Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron

• Decision Date: 29 May 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. CA-4-77-310-K.
• Citation: 491 F. Supp. 1129
• Parties: Frederick Charles BAIRD and Donnella Laura Baird v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, A Division of Textron, Inc., v. LAC ST. JEAN AVIATION, LTD., Canadian Helicopters, Ltd., Okanagan Helicopters, Ltd.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

491 F. Supp. 1129

Frederick Charles BAIRD and Donnella Laura Baird v.BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, A Division of Textron, Inc., v.LAC ST. JEAN AVIATION, LTD., Canadian Helicopters, Ltd., Okanagan Helicopters, Ltd.

Civ. A. No. CA-4-77-310-K.

United States District Court, N. D. Texas, Fort Worth Division.

May 29, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James J. McCarthey, Magana, Cathcart & McCarthey, Los Angeles, Cal., Jim Lane, Lane & Paddock, Fort Worth, Tex., for plaintiff.

R. David Broiles, Stephen C. Howell, Fort Worth, Tex., for Bell.

Eugene Jericho and Kevin H. Good, Strasburger & Price, Dallas, Tex., for Lac St. Jean.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BELEW, District Judge.

Defendant Bell Helicopter Textron ("Bell") has presented this Court with its various Motions for Determination of Applicable Law, and for Determination of Foreign Law and Third-Party DefendantsLac St. Jean Aviation, Ltd. and Canadian Helicopters, Ltd. have presented their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Okanagan Helicopters, Ltd. has argued Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief may be Granted.After carefully considering the briefs of counsel, and having heard oral argument, this Court is of the opinion that Lac St. Jean's and Canadian Helicopters' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Okanagan Helicopters Ltd.'s Motion to Dismiss should be and are hereby DENIED.

This Court is further of the opinion that Bell's Motion for Determination of Applicable Law is disposed of as set out in Part 2 of this opinion, to wit:

1.This Court holds that the law of Texas is applicable to the liability aspects of Plaintiffs' products liability claim against Bell.

2.This Court holds that the law of Texas applies to Bell's claim for contribution from third-party defendantsLac St. Jean Aviation, Ltd., Canadian Helicopters, Ltd., and Okanagan Helicopters, Ltd.

3.This Court holds that the law of Texas will be applied to Plaintiffs' pecuniary losses; i. e. medical expenses, lost earnings and the like.

4.This Court holds that the laws of Canada will be applied to PlaintiffF. C. Baird's non-pecuniary damage claims; i. e. pain and suffering.

5.This Court directs the parties to submit additional authority on the question of the nature of British Columbian law with regard to PlaintiffD. L. Baird's cause of action for loss of consortium, and its applicability to this case.

Finally, this Court declines to rule upon Bell's Motion for Determination of Foreign Law at this time.

The Facts

This lawsuit arises out of the crash of a helicopter in the jungles of Surinam on May 25, 1976.Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen, was piloting the aircraft at the time of the accident and he suffered severe injuries from the mishap.Baird's cause of action against Bell, the manufacturer of the helicopter, is grounded in strict liability.Bell answers Baird's claims with the assertion that the aircraft was not defectively designed or manufactured and that the accident was caused by the negligent repair and maintenance of the aircraft by one or more of the third-party defendants.

The aircraft involved has a lengthy chain of ownership.The helicopter ("C-FAOT") was sold by Bell to Highway Properties, Ltd., a Canadian corporation in March of 1972.On December 30, 1972, the C-FAOT was sold by Highway Properties, Ltd. to DefendantLac St. Jean Aviation, Ltd.("LSJ"), a Canadian Corporation.Two months later, all of LSJ's stock was purchased by Third-Party Defendant.Okanagan Helicopters, Ltd.("Okanagan"), another Canadian Company.LSJ became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Okanagan, but the C-FAOT was registered to LSJ and was still nominally owned by that company.

At the time of the accident, the helicopter was operating in Surinam under the ownership and control of one of two corporations.There is a factual dispute over whether Canadian Helicopters, Ltd., a Third-Party Defendant and wholly-owned subsidiary of Okanagan, or Surinam Helicopters, Ltd. N.V.i.o., a corporation set up in Surinam under a license from that government, owned or operated the C-FAOT at the time of the incident in question.There is also a dispute between Bell and the other parties to this suit over whether Surinam Helicopters, Ltd. was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Canadian Helicopters, Ltd., ("Canadian") or an independent corporation.Indeed, there is some evidence in the record that Surinam Helicopters, Ltd. was never incorporated.The status of the various corporate entities involved in this litigation is crucial to the determination of liability, if any, for Plaintiff's injuries.For the purpose of the motions presently before this Court, however, no such findings need be made and this Court expressly declines to do so.

The C-FAOT has had a rather checkered history.It was manufactured and sold in early 1972.The record reflects that it saw continuous service with one or two exceptions right up to the date of the final accident.One of those service interruptions occurred when the aircraft crashed in Canada in July of 1973.The record does not reveal the nature of the first mishap, but the damage to the aircraft was apparently extensive.The C-FAOT was almost completely rebuilt, although the mechanical repair work was not done by Bell.Bell's only connection with that crash was that it undertook cabin repairs at its plant in Amarillo, Texas.There is some evidence in the record that Bell did not warrant or certify the refurbished C-FAOT because the major mechanical repairs had been done by another company.

After the first accident, the aircraft operated in Canada for approximately 14 months without incident.In September of 1975, it was disassembled and flown to South America, where it was reassembled and operated in Guyana and Surinam until the Spring of 1976.On May 8, 1976, the C-FAOT was forced to make an emergency landing on a jungle road because of an engine failure.Repairs were undertaken and several components of the engine and driveshaft were replaced, including that portion of the power train which allegedly failed causing the crash in which Plaintiff sustained his injuries.After the latest repairs were made, the C-FAOT was flown for three days before the accident in question occurred on or about May 20, 1976.

Plaintiff and his wife are both Canadian citizens.Except for the brief and unfortunate sojourn to Surinam, they have lived in Canada all of their lives.Bell is an unincorporated division of Textron, Inc., a Delaware corporation.The aircraft in question was manufactured at Bell's main plaint in Fort Worth, Texas.The Third-Party Defendants are all Canadian corporations.Okanagan has consented to jurisdiction in Texas, but Canadian and LSJ have filed Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, alleging that they have no contacts with the State of Texas and that, therefore, this court lacks in personam jurisdiction over them.

The record reflects that the three Canadian corporations have filed suit against Bell in Canada for losses sustained as a result of the crash of the C-FAOT.Those claimed damages are largely based on the loss of the aircraft itself.The instant case was originally filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles, California.By agreed order, the case was dismissed and refiled in this Court, a fortuitous circumstance given the choice of law complexities inherent in a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).SeeVan Dusen v. Barrack,376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945(1964).

Discussion

As stated earlier, there are three motions presently under consideration.For the purposes of organization, they will be taken up in sequence.

1.Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.

Third-Party Defendants Canadian and LSJ claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction over them.LSJ claims to have no contact whatsoever with the State of Texas and that, therefore; (1)this Court lacks in personam jurisdiction; and (2) proper service of process cannot be effected as to it under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 2031b.

Canadian acknowledges that it has, in the past, had contact with Texas, but it urges that the contact is constitutionally insufficient to support this Court's exercise of jurisdiction over it.It also claims that it could not be properly served with process.Bell answers these claims with affidavits and other documentary evidence submitted to refute the movants' claims that they have not had sufficient contacts with Texas to support jurisdiction.

In a situation such as this, where non-resident defendants test the power of a court to exercise in personam jurisdiction, a two-fold inquiry must be made.First, it must be determined whether the non-residents are amenable to process under the Texas long-arm statute.SeeD.L.J. Properties v. Eastern Savings Bank,549 S.W.2d 754(Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1977 no writ), Gubitosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf Products, Inc.,545 S.W.2d 528(Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1976, no writ), Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Lumar,513 S.W.2d 251(Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland1974, writ ref'd n. r. e.).Second, assuming service may be had under the long-arm statute, the court must then determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would run afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process.Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,495 F.2d 483(5th Cir.1974);Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms,357 F.2d 847(5th Cir.1966).These two requirements will be examined separately below.

(a)Texas' Long-Arm Statute

Texas' long-arm statute, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. Art. 2031b provides in part:

Sec. 3 Any ... non-resident .. person that engages in business in this State ... and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State or a designated agent ... in this State shall be deemed to have appointed ... the Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon whom service of process may be made in any action, suit or proceedings arising out of such business done in this State, wherein such ... non-resident natural person is a

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