Baines v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 135, Sept. Term, 2008.,135, Sept. Term, 2008.
• Citation: 416 Md. 604,7 A.3d 578
• Parties: Paul Antoine BAINES v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

7 A.3d 578

416 Md. 604

Paul Antoine BAINES

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 135, Sept. Term, 2008.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Oct. 28, 2010.

Brian L. Zavin, Assistant Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, Baltimore), on brief, for petitioner.

Brenda Gruss, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, BARBERA, and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

BARBERA, J.

This appeal concerns whether a judge who agrees to be bound to the terms of a plea agreement that calls for a sentence "within the guidelines" may impose a "split sentence" that exceeds the guidelines and suspends all but the part of the sentence that falls within the guidelines. The State and Petitioner Paul Antoine Baines negotiated a plea bargain that called for him to plead guilty to two counts of armed robbery and be sentenced "within the guidelines." The overall guidelines range for those offenses was seven to thirteen years. The court accepted the plea and agreed "just [to] commit myself within [the] Guidelines." The court sentenced Petitioner on the first count of armed robbery to 20 years, all but 7 years suspended, and on the second count of armed robbery to a consecutive 20 years, all but 6 years suspended, with the suspended part of each sentence accompanied by 5 years of probation.

Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal, arguing that the court breached the sentencing term of the plea agreement because the total sentence, including the part of the sentence that was suspended, exceeded the sentencing guidelines. The Court of Special Appeals granted the application and, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the judgment. We granted certiorari to consider whether the sentence imposed by the Circuit Court was in breach of the plea agreement.

The answer to that question is dictated by Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 7 A.3d 557 (2010), which we filed today immediately prior to this opinion. Consistent with the rule announced in Cuffley, we hold that the sentence was in breach of the plea agreement, because the record of the plea proceeding reflects that Petitioner reasonably understood that the court would not impose a total sentence exceeding thirteen years, including both non-suspended and suspended time. Therefore,Petitioner is entitled to the relief of specific performance of the agreement.

I.

In March 2006, Petitioner was charged in a 30-count indictment filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, with offenses arising out of a home invasion. In May 2006, an Assistant State's Attorney (not the Assistant State's Attorney who worked out the final plea bargain) mailed to Petitioner's counsel a letter setting forth the terms of a proposed plea agreement. The letter read:

This is to advise you that the State intends to make the following plea offer in this case:

Plea to: Count 1, 8 & 15-RDW [robbery with a dangerous weapon], free to allocute within guidelines.

The defendant agrees as part of the plea agreement to request a full and complete record check or PSI [pre-sentence investigation] by Parole and Probation after accepting the plea and prior to sentencing. If the information provided by Parole and Probation would yield an offender score greater than that set forth above, then the State is free to request at the time of sentencing any period of actual incarceration, which is within the confines of the sentencing guidelines. Any and all offender scores are to be determined pursuant to theinstructions set forth in the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The State is free to file for and request mandatory sentencing if the information yielded by Parole and Probation reveals that the defendant is a candidate for mandatory sentencing.

This offer expires and will be treated as having been automatically rejected if not accepted by the defendant on or before the first motions date. This plea offer is automatically rejected if the defendant litigates motions.

(Emphasis in original).¹

The record discloses no further communications between the parties until September 2006, when they appeared in the Circuit Court for a plea hearing. At the outset of the hearing, defense counsel informed the court of the terms of the plea agreement between the parties: Petitioner would enter an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon (one count for each of the two victims); the State would enter the remaining charges nolle prosequi; and "sentencing [would] be within Guidelines." The court confirmed that it was being asked that "I just commit myself within Guidelines?" to which the State replied, "Yes, sir. Free to allocute."

The court spoke with Petitioner to ascertain that he understood the terms of the plea agreement, which included that the court, in its words, "would sentence [Petitioner] within the Guidelines." The court also engaged Petitioner in a colloquy to ensure that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Among other questions, the court asked Petitioner about a document entitled "Waiver of Rights at Plea." That document, which Petitioner and his attorney signed on the day of the plea hearing, includes a handwritten interlineation stating: "[M]y sentence is to be within guidelines." The court asked Petitioner if he had read over the "Waiver of Rights at Plea" and understood the rights he was waiving. Petitioner replied that he understood. The State then set forth the factual basis for the plea. The court accepted the plea, ordered a pre-sentence investigation, and set a date for sentencing.

Sentencing occurred three months later. At the outset of the proceeding, the court asked if "[t]his is another guidelines case?" Defense counsel stated: "By agreement with theOffice of the State's Attorney, which you approved, the sentencing was to be within the sentencing guidelines; free to allocute within the guidelines. The other 28 counts of the indictment would be entered as nolle prosequi by the State; probation within the Court's discretion." The guidelines range, as we have mentioned, called for a sentence of 7 to 13 years' incarceration.²

Defense counsel informed the court that he had reviewed the pre-sentence report with Petitioner and there were "no corrections, additions or deletions to be made in the report." Defense counsel spoke on Petitioner's behalf, addressed Petitioner'sfour prior convictions (three of which Petitioner, evidently, incorrectly thought had been expunged), then asked the court "to impose a sentence of 13 years, suspend all but seven years, credit for time served" and "an appropriate period of probation as the Court sees fit."

The State recommended a sentence of "20 [years], suspend all but 13 years, for each count, to run concurrent, with five years supervised probation." Defense counsel did not assert that the State was barred by the terms of the agreement from making such a recommendation. The court imposed the following sentence: "On count 1, the sentence is 20 years, suspend all but seven, with five years probation. On count 8, the sentence is 20 years, suspend all but six. That's to be consecutive to count 1. Five years probation." Defense counsel did not object to the sentence imposed.

Several days after sentencing, Petitioner personally wrote to the court, asking the court to reconsider the sentence. Petitioner averred that he had entered his plea with the understanding that the sentencing range was three to nine years, "no matter what the P.S.I. report says." ³ He objectedto 13 years' incarceration and did not mention the suspended part of the sentence. Petitioner suggested that the court run the two sentences concurrently.

Petitioner, through defense counsel, filed in the Circuit Court a motion for reconsideration of sentence, requesting that the sentence be reduced. The Circuit Court denied that motion, without a hearing. Defense counsel also filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals granted the application and transferred the case to the regular appeal docket.

Petitioner argued before the Court of Special Appeals, inter alia, that the sentence was illegal in that it exceeded the terms of the binding plea agreement. According to Petitioner, the agreement called for a "total sentence that could not exceed thirteen years." The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, disagreed, and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. The Court of Special Appeals looked to the entire record before the appellate court and, based on it, held that Petitioner understood that the Circuit Court could impose a sentence that exceeded the sentencing guidelines, so long as the un-suspended part of the sentence did not exceed the guidelines. The Court of Special Appeals noted preliminarily:

An agreement to sentence "within the guidelines" necessarily contemplates the application of the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("the Sentencing Manual"), which expressly provides, at § 12.1 p. 42 (2005): "Suspended time is not considered in determining whether the sentence falls within the recommended guidelines range. The guidelines range represents only non-suspended time." Therefore, the sentence imposed in this case is a sentence "within the recommended guidelines range" according to the Sentencing Manual.

The Court recognized that "[t]his does not, however, end our inquiry."

The Court of Special Appeals noted that the Circuit Court "did not advise [Petitioner] that a sentence 'within the guidelines' did not include suspended time." Moreover, the AssistantState's Attorney who wrote the May 2006 plea offer letter stated that " 'the State is free to request at the time of sentencing any period of actual incarceration which is in the confines ofthe sentencing guidelines.' " (Emphasis added by the Court of Special Appeals). The Court of...