Bainter v. Bainter

• Decision Date: 04 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 18A02-9107-CV-283,18A02-9107-CV-283
• Citation: 590 N.E.2d 1134
• Parties: Keith BAINTER, William Bainter, and Teresa George, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Evadean BAINTER, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1134

590 N.E.2d 1134

Keith BAINTER, William Bainter, and Teresa George Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Evadean BAINTER, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 18A02-9107-CV-283.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Second District.

May 4, 1992.

Steven C. Smith, Anderson, for appellants-plaintiffs.

William Clifford, Anderson, for appellee-defendant.

SHIELDS, Judge.

Keith Bainter Jr., William Bainter, and Teresa (nee Bainter) George appeal the trial court's award of their deceased father's life insurance proceeds to his wife Evadean Bainter.

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in finding Melvin Bainter's obligation to name his children as beneficiaries on a life insurance policy pursuant to a dissolution decree terminated upon the children's emancipation.

FACTS

Melvin Keith Bainter and Judith Ann (Bainter) Bowen divorced on July 10, 1981. The decree of dissolution awarded Judith custody of the couple's three children: Melvin Keith Jr. (Keith), born November 26, 1961; William David, born January 17, 1963; and Teresa Lucille, born October 10, 1965, and ordered Melvin to pay child support, provide medical, optical, and dental care, and "name his minor children as beneficiaries under any life insurance policy presently in force or which he shall obtain prior to his youngest child reaching the age of twenty-one (21)." Record at 110. At the time of divorce, Keith, William, and Teresa were nineteen, eighteen, and fifteen years old, respectively.

Melvin married Evadean (Bowen) Bainter on August 1, 1981. Thereafter, he changed the beneficiary designation on an existing life insurance policy, in effect at the time of the dissolution decree, from his children to Evadean.

At a hearing held on July 9, 1984, concerning child support payments, the court declared then-nineteen-year-old Teresa emancipated; Keith, at age twenty-two, and William, at age twenty-one, were emancipated by operation of law.

Following Melvin's death on November 5, 1984, United Farm Bureau Insurance Company issued a check to Evadean in the amount of eleven thousand four hundred twenty dollars and twenty-eight cents ($11,420.28), representing the death benefits from Melvin's insurance policy. The Bainter children filed an action against Evadean to recover the proceeds of the insurance policy.

The trial court found against the Bainter children and entered judgment in favor of Evadean. The Bainter children appeal.

DISCUSSION

The parties' disagreement concerns the correct interpretation of the provision in the dissolution decree that shall "name his minor children as beneficiaries under any life insurance policy presently in force or which he shall obtain prior to his youngest child reaching the age of twenty-one (21)." Record at 110.

The provision requires interpretation: the initial clause requires Melvin to name his minor children as beneficiaries on the life insurance policy in force at the time of the dissolution, while the second clause requires Melvin to name his minor children as beneficiaries on any policy he obtains prior to his youngest child reaching twenty-one.

A minor is a person under full legal age, i.e., a person under a legal disability. See Wells v. Wells (1855), 6 Ind. 447 (in 1849 a person's legal disabilities were removed the day preceding his or her twenty-first anniversary of birth); IC 1-1-4-5(6) (1991 Supp.) (for purposes of all Indiana statutes, the term "minor" means "a person less than eighteen (18) years of age"); Random House Webster's College Dictionary 863 (1991). Under present Indiana law, a person's legal disabilities are removed upon attaining eighteen (18) years of age. See, e.g., IC 3-7-1-1 (1988) (eighteen year old may vote); IC 16-8-12-1 (1988) (eighteen year old may consent to medical treatment); IC 29-1-5-1 (1988) (eighteen year old may execute a will); IC 29-1-10-1 (1991 Supp.) (eighteen year old may serve as personal representative); IC 29-3-1-10 (1991 Supp.) (anyone under eighteen is a minor for purposes of Title 29); IC 30-4-1-2 (1991 Supp.) (for purposes of Title 30 an adult is anyone eighteen years of age or older); IC 31-6-1-9 (1991 Supp.) (a child is a person under eighteen years of age for purposes of Title 31); IC 32-1-2-2 (1991 Supp.) (persons under eighteen may not alienate land).

At the time of the dissolution decree only one child, Teresa, was a minor. However, the trial court's intent in using the term minor is called into question by the fact that Bainter could not comply with the second clause if the term minor is correctly used in the first clause. It would have been impossible for Bainter to name his minor children (children under eighteen years of age) as beneficiaries of any policy which he obtains prior to the youngest child reaching twenty-one because there could be no such child (i.e., once the youngest child reaches eighteen, that child would no longer be a "minor"--thus, there would no longer be minor children to name in any policy during the three years until the youngest child reaches twenty-one).

Further interpretation of the provision is required because the decree is silent as to the duration of Melvin's obligation to name certain of his children as beneficiaries.

The trial court interpreted the contested provision based upon its determination the decree "sought to protect the rights of unemancipated children during the time in which support was due from Melvin. Such a decree has no effect after the children are emancipated and consequently, Melvin was free to change beneficiaries as he saw fit." Record at 152.

The children acknowledge that the intent of the insurance provision was, in part, to protect their interest in child support during their minority. However, they assert an additional intention to protect their interests "in Melvin's estate in the event of his remarriage or Melvin's excluding them under his Last Will and Testament." Appellants' Brief at 9.

The trial court's judgment protects the interest of the children in child support during their minority; it does not protect their asserted interest in Melvin's estate. However, the existence of this second, additional intent in the dissolution court's insurance provision is negated by the dissolution court's designation of the...