Baird v. Boyer
| Decision Date | 27 September 1949 |
| Citation | 187 Or. 131,210 P.2d 118 |
| Parties | BAIRD <I>v.</I> BOYER |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
1. "Gross negligence" within automobile guest statute consists in conduct which indicates an indifference to the probable consequences of the act and to the rights of others. O.C.L.A. § 115-1001.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Gross Negligence".
Automobiles — Conduct — Gross negligence or reckless disregard of the rights of others — Facts
2. Whether defendant's conduct constituted gross negligence or reckless disregard of the rights of others within automobile guest statute depends largely upon the particular facts. O.C.L.A. § 115-1001.
Automobiles — Evidence insufficient to show gross negligence or reckless disregard of rights of others
3. In action for injuries sustained by automobile guest in collision with truck, evidence was insufficient to show that accident was caused by gross negligence of automobile host or his reckless disregard of the rights of others within meaning of automobile guest statute. O.C.L.A. § 115-1001.
Automobiles — Conduct — Thoughtlessness, inadvertence, error of judgment — "Reckless desregard of rights of others"
4. Conduct attributable merely to thoughtlessness, inadvertence or an error of judgment does not indicate "reckless disregard of the rights of others" within automobile guest statute. O.C.L.A. § 115-1001.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Reckless Disregard of Rights of Others".
Appeal and error — Judgment for defendant notwithstanding verdict — Evidence considered most favorable to plaintiff
5. On appeal from judgment for defendant notwithstanding verdict in favor of plaintiff, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff. O.C.L.A. § 6-707.
Evidence — Plea of guilty to reckless driving — Gross negligence — Reckless disregard of rights of others
6. That automobile host pleaded guilty in municipal court to a charge of reckless driving did not tend to prove that accident was caused by his gross negligence or reckless disregard of the rights of others within meaning of automobile guest statute. O.C.L.A. § 115-1001.
See: 2 A.L.R. 2d 932
5 Am. Jur. 626
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.
Willis A. West argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Clark & Clark, all of Portland.
Glen McCarty, of Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before BRAND, Acting Chief Justice, BAILEY, HAY and PAGE, Justices.
Action by Bazil Baird against Wilmer Boyer and Roland Schneider for injuries sustained by plaintiff while riding as a guest in automobile driven by first-named defendant when it collided with a truck driven by the other defendant.
The Circuit Court of Multnomah County, JAMES R. BAIN, J., entered a judgment of involuntary nonsuit in favor of defendant Schneider and a judgment for defendant Boyer notwithstanding verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from the latter judgment, plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court, BAILEY, J., held that the evidence was insufficient to show that accident was caused by gross negligence of defendant Boyer, or his reckless disregard of the rights of others within meaning of automobile guest statute, and affirmed the judgment.
This action was brought by Bazil Baird against Wilmer Boyer and Roland Schneider to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff in a collision, at the intersection of N.W. Hoyt Street and N.W. Broadway Avenue, Portland, Oregon, between an automobile driven by Boyer, in which Baird was a guest passenger, and a truck driven by Schneider.
The cause was tried before the court and a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence a judgment of involuntary nonsuit was entered in favor of defendant Schneider. At the conclusion of all the evidence defendant Boyer's motion for a directed verdict was denied and the cause was submitted to the jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Boyer for the sum of $2,500. The judgment entered thereon was, on motion of defendant Boyer, set aside and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered in his favor pursuant to section 6-707, O.C.L.A., as amended (Ch. 309, Oregon Laws 1941, and Ch. 149, Oregon Laws 1945). From this judgment plaintiff has appealed.
Northwest Broadway Avenue, where the collision occurred, extends north and south. It is a through street and is intersected at right angles by N.W. Hoyt Street. For two or more blocks northward from this intersection N.W. Broadway Avenue forms one of the two approaches to the Broadway bridge on the west side of the Willamette River, and is referred to in the record as the Broadway ramp. The other approach is known as the Lovejoy ramp. It extends east and west. Traffic entering or leaving Broadway bridge over these ramps, except traffic westward over the Lovejoy ramp, is regulated by traffic signals at a point where these ramps join. From that point to N.W. Hoyt Street, a distance of approximately two blocks, Broadway ramp slopes downward at a grade, estimated by plaintiff, of ten per cent. The southern end of this ramp reaches level grade at its intersection with N.W. Hoyt Street, the place of the accident.
The accident occurred between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. on the 21st day of August, 1946. At that time plaintiff and defendant were about 20 and 19 years of age respectively. They were residents of Ontario, Oregon, and were familiar with the traffic in Portland. They were, as hereinbefore stated, riding in a car driven by Boyer, who hereinafter will be referred to as the defendant. The car was driven across Broadway bridge from east to west and southerly over the Broadway ramp. Plaintiff testified that traffic on the Broadway bridge "was moving along as far as I know, just regular traffic", and that the car in which he was riding was moving "along with the rest of" the traffic, at the "same speed." He stated that after they turned southward on the Broadway ramp
Baird stated that the truck was traveling northerly on N.W. Broadway Avenue "on the inside lane next to the yellow line". He thought the truck was about 75 feet away when he first saw it and the driver of the truck "had started his turn, going into the turn." He did not see the driver thereof give any signal. He said he knew the defendant "was going at least 40 miles an hour, not more than 60; between 40 and 60"; that defendant told him he was going over 30 miles an hour; that when he told the defendant that he was going to hit the truck defendant "slammed on the brakes and he slid a considerable distance into the intersection and hit the truck approximately where the rear dual wheels of the truck are"; that defendant "must have slid 25 feet, 20 feet to 25 feet at least." Asked how far they were from the truck when he told Boyer "to look out", Baird said, "Oh, between 50 and 100 feet, I would say * * * somewhere in there." Northwest Broadway Avenue, including Broadway ramp, has four lanes of traffic.
Plaintiff described the damage done to the defendant's automobile as follows: He thought the drive shaft of the truck was broken or loosened.
Plaintiff testified that the defendant's car came to rest right after the collision "Right up against the truck just about right ____"; that the truck was in the northwest part of the intersection and that "neither car moved a great distance" after the collision; that the truck was going "10 or 15 miles an hour" when it turned westerly in the intersection; and that he saw no "skid marks on the pavement caused by the truck".
Defendant Boyer testified that he saw the truck proceeding northward on N.W. Broadway Avenue before it turned west on N.W. Hoyt Street. He stated that "about 50 or 60 feet in front of me he [the truck driver] turned" west of N.W. Hoyt Street "and I couldn't stop." In answer to the question as to what his speed was when he "came down this ramp before the accident", defendant said, Later on in his testimony, referring to his speed, Boyer testified: He further testified: ...
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