Baires v. United States
| Decision Date | 09 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C 09-05171 CRB,C 09-05171 CRB |
| Parties | DORA BAIRES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiffs Juan Carlos Baires1 and Teofilo Miranda, two HIV-positive individuals who were Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detainees at the Lerdo Pre-trial Detention Facility ("Lerdo"), filed a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") alleging that they received horrifically inadequate medical care while at Lerdo. See TAC (dkt. 122) ¶¶ 3-5. At this point, there is no real dispute that that allegation is true; the question instead is who can be held responsible. Plaintiffs sued the federal government, various agencies, numerous individual federal employees (collectively, "the Federal Defendants"), Kern County and its Sheriff and Medical Center, Lerdo and its staff, and numerous Doe defendants. See generally id. ¶¶ 19-44. Now pending is the Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (dkt. 125) the TAC. As set forth below, the Court grants the Motion in part, and denies theMotion in part, as it finds that the TAC resolves a number of the problems of the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC").
The basic allegations of the TAC are much the same as described in the Court's September 2010 Order (dkt. 77) and so the Court will not repeat them. In sum, Baires had been diagnosed as HIV-positive and was taking life-saving antiretroviral medications at the time ICE took him into custody on October 20, 2008. TAC ¶¶ 2; 78. Although he repeatedly stressed that an interruption in his medication would put him at grave danger, his supply of medication was cut off while at Lerdo. Id. ¶ 2. Denied adequate care despite asking for it repeatedly, Baires's condition worsened until he died of a painful and untreated staph infection on November 12, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 83-105. Teofilo Miranda was also HIV-positive and had an upcoming appointment to get treatment at the time ICE took him into custody on September 18, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 106, 110. Despite informing numerous officers and medical staff that he needed HIV medications, he missed his scheduled appointment, received no medication, suffered pain and anxiety, and did not receive competent care until December 4, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 111-131. He was released that same day, dumped on a street corner in San Francisco. Id. ¶ 132.
Plaintiffs initially brought suit in October 2009. See dkt. 1. They amended with the Court's permission in May 2010. See dkt. nos. 50, 51. The Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint as to all of the federal defendants in September 2010. See Order (dkt. 77). Plaintiffs amended again. See SAC (dkt. 80). The Court dismissed the SAC against the individual federal defendants and granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Dismiss filed by the United States. See Order (dkt. 107) (hereinafter referred to as "Order"). Plaintiffs amended again. See generally TAC. And the federal defendants again move to dismiss. See generally Mot.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003).Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but the Rule does call for sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, — (2009), 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. In determining facial plausibility, whether a complaint states a plausible claim is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950.
The Federal Defendants' first challenge to the TAC is to the extensive allegations pertaining to individual federal defendants. For example, under the heading "Parties," the TAC alleges that Nancy Alcantar was the San Francisco Field Office Director for ICE-DRO from 2003 to 2009, and that she "authorized [Plaintiffs'] detention at LERDO, which she knew was a dangerous facility hundreds of miles from their medical teams, family and lawyers." TAC ¶ 24. Similarly, it alleges that Timothy Aitken is the Field Office Director of the San Francisco Field Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations, that he "knew that LERDO had received 'at risk' and 'deficient' ratings in 2007 and 2008," but nonetheless "failed to take corrective action against LERDO and failed to protect [Plaintiffs]." Id. ¶ 25.3
Despite including extensive allegations, listing the individual federal defendants as Parties, and including them in the caption, the Federal Defendants note that those individual federal defendants are not included as part of any of the causes of action. Mot. at 9.Plaintiffs respond that the inclusion of those defendants, named in their official capacities, was merely "another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," Opp'n (dkt. 134) at 4 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985), quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)), and that the "courts treat suits against government officials in their official capacity as suits against the government," id. (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). They assert that "Plaintiffs included detailed factual allegations regarding the role of each federal defendant in their complaint in order to add the specificity and detail required to state a claim under the [Federal Tort Claims Act, or 'FTCA']." Id.
Plaintiffs thus concede that their intent is to sue the government under the FTCA, not the individual federal defendants. Indeed, "the United States is the only proper party defendant in an FTCA action." See Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Service, 145 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1998). As the TAC alleges no causes of action against any of the individual federal defendants - aside from Myrick, discussed below - and as the individual federal defendants cannot be sued under the FTCA, the Court dismisses them, with prejudice.4
The Federal Defendants next challenge the TAC's two Bivens causes of action against Defendant Myrick. See Mot. at 10-13. Myrick was Baires's Deportation Officer at Lerdo and, "[a]ccording to a 'Staff-Detainee Communication Report' that Myrick prepared," he also interviewed Miranda at Lerdo on December 1, 2008. TAC ¶ 27.5
The First Cause of Action charges Myrick with reckless and deliberate indifference under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and relates to Baires. Id. at 41. The TAC alleges that "MYRICK knew that BAIRES was suffering from chronic and substantial pain and his condition was deteriorating and he was in need ofmedical care and treatment and was not receiving it at LERDO, but he failed to take reasonable action to summon aid, or provide, or cause to be provided such medical care and treatment." Id. ¶ 163. It further alleges that "MYRICK knew or should have known that his failure to take steps to ensure BAIRES received reasonable medical care created a constitutionally unreasonable risk of harm to BAIRES while he remained jailed at LERDO." Id. ¶ 163. And it concludes that Myrick's deliberate indifference directly and proximately caused Baires pain, suffering, and death. Id. ¶¶ 164, 165.
The Second Cause of Action charges Myrick with reckless and deliberate indifference under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and relates to Miranda. Id. at 42. The TAC alleges that "MYRICK knew that MIRANDA was suffering from chronic and substantial pain and his condition was deteriorating, but he breached his duties to MIRANDA by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs." Id. ¶ 169. It further alleges that "MIRANDA told MYRICK that he was being denied medical care [on] December 1, 2008," and that "MYRICK promised to assist in obtaining the needed medical care, but then failed to take reasonable action to summon aid, or provide, or cause to be provided medical care and treatment." Id. ¶ 170. And it concludes that "Myrick's deliberate indifference to MIRANDA's serious medical needs" directly and proximately caused Miranda "pain, anxiety, anguish, feelings of unjust treatment, fear and other feelings of dying in jail," thereby inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. Id. ¶ 172.
The Federal Defendants seek to dismiss these causes of action against Myrick, or in the alternative, to have the Court convert their Motion to one for summary judgment, and grant summary judgment for Myrick. See Mot. at 10-13. The Court denies both requests. 1. Motion to Dismiss
To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that an individual defendant personally committed a specific wrongful act that violated a well-established constitutional right. Mot. at 10 (citing Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1987)). A plaintiff must allege that "through the official's own actions" there was a constitutional violation. Id. at 10-11 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948)). The Federal Defendants argue that the TAC "do[es]not begin to describe a scenario where Myrick violated the detainees' constitutional rights." Mot. at 11.
The Federal Defendants argue first that the only allegation as to Baires is that ...
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