Bair v. Bair

• Decision Date: 23 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. 9581,9581
• Citation: 415 P.2d 673,91 Idaho 30
• Parties: W. M. BAIR, Enid Ereman, Geneva Wilson, Robert G. Bair, Elsie Bezona, Ruth J. Bair, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Kathryn M. BAIR, Administratrix of the Estate of Samuel Wayne Bair, deceased, Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 673

415 P.2d 673

91 Idaho 30

W. M. BAIR, Enid Ereman, Geneva Wilson, Robert G. Bair, Elsie Bezona, Ruth J. Bair, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Kathryn M. BAIR, Administratrix of the Estate of Samuel Wayne Bair, deceased, Respondent-Respondent.

No. 9581.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 23, 1966.

Green & Hunt, Sandpoint, for appellants.

Stephen Bistline, Sandpoint, for respondent.

McQUADE, Justice.

The opinion of this court filed herein December 31, 1965, is withdrawn and this opinion is substituted therefor.

This petition was filed in the Probate Court of Bonner County by the brothers and sisters of the deceased, Samuel Wayne Bair, for the purpose of having themselves declared his heirs at law. The basis of their challenge was the allegation that Kathryn Margaret Bair, referred to herein as Kathryn, was not the lawful wife of Bair at the time of his death by reason of the fact that she was still legally married to one George Treece because a divorce she previously had obtained from Treece was invalid. The Probate Court ruled against the petitioners and decreed Kathryn to be the surviving widow of Samuel Wayne Bair. The petitioners appealed to the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District and a trial de novo was held on the issues presented. The District Court affirmed the judgment of the Probate Court and the petitioners have appealed from that judgment.

Numerous issues were presented on this appeal, but at the outset we must determine whether petitioners had standing to attack collaterally the Idaho divorce decree granted to Kathryn from her former husband, Treece. Petitioners allege that Kathryn was not a resident of Idaho for six full weeks next preceding the commencement of her divorce action against Treece as required by I.C. § 32-701 and that, therefore, the divorce judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction, cf. Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 212 P.2d 1031 (1949), and that her subsequent marriage to Bair was ipso facto invalid. I.C. § 32-207. Regardless of the validity of these contentions, we hold that petitioners are not such persons as are entitled to attack the validity of Kathryn's divorce decree and, therefore, the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed.

As is true in all areas of the law, but most especially with respect to marriage and divorce, the stability of judgments and their inviolability from subsequent impeachment are essential for an orderly society. After a decree of divorce is granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, not only the parties thereto but others as well place great reliance on the validity of that decree. It would be both inequitable and against established law to freely permit, except in the most unusual of circumstances, such judgments to be subject to collateral attack and thus severely disrupt the lives of numerous persons who wre litigants, most of whom will be innocent of any wrongdoing. The interest of these petitioners is too tenuous to permit such an attack. They were neither parties to nor in privity with any of the parties to the eivorce action. They had no preexisting rights adversely affected by the decree of divorce between Treece and Kathryn. Petitioners had, at most, an expectancy of inheritance should their brother, the deceased, die intestate and without a wife. This expectancy was not a legal right-during Bair's lifetime they could not, of course, sue to enforce it. However, as a matter of public policy, we feel petitioners, as strangers to the divorce decree, have no right to attack its validity. To hold otherwise could cause chaos and uncertainty in the lives of the thousands of persons who have been divorced and, relying upon that judgment, have subsequently remarried. Once a divorce decree is final, it should not be disturbed by strangers who had no preexisting rights or interests adversely affected by such judgment. The parties to the divorce and others who have since relied on the valied on the decree are entitled to rely thereon and plan their lives accordingly without fear that at some future date they will be found to have acted bigamously or that their children will become bastardized.

The conclusion we have reached herein is supported by the weight of authority from other jurisdictions. In Re Hanson's Estate, 210 F.Supp. 377 (D.C.Cir.1962), aff'd 117 U.S.App.D.C. 191, 327 F.2d 889 (1963); Brown v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 196 F.2d 777 (D.C.Cir.1952); Tippin v. Tippin, 148 Conn. 1, 166 A.2d 448 (1960); Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 47 Atl. 755, 54 L.R.A. 758 (1901); Webb v. Daiger, 173 A.2d 920 (Mun.Ct.D.C.1961); deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla.1949); Martocello v. Martocello, 197 Ga. 629, 30 S.E.2d 108 (1944); Thomas v. Lambert, 187 Ga. 616, 1 S.E.2d 443 (1939); Hansberger v. Hansberger, 182 Ga. 495, 185 S.E. 810 (1936); Fisher v. De Marr, 226 Md. 509, 174 A.2d 345 (1961); Kirby v. Kent, 172 Miss. 457, 160 So. 569, 99 A.L.R. 1303 (1935); Reger v. Reger, 316 Mo. 1310, 293 S.W. 414 (1927); Deyette v. Deyette, 92 Vt. 305, 104 A. 232, 4 A.L.R. 1115 (1918); Evans v. Asphalt Roads & Materials Co., 194 Va. 165, 72 S.E.2d 321 (1952); In re Englund's Estate, 45 Wash.2d 708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954). See also 1 Freeman, Judgments §§ 318, 319 (5th ed.); 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 355; 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 485; Annot. 12 A.L.R.2d 717. But cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135, 12 A.L.R.2d 706 (1949); Ex Parte Nimmer, 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E.2d 716 (1948).

Because of our holding herein, it is unnecessary to discuss other issues raised on this appeal.

The judgment is affirmed with directions to the trial court to dismiss the action.

No costs awarded.

FELTON, D. J., and TOWLES, D. J., concur.

TAYLOR, Justice (concurring):

As a general proposition, a collateral attack upon a judgment can be permitted only in cases where the judgment is invalied on jurisdictional grounds or where it was obtained through extrinsic fraud. Moyes v. Moyes, 60 Idaho 601, 94 P.2d 782 (1939); Rogers v. National Surety Co., 53 Idaho 128, 22 P.2d 141 (1933); Welch v. Morris, 49 Idaho 781, 291 P. 1048 (1930); Harkness v. Utah Power & Light Co., 49 Idaho 756, 291 P. 1051 (1930); Weil v. Defenbach, 36 Idaho 37, 208 P. 1025 (1922); O'Neill v. Potvin, 13 Idaho 721, 93 P. 20, 257 (1907).

I do not regard the decision in Treece v. Treece, 84 Idaho 457, 373 P.2d 750 (1962), as controlling here. We have held that domicile of the plaintiff within this state is essential to the jurisdiction of the district court in a divorce action. Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 212 P.2d 1031 (1949). In that case it was also held that the statutory requirement of six weeks residence does not present an issue of jurisdiction, but one of proof essential to the authority of the court to grant a divorce.

In this case Kathryn returned to Idaho and established her domicile in this state, intending to reside here permanently. This she was permitted to do under our statute. I.C. § 32-702. Upon the filing of her complaint the district court acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. Robinson v. Robinson, supra; Stewart v. Stewart, 32 Idaho 180, 180 P. 165 (1919). The petitioners in this case seek to show that the divorce decree was invalid because Kathryn had not actually resided in this state the full six weeks next preceding the commencement of the divorce action. They seek to show that the divorce court committed error in finding from the proof submitted that Kathryn had met the residence requirement. This constitutes a collateral attack upon a ground which is not jurisdictional, and an attack which is not based upon a showing of extrinsic fraud. The issue of residence was intrinsic in the divorce proceedings and...