Bailey v. Unified School Dist. No. 345
Decision Date | 10 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 55347,55347 |
Citation | 233 Kan. 714,664 P.2d 1379 |
Parties | , 12 Ed. Law Rep. 131 In re Due Process Hearing of Kurt BAILEY, Kenneth E. and Barbara Bailey as natural parents and guardians for Kurt E. Bailey, a minor child, Appellants, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 345, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.) permitting a party to present additional evidence in a civil appeal from an administrative decision does not require the district court to admit evidence offered subsequent to the court hearing.
2. In an appeal to the district court pursuant to K.S.A.1982 Supp. 72-974(c ) by the parents of a handicapped child from the decision of the State Board of Education relative to the child's appropriate educational placement, the record is examined and it is held: The district court did not err in finding the decision of the State Board of Education was supported by substantial evidence, but see comments in opinion relative to appropriate standard of review.
A. Rodman Johnson, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellants.
Robert D. Hecht, of Scott, Quinlan & Hecht, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
This is a dispute between plaintiffs Kenneth E. and Barbara Bailey, parents of a handicapped child, Kurt E. Bailey, and defendant Unified School District No. 345 concerning the latter's determination the child's free appropriate public education is residential placement at the Kansas State School for the Visually Handicapped (K.S.S.V.H.). The parents demand Kurt continue his mainstream education in the local public school system.
The Baileys were provided a due process hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 72-972. The parties presented their evidence, and the hearing examiner upheld the school district's determination K.S.S.V.H. was an appropriate placement for the child. Pursuant to K.S.A.1982 Supp. 72-974(b) the Baileys appealed the hearing examiner's decision to the State Board of Education. The State Board of Education reviewed the 700 page transcript and exhibits and held a review hearing wherein arguments of counsel were heard. The Board upheld the decision of the hearing examiner. The Baileys appealed the decision of the Board to the district court pursuant to K.S.A.1982 Supp. 72-974(c ). No additional evidence was submitted to the district court and, based on the record from the administrative proceeding, the district court upheld the decision of the Board, finding the same to be "supported adequately and fully" by the record. The Baileys appeal to this court from the district court decision.
Two issues are presented on appeal. The first relates to alleged district court error in excluding evidence and the second relates to whether the district court erred in finding there was substantial evidence to support the Board's decision.
The exclusion issue may be stated as follows. Did the district court err in refusing to admit additional evidence offered by the Baileys after the case had been submitted to the court for determination?
On January 3, 1983, the parties presented their oral arguments to the district court. Four days later, January 7, 1983, plaintiffs' attorney filed a motion to submit additional evidence which stated in pertinent part:
The district court, in its Memorandum Decision filed on January 18, 1983, denied plaintiffs' motion. In so doing the court stated:
The "applicable federal law" referred to in the Bailey motion is 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), a part of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.) 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Baileys interpret 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) as carte blanche authority to submit additional evidence at any time before the decision by the district court. We do not agree.
The purpose of the "additional evidence" provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) was discussed in Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F.Supp. 1256 (E.D.Wis.1980), aff'd 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1981). In Anderson there was a three-year interim between the administrative decision relative to the handicapped child's needs and the court hearing on the appeal therefrom. The school district argued the court should be limited to reviewing the record from the state administrative hearing. In rejecting the school district's contention, the United States District Court stated:
Continuing:
We interpret the "additional evidence" provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) as applying only to evidence offered at the time of the district court hearing. To require a court to consider evidence submitted at any time prior to decision could destroy orderly determination of the issues and final determination could be postponed indefinitely by a party who believed the decision might be unfavorable.
No proffer of evidence was made to the district court and no reason has been espoused as to why the "additional evidence" could not have been introduced at the time of the hearing. Indeed, even on appeal we have no information as to the nature of such "additional evidence."
We find no error or abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to permit the introduction of additional evidence after the hearing had concluded.
The second issue is whether there was substantial evidence to support the State Board of Education's decision. The parties have agreed the appropriate standard of review to be applied by the district court in this proceeding is the substantial evidence test.
In Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968), 28 A.L.R.3d 472, this court enunciated a three-pronged test for judicial review of administrative actions.
"A district court may not, on appeal, substitute its judgment for that of an administrative tribunal, but is restricted to considering whether, as a matter of law, (1) the tribunal acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, (2) the administrative order is substantially supported by evidence, and (3) the tribunal's action was within the scope of its authority." Syl. p 1. (Emphasis supplied.)
"In reviewing a district court's judgment ... this court will, in the first instance, for the purpose of determining whether the district court observed the requirements and restrictions placed upon it, make the same review of the administrative tribunal's action as does the district court." Syl. p 2.
Recently, in Kansas Dept. of Health & Environment v. Banks, 230 Kan. 169, 630 P.2d 1131 (1981), this court defined substantial evidence as:
230 Kan. at 172, 630 P.2d 1131.
The portion of the district court's memorandum decision relative to this issue states:
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