "to extracurricular activities in grades 7-12."

After receiving a memorandum dated January 19, 1984, from respondent Roy Truby, State Superintendent of Schools, reminding those involved in the implementation of the new academic eligibility standard that it would become effective at the end of the first semester of the 1983-84 school year, the Wood County Board of Education voted unanimously on January 31, 1984, to refuse to implement this new policy. The petitioners state that this action was taken "[b]ecause of considerable concern as to the merits of the subject policy and as to the authority of [the State Board of Education] to enact such a policy." Therefore, the principals and administrators of secondary schools in Wood County were directed by the Wood County Board of Education not to implement the new policy. On February 6, 1984, the petitioners voted unanimously to seek a ruling from this Court as to whether the respondents have the legal authority to adopt and enforce the new academic eligibility policy.

A.

Initially, this Court must address the propriety of mandamus as an appropriate remedy for the relief sought by the petitioners. The basic requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are well established in this jurisdiction. In Syllabus Point 2 of State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969), this Court stated: "A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist--(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy." See also Reed v. Hansbarger, 314 S.E.2d 616, 619-20 (W.Va.1984), and cases cited therein. The first two elements of this formula require an analysis of the legal rights and duties of the respective parties. At this point, it is sufficient that the petitioners are charged with the implementation of the new policy, and challenge the authority of the respondents to order its implementation. As to the third element, although the respondents contend that the "petitioners obviously have other remedies to pursue which would be more effective," they fail to identify any of these alternate adequate avenues of relief available to the petitioners.

The respondents also contend that mandamus is inappropriate in this case because the promulgation of the new policy has already taken place. Several of our cases have recognized, however, that mandamus may be utilized to challenge the validity or the constitutionality of administrative regulations or statutes already in effect. See Myers v. Barte, 279 S.E.2d 406, 408-09 (W.Va.1981); State ex rel. McCamic v. McCoy, 276 S.E.2d 534, 535, 539 n. 6 (W.Va.1981); State ex rel. West Virginia Housing Development Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W.Va. 636, 638, 171 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1969); State ex rel. Sheldon v. City of Wheeling, 146 W.Va. 691, 695, 122 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1961); Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W.Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747, 757 (1949); see also State ex rel. Ammerman v. City of Philippi, 136 W.Va. 120, 65 S.E.2d 713 (1951); State ex rel. Tucker v. City of Wheeling, 128 W.Va. 47, 35 S.E.2d 681 (1945); Austin v. Thomas, 96 W.Va. 628, 123 S.E. 590 (1924).

The respondents final argument...

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