Baim v. Fleck
| Decision Date | 18 May 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 31484,31484 |
| Citation | 92 N.E.2d 770,406 Ill. 193 |
| Parties | BAIM v. FLECK et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Aronson & Aronson, of Chicago (Irving Goodman, and Herbert F. Friedman, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General (Robert J. Burdett, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
Plaintiff, a taxpayer, brought suit in the superior court of Cook County to enjoin the defendant officers from disbursing public funds in the administration or enforcement of sections 23 and 24 of article VI of the Illinois Liquor Control Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 43, pars. 144a and 144b.) By his amended complaint the validity of each section was challenged on several grounds. A motion by defendants to dismiss the suit was sustained as to section 23 but overruled as to section 24, which the court found to be unconstitutional. Defendants elected to stand on their motion, and a final decree was rendered accordingly. Plaintiff appeals to this court, contending the superior court erred in holding section 23 valid, and defendants have taken a cross appeal contesting the portion of the decree holding section 24 to be void.
The validity of section 23 will be considered first. It reads as follows: (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 43, par. 144a.) It is first contended that the section is unconstitutional on the grounds that the terms 'unmixed whiskey,' 'unmixed gin' and 'unmixed run' are vague and uncertain in meaning, and that by their use the legislature has given to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission an uncontrolled discretion to define the type of liquor referred to. There is no merit in this position. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the word 'whiskey' has a usual and popular meaning, which is not rendered ambiguous by the fact that classifications may be made as to 'bonded' whiskey, 'straight' whiskey, 'blended' whiskey and the like. The statute applies to all types of whiskey, gin and rum, sold or offered for sale by the drink, in the form in which they are poured from the bottle, without being first combined with other ingredients to form a mixture. The term 'unmixed' clearly refers to the designated liquors in the form in which they exist in the original container, and has no bearing upon their composition as determined by the manufacturer. Where the words appearing in a statute are in common and daily use, and when read in connection with the context are susceptible to a common understanding, their use does not render the statute invalid. The section is not subject to the objection of uncertainty and vagueness.
Plaintiff secondly contends that the fixing of a minimum quantity which may be sold is an unreasonable and arbitrary restriction having no relation to publice health, safety, or welfare. The police power of the State is not confined to the protection of public health and safety, and the preservation of order, but extends as well to the prevention of fraud, deceit and imposition. People v. Freeman, 242 Ill. 373, 90 N.E. 17 Ann.Cas. 1098. The manifest purpose of the instant prohibition is to curb the opportunities for deception involved in the use of containers purporting by implication to hold an ounce but which in fact contain a smaller amount. It is not unreasonable for the legislature to infer that glasses or other containers in which whiskey, gin and rum are sold by the drink are commonly and popularly understood to hold an ounce; that purchasers are generally uncritical, and rely in their purchases upon such a prevailing understanding; and that opportunities exist for the vendor to deceive unsuspecting purchasers by using smaller containers. And the legislature presumably found such practices to exist and to be sufficiently extensive in this State to require some corrective measures. The reasonableness of the present enactment must be tested with reference, not only to the nature of the evil intended to be remedied, but also the means otherwise available for that purpose. The prevention of deception in such sales would not be practicable if the matter were left to ordinary legal remedies afforded the consumer for fraud or deceit, for the amount involved would in most cases not justify a resort to litigation. Requirements similar to those in the case at bar have been upheld by this court as reasonable methods of preventing deception. Thus a requirement that every container in which milk is sold bear a true marking as to its capacity is a valid exercise of police power to prevent fraud and imposition in the sale of milk; City of Chicago v. Bowman Dairy Co. 234 Ill. 294, 84 N.E. 913, 17 L.R.A., N.S., 684, 123 Am.St.Rep. 100, 14 Ann.Cas. 700, and a regulation prescribing weights for loaves of bread which may be offered for sale is not subject to the constitutional objections urged in the case at bar. City of Chicago v. Schmindinger, 243 Ill. 167, 90 N.E. 369, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 632, 17 Ann.Cas. 614, affirmed 226 U.S. 578, 33 S.Ct. 182, 57 L.Ed. 364, Ann.Cas.1914B, 284. Further, we have heretofore held that a law is not invalid which prohibits the sale of rum, gin, or whiskey in a quantity less than a designated amount. Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196. The prevention of fraud and deception has generally been recognized as being within the police power. Statutes enacted for this purpose, which have a reasonable relation to the preservation of the public interest sought to be protected, do not contravene the constitutional provision here relied upon, despite some degree of interference with freedom of contract. This rule is especially applicable where, as here, the regulation concerns the business of selling intoxicating liquors. Unlike the pursuit of other occupations, there is no inherent right to engage in this business. It is the policy of this State to consider the right to such traffic as permissive, only. People v. Smith, 368 Ill. 328, 333, 14 N.E.2d 82; Schwuchow v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 444, 449. We cannot say, therefore, that the present requirement is unreasonable or arbitrary, or that it lacks the necessary relation to the general purposes of police power.
It is further urged that in exempting sales made on boats and railroad cars the section constitutes special legislation in violation of section 22 of article IV of the constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats. This position cannot be sustained. The legislature may reasonably believe that the causes of the evil at which the act is directed do not exist in such places to the same extent as elsewhere. The intensity of competition among ordinary vendors of intoxicating liquors, which may to some extent induce resort to questionable practices in order to sell at reduced prices, does not exist on railroad cars. Whether it is among the taverns and other fixed localities that the evil to be suppressed is most likely to arise is a matter for determination by the legislature if there is some reasonable basis for the classification. The legislature has a broad discretion in making classifications for police regulation. The requirement of the constitution that laws shall be general does not mean that every statute shall have effect upon every individual and in every locality. It is for the legislature to determine when and where conditions exist requiring an exercise of police power to meet existing evils, and, when the legislature has acted, a presumption arises that the act is a valid exercise of such power. People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 279, 182 N.E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605. In the case at bar plaintiff has failed...
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