Bailey v. Unified School Dist. No. 345

• Decision Date: 10 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 55347,55347
• Citation: 233 Kan. 714,664 P.2d 1379
• Parties: , 12 Ed. Law Rep. 131 In re Due Process Hearing of Kurt BAILEY, Kenneth E. and Barbara Bailey as natural parents and guardians for Kurt E. Bailey, a minor child, Appellants, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 345, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1379

664 P.2d 1379

233 Kan. 714, 12 Ed. Law Rep. 131

In re Due Process Hearing of Kurt BAILEY, Kenneth E. and

Barbara Bailey as natural parents and guardians for Kurt E. Bailey, a minor child, Appellants, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 345, Appellee.

No. 55347.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

June 10, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.) permitting a party to present additional evidence in a civil appeal from an administrative decision does not require the district court to admit evidence offered subsequent to the court hearing.

2. In an appeal to the district court pursuant to K.S.A.1982 Supp. 72-974(c ) by the parents of a handicapped child from the decision of the State Board of Education relative to the child's appropriate educational placement, the record is examined and it is held: The district court did not err in finding the decision of the State Board of Education was supported by substantial evidence, but see comments in opinion relative to appropriate standard of review.

A. Rodman Johnson, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellants.

Robert D. Hecht, of Scott, Quinlan & Hecht, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.

McFARLAND, Justice:

This is a dispute between plaintiffs Kenneth E. and Barbara Bailey, parents of a handicapped child, Kurt E. Bailey, and defendant Unified School District No. 345 concerning the latter's determination the child's free appropriate public education is residential placement at the Kansas State School for the Visually Handicapped (K.S.S.V.H.). The parents demand Kurt continue his mainstream education in the local public school system.

The Baileys were provided a due process hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 72-972. The parties presented their evidence, and the hearing examiner upheld the school district's determination K.S.S.V.H. was an appropriate placement for the child. Pursuant to K.S.A.1982 Supp. 72-974(b) the Baileys appealed the hearing examiner's decision to the State Board of Education. The State Board of Education reviewed the 700 page transcript and exhibits and held a review hearing wherein arguments of counsel were heard. The Board upheld the decision of the hearing examiner. The Baileys appealed the decision of the Board to the district court pursuant to K.S.A.1982 Supp. 72-974(c ). No additional evidence was submitted to the district court and, based on the record from the administrative proceeding, the district court upheld the decision of the Board, finding the same to be "supported adequately and fully" by the record. The Baileys appeal to this court from the district court decision.

Two issues are presented on appeal. The first relates to alleged district court error in excluding evidence and the second relates to whether the district court erred in finding there was substantial evidence to support the Board's decision.

The exclusion issue may be stated as follows. Did the district court err in refusing to admit additional evidence offered by the Baileys after the case had been submitted to the court for determination?

On January 3, 1983, the parties presented their oral arguments to the district court. Four days later, January 7, 1983, plaintiffs' attorney filed a motion to submit additional evidence which stated in pertinent part:

"Movant shows this Court:

"1) That certain evidence relevant to the resolution of the issues before the Court was not adduced at the due process hearing below;

"2) That the evidence is readily available and its submission is not made for the purposes of delay; and,

"3) Applicable federal law authorizes the taking of additional evidence by this Court at this stage of the proceeding."

The district court, in its Memorandum Decision filed on January 18, 1983, denied plaintiffs' motion. In so doing the court stated:

"Certain preliminary matters require initial determination. First, subsequent to the submission of this case for decision, counsel for appellant has moved this Court for an order permitting the introduction of additional evidence. No additional evidence was presented in the appeal before the State Board and no additional evidence was presented to this Court prior to the submission of this cause for decision. This Court's review is on the record, and further, the motion comes too late--the matter being now concluded."

The "applicable federal law" referred to in the Bailey motion is 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), a part of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.) 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) provides:

"(2) Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision ... shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States .... In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." (Emphasis supplied.)

The Baileys interpret 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) as carte blanche authority to submit additional evidence at any time before the decision by the district court. We do not agree.

The purpose of the "additional evidence" provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) was discussed in Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F.Supp. 1256 (E.D.Wis.1980), aff'd 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1981). In Anderson there was a three-year interim between the administrative decision relative to the handicapped child's needs and the court hearing on the appeal therefrom. The school district argued the court should be limited to reviewing the record from the state administrative hearing. In rejecting the school district's contention, the United States District Court stated:

"[T]here would be little purpose served by freezing the evidence at the moment in time when the final state administrative decision was rendered. In view of the rate at which any child's needs may change, there would be little purpose served by a court proceeding which refused to take into account current evidence of the child's needs." 495 F.Supp. at 1261.

Continuing:

"Without considering such current evidence of the child's needs as the parties choose to offer, the court would be unable adequately to meet that responsibility [determination of whether suitable specialized education is provided]. Thus, in this case all of the evidence presented during the state administrative hearing and all of the evidence presented in this action during May and June 1980 will be considered as it bears upon [the child's] current needs and the suitability of a current educational placement and program for her." 495 F.Supp. at 1261.

We interpret the "additional evidence" provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) as applying only to evidence offered at the time of the district court hearing. To require a court to consider evidence submitted at any time prior to decision could destroy orderly determination of the issues and final determination could be postponed indefinitely by a party who believed the decision might be unfavorable.

No proffer of evidence was made to the district court and no reason has been espoused as to why the "additional evidence" could not have been introduced at the time of the hearing. Indeed, even on appeal we have no information as to the nature of such "additional evidence."

We find no error or abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to permit the introduction of additional evidence after the hearing had concluded.

The second issue is whether there was substantial evidence to support the State Board of Education's decision. The parties have agreed the appropriate standard of review to be applied by the district court in this proceeding is the substantial evidence test.

In Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968), 28 A.L.R.3d 472, this court enunciated a three-pronged test for judicial review of administrative actions.

"A district court may not, on appeal, substitute its judgment for that of an administrative tribunal, but is restricted to considering whether, as a matter of law, (1) the tribunal acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, (2) the administrative order is substantially supported by evidence, and (3) the tribunal's action was within the scope of its authority." Syl. p 1. (Emphasis supplied.)

"In reviewing a district court's judgment ... this court will, in the first instance, for the purpose of determining whether the district court observed the requirements and restrictions placed upon it, make the same review of the administrative tribunal's action as does the district court." Syl. p 2.

Recently, in Kansas Dept. of Health & Environment v. Banks, 230 Kan. 169, 630 P.2d 1131 (1981), this court defined substantial evidence as:

"The deliberation of a reviewing court on application of the 'substantial evidence' test is analogous to that of a trial court which considers whether to take a case away from a jury by sustaining a motion for a directed verdict. 'Substantial evidence' has been defined as evidence which possesses both relevance and substance, and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved. Stated in another way, substantial evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as being sufficient to support a conclusion. Jibben v. Post & Brown Well Service, 199 Kan. 793, 433 P.2d 467 (1967)." 230 Kan. at 172, 630 P.2d 1131.

See also Ryan, Judicial Review of Administrative Action--Kansas Perspectives, 19 Washburn L.J. 423, 430-31 (1980).

The portion of the district court's memorandum decision relative to this issue states:

"Turning to the...