Baird v. Board of Recreation Commissioners of The Village of South Orange

• Decision Date: 16 May 1932
• Docket Number: No. 18.,18.
• Citation: Baird v. Bd. of Recreation Com'rs of Vill. of S. Orange, 160 A. 537 (N.J. 1932)
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAM T. BAIRD, individually and as trustee, &c., complainant-respondent, v. BOARD OF RECREATION COMMISSIONERS OF THE VILLAGE OF SOUTH ORANGE et al., defendants-appellants

160 A. 537

BAIRD

v. BOARD OF RECREATION COM'RS OF VILLAGE OF SOUTH ORANGE et al.

No. 18.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 16, 1932.

Syllabus by the Court.+++

1. Nuisances will not be enjoined at the suit of an individual unless he suffers some

private, direct, and material damage beyond the public at large as well as damage otherwise irreparable.

2. There is no jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery to restrain violations of the criminal statutes.

3. A restrictive covenant in a deed conveying lands to a municipality that such lands "are conveyed upon condition and subject to the restriction that the premises above described shall be used solely for public park and playground purposes" is not violated by the use of such lands in the manner provided and authorized by section 11, article 36, of the act entitled "An Act concerning municipalities" (P. L. 1917, chapter 152, p. 319), such statute existing at the time the deed containing such covenant was executed and delivered.

4. Strock v. East Orange, 80 N. J. Law, 619, 77 A. 1051, approved, adopted, and applied.

WELLS, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by William T. Baird, individually and as trustee, etc., against the Board of Recreation Commissioners of the Village of South Orange and others. Decree in favor of the complainant (108 N. J. Eq. 91, 154 A. 204), and the defendants appeal.

Decree reversed.

Thomas E. Fitzsimmons, of Newark, for appellants.

Auguste Roche, Jr., of Newark, for respondent.

CAMPBELL, J.

This is an appeal from an injunctive order of March 25, 1931, restraining the village of South Orange, its board of recreation commissioners, and the South Orange Baseball Club from holding professional or semi-professional baseball games, with an admission charge, on Sundays, or any other days, upon lands obtained by the village from the Meadowland Society, and also from so using such lands "in such a manner as to annoy and disturb the rest of complainant and his family and to interrupt and destroy their peace, quiet and enjoyment on Sundays or any other days, by playing or permitting said professional or semi-professional baseball games to be played on Sundays or any other days."

From the opinion of the Vice Chancellor, who heard the matter, it is somewhat difficult and confusing to reach a conclusion upon exactly what grounds, factual and legal, he advised the decree under review.

There seems to have been, originally, three findings:

(1) That there was established a public nuisance amounting to a special nuisance to the complainant, because the Vice Chancellor says: "I have no difficulty in believing that the peace, rest, and quiet of the complainant and his supporting witnesses, and that of the public, on Sunday afternoons, were thus disturbed."

(2) "That the playing of games on this property on Sunday is unlawful and a violation of the covenant in the deed of conveyance."

(3) That "It is clear * * * that the restriction contained in the deed of conveyance * * * limits the use of the land * * * to the enjoyment of the public at large and does not contemplate or permit the segregation of any part of it for games at which portions of the public are admitted on payment of admission fees."

The learned Vice Chancellor, however, sums up his reasonings as follows: "My conclusion is that the deed from the Meadowland Society to the Village of South Orange restricts the use of the land to public park and playground purposes; that the meaning of the restriction is that the land shall be used by the general public and that no part of it shall be segregated and used for games to which admission is charged on any day of the week."

If, by this final expression, the Vice Chancellor intends to express his judgment that his previously expressed conclusions, before referred to, are not supported by fact or law, we have no difficulty in reaching the same conclusion, because we do not find the proofs sufficient to support a finding of a special nuisance, suffered by the complainant, warranting relief by injunction, nor do we find the authorities support the right of the Court of Chancery to restrain acts which are violations of the criminal law. Upon the question of enjoining a nuisance at the suit of an individual, the rule is that it will not be enjoined, unless the individual suffers some private, direct, and material damage beyond the public at large, as well as damage otherwise irreparable. Morris & Essex R. Co. v. Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq. 530.

We find nothing in the proofs that brings the present case within this rule.

As to the question of the jurisdiction of the court of equity to restrain violations of ordinances or crimes, there can be no question as to the total lack thereof. Green v. Piper, SO N. J. Eq. 288, 84 A....