Bailey v. United States

• Decision Date: 19 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–770.,11–770.
• Citation: 568 U.S. 186,133 S.Ct. 1031,185 L.Ed.2d 19
• Parties: Chunon L. BAILEY, aka Polo, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

568 U.S. 186

133 S.Ct. 1031

185 L.Ed.2d 19

Chunon L. BAILEY, aka Polo, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 11–770.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 1, 2012.

Decided Feb. 19, 2013.

Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Susan V. Tipograph, New York, NY, Kannon K. Shanmugam, Counsel of Record, John S. Williams, C.J. Mahoney, Kristin A. Feeley, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Jeffrey B. Wall, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Deborah Watson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the United States.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. A search may be of a person, a thing, or a place. So too a seizure may be of a person, a thing, or even a place. A search or a seizure may occur singly or in combination, and in differing sequence. In some cases the validity of one determines the validity of the other. The instant case involves the search of a place (an apartment dwelling) and the seizure of a person. But here, though it is acknowledged that the search was lawful, it does not follow that the seizure was lawful as well. The seizure of the person is quite in question. The issue to be resolved is whether the seizure of the person was reasonable when he was stopped and detained at some distance away from the premises to be searched when the only justification for the detention was to ensure the safety and efficacy of the search.

I

A

At 8:45 p.m. on July 28, 2005, local police obtained a warrant to search a residence for a .380–caliber handgun. The residence was a basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive, in Wyandanch, New York. A confidential informant had told police he observed the gun when he was at the apartment to purchase drugs from "a heavy set black male with short hair" known as "Polo." App. 16–26. As the search unit began preparations for executing the warrant, two officers, Detectives Richard Sneider and Richard Gorbecki, were conducting surveillance in an unmarked car outside the residence. About 9:56 p.m., Sneider and Gorbecki observed two men—later identified as petitioner Chunon Bailey and Bryant Middleton—leave the gated area above the basement apartment and enter a car parked in the driveway. Both matched the general physical description of "Polo" provided by the informant. There was no indication that the men were aware of the officers' presence or had any knowledge of the impending search. The detectives watched the car leave the driveway. They waited for it to go a few hundred yards down the street and followed. The detectives informed the search team of their intent to follow and detain the departing occupants. The search team then executed the search warrant at the apartment.

Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki tailed Bailey's car for about a mile—and for about five minutes—before pulling the vehicle over in a parking lot by a fire station. They ordered Bailey and Middleton out of the car and did a patdown search of both men. The officers found no weapons but discovered a ring of keys in Bailey's pocket. Bailey identified himself and said he was coming from his home at 103 Lake Drive. His driver's license, however, showed his address as Bayshore, New York, the town where the confidential informant told the police the suspect, "Polo," used to live. Id ., at 89. Bailey's passenger, Middleton, said Bailey was giving him a ride home and confirmed they were coming from Bailey's residence at 103 Lake Drive. The officers put both men in handcuffs. When Bailey asked why, Gorbecki stated that they were being detained incident to the execution of a search warrant at 103 Lake Drive. Bailey responded: "I don't live there. Anything you find there ain't mine, and I'm not cooperating with your investigation." Id ., at 57, 77.

The detectives called for a patrol car to take Bailey and Middleton back to the Lake Drive apartment. Detective Sneider drove the unmarked car back, while Detective Gorbecki used Bailey's set of keys to drive Bailey's car back to the search scene. By the time the group returned to 103 Lake Drive, the search team had discovered a gun and drugs in plain view inside the apartment. Bailey and Middleton were placed under arrest, and Bailey's keys were seized incident to the arrest. Officers later discovered that one of Bailey's keys opened the door of the basement apartment.

B

Bailey was charged with three federal offenses: possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) ; possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). At trial Bailey moved to suppress the apartment key and the statements he made when stopped by Detectives Sneider and Gorbecki. That evidence, Bailey argued, derived from an unreasonable seizure. After an evidentiary hearing the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the motion to suppress. The District Court held that Bailey's detention was permissible under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), as a detention incident to the execution of a search warrant. In the alternative, it held that Bailey's detention was lawful as an investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). After a trial the jury found Bailey guilty on all three counts.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that Bailey's detention was proper and affirmed denial of the suppression motion. It interpreted this Court's decision in Summers to "authoriz[e] law enforcement to detain the occupant of premises subject to a valid search warrant when that person is seen leaving those premises and the detention is effected as soon as reasonably practicable ." 652 F.3d 197, 208 (2011). Having found Bailey's detention justified under Summers, the Court of Appeals did not address the District Court's alternative holding that the stop was permitted under Terry .

The Federal Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions as to whether Michigan v. Summers justifies the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises covered by a search warrant. This Court granted certiorari to address the question. 566 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2710, 183 L.Ed.2d 67 (2012).

II

The Fourth Amendment, applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment to the States, provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." This Court has stated "the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause" to believe that the individual has committed a crime. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). The standard of probable cause, with "roots that are deep in our history," Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959), "represent[s] the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Dunaway,supra, at 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248.

Within the framework of these fundamental rules there is some latitude for police to detain where "the intrusion on the citizen's privacy 'was so much less severe' than that involved in a traditional arrest that 'the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer's safety' could support the seizure as reasonable." Summers, supra, at 697–698, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (quoting Dunaway,supra, at 209, 99 S.Ct. 2248); see also Terry, supra, at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (holding that a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may conduct a brief investigative stop).

In Summers, the Court defined an important category of cases in which detention is allowed without probable cause to arrest for a crime. It permitted officers executing a search warrant "to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." 452 U.S., at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587. The rule in Summers extends farther than some earlier exceptions because it does not require law enforcement to have particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific danger to the officers. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005). In Muehler, applying the rule in Summers, the Court stated: "An officer's authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the 'quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.' " 544 U.S., at 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (quoting Summers, supra, at 705, n. 19, 101 S.Ct. 2587). The rule announced in Summers allows detention incident to the execution of a search warrant "because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial." Muehler,supra, at 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465.

In Summers and later cases the occupants detained were found within or immediately outside a residence at the moment the police officers executed the search warrant. In Summers, the defendant was detained on a walk leading down from the front steps of the house. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in O.T. 1980, No. 79–1794, pp. 41–42; see also Muehler, supra, at 96, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (detention of occupant in adjoining garage); Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 611, 127 S.Ct. 1989,...