Bailey v. United States, 17834.
Decision Date | 06 February 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 17834.,17834. |
Citation | 328 F.2d 542,117 US App. DC 241 |
Parties | Joseph W. BAILEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Richard P. Williams, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Franklin M. Schultz and Charles F. Moore, Washington, D. C., (all appointed by this court) were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Robert D. Devlin, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker and Robert B. Norris, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Harold J. Sullivan, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, BASTIAN and J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied March 23, 1964.
Between 11:00 p. m. and midnight on Friday, July 27, 1962, Joseph W. Bailey shot and killed Reginald Harvey, a brother of his common law wife. On August 20, 1962, he was indicted for manslaughter and on March 5, 1963, he was found guilty by a jury. On this appeal, Bailey contends that a typed statement he gave the police was erroneously received in evidence, that his acquittal should have been directed on the ground of self-defense, and that his conviction should be reversed on the ground that he was not accorded a speedy trial.
As to the principal contention — that Bailey's typed statement should have been rejected on Mallory grounds1 — Bailey testified that about 12:20 a. m. on Saturday, July 28, 1962, shortly after he fled from the scene of the shooting, he surrendered to a police officer whom he met on the street. He said,
The officer arrested Bailey and took him to the 14th precinct station where he had a conversation with Detective Hack at approximately 12:50 a. m., which Hack described thus:
They arrived at the Homicide Office about ten minutes later, and at 1:30 a. m. the typing of a statement was begun. It was completed and signed by Bailey at about 2:00 a. m. Saturday, July 28.
At the trial, Bailey told the story of the shooting much as he had done in the typed statement. In cross-examination, Government counsel read portions of the statement to him in an effort to impeach him as to several minor points. This was proper, even if the typed statement had been unlawfully obtained; for the Supreme Court said in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 356, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954):
To the same effect is Tate v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 283 F.2d 377 (1960).
As he had done in his oral confession and in his typed statement, Bailey admitted from the stand that he had shot Harvey but claimed, as he had done in the typed statement, that he had acted in self-defense. The jury did not agree with him. Although he had objected on Mallory grounds to the use of the statement, Bailey's counsel suggested the entire statement be given to the jury, and said he would like to read to the jury "the parts that have not been previously read." Counsel then proceeded to ask Bailey whether he had made certain rather lengthy statements contained in the typed document. He admitted that he had, with a few minor corrections, but stated that the typed statement was incomplete in that it did not include the statement that Harvey was a bully and that he was afraid of him. He also said, inaccurately, that his claim of self-defense was omitted from the statement.
In these circumstances, the trial judge was correct in the first instance in receiving the typed statement over the Mallory objection. There was a threshold oral confession, and the typed statement was immediately prepared and signed. Appellant was informed that he need not make a statement and that he could remain silent. Moreover, Bailey's counsel read to the jury those portions of the typed statement that the prosecutor had omitted.
The appellant's argument that the Mallory rule was violated is principally based on the fact that he was not presented to a committing magistrate until Monday, July 30, although he had confessed to the shooting and given the largely exculpatory typed statement in the early morning hours of Saturday, July 28. Even if his detention during this subsequent period was unlawful, it did not retroactively make inadmissible the typed statement voluntarily given at its inception. The Supreme Court said of illegal detention subsequent to confession in the Mitchell case:2
In the Mallory decision, written thirteen years after the Mitchell case, the Supreme Court said, 354 U.S. at 453, 77 S.Ct. at 1359, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479:
"* * * In order adequately to enforce the congressional requirement of prompt arraignment, it was deemed necessary in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 to render inadmissible incriminating statements elicited from defendants dur- ing a period of unlawful detention." (Emphasis added.)
Some judges have construed this as an alteration of the Mitchell ruling and, in consequence, have held that a voluntary confession is inadmissible if it was followed by a period of illegal detention.
We have held to the contrary in a number of cases. Judge Burger said in Metoyer v. United States:3
In Porter v. United States5 Mr. Justice Reed, sitting with us by designation, after referring to the Mitchell case, said:
"* * * There is no rule of law in federal courts that bars the admissibility of extra-judicial statements of prisoners to the police after arrest and before the time has expired of permissible detention between arrest and appearance before a magistrate."
In Lockley v. United States6 we said:
"* * * A confession given during a period of necessary delay in arraignment is not inadmissible because that period was followed by a period of unnecessary delay. * *"
Judge Edgerton, speaking for a unanimous court in a case where the timetable was largely similar to that in the present situation, said:7
* * *"
The Mitchell case, relied upon in each of the foregoing decisions, has never been altered by the Supreme Court. Indeed, as recently as 1961, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the author of the McNabb, Mitchell and Mallory opinions, said:8
"* * * Of course, our decision in United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140, makes clear that confessions made during the period immediately following arrest and before delay becomes unlawful are not to be excluded under the rule."
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