Bajart v. Unm

• Decision Date: 16 April 1999
• Docket Number: 19-321
• Citation: 980 P.2d 94
• Parties: CHRISTINE BAJART, Worker-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, Employer-Appellee. CONSOLIDATED WITH CHRISTINE BAJART and BILL BRADISH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant-Appellee.Opinion Number: 1999-IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO Filing Date:
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

CHRISTINE BAJART, Worker-Appellant v UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, Employer-Appellee

CONSOLIDATED WITH

CHRISTINE BAJART and BILL BRADISH, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 19,321 and 19,605

Opinion Number: 1999-NMCA-064

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: April 16, 1999

APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

W. C. "Woody" Smith, District Judge and the NEW MEXICO WORKERS' COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION, Joseph N. Wiltgen, Workers' Compensation Administration Judge

JOSEPH WILLIAM REICHERT, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants

KATHERINE E. TOUREK, BRADLEY & McCULLOCH, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee University of New Mexico

DOUGLAS A. BAKER, MODRALL, SPERLING, ROEHL, HARRIS & SISK, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Board of Regents of University of New Mexico

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} In this consolidated appeal, Christine Bajart (Bajart) appeals the Compensation Order entered by the workers' compensation judge (WCJ), which concluded that Bajart's exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). See NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 1993). Bajart also appeals the district court's order, which granted summary judgment against Bajart in her personal injury suit on the grounds of collateral estoppel. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{2} Bajart was employed as a graduate teaching assistant at the University of New Mexico (UNM) during the 1994-1995 academic year. UNM compensated Bajart for her work with monthly payments and a tuition waiver. In addition to teaching, Bajart worked in the photography darkroom. On April 25, 1995, Bajart attempted to fix a nonfunctioning machine that mixed chemicals used in the darkroom. In so doing, Bajart was injured by a powerful shock.

{3} Between April 25, 1995, and March 17, 1997, Bajart completed a number of workers' compensation forms and reports, and received medical care that was paid for by UNM. On March 17, 1997, Bajart filed a workers' compensation complaint against UNM seeking benefits for permanent partial disability and attorney fees. After a hearing at which testimonial evidence was admitted, the WCJ filed an Order on Status of Claimant, which specifically concluded that Bajart was "estopped from alleging that her claim is not a workers' compensation claim," and that the Act provides Bajart's exclusive remedy. The WCJ later incorporated this order into his March 9, 1998, Compensation Order.

{4} On April 10, 1997, while the workers' compensation proceedings were underway, Bajart and her husband, Bill Bradish, filed a complaint in district court against the Board of Regents of UNM (the Board) seeking damages for personal injury. On January 7, 1998, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. This motion, and the memorandum filed in its support, argued, among other things, that Bajart was attempting to relitigate issues already resolved by the WCJ in its Compensation Order. Accordingly, argued the Board, the doctrine of collateral estoppel required the district court to dismiss Bajart's tort suit. The district court concluded that "it would be an abuse of discretion not to apply collateral estoppel principles, and that this summary judgment [motion] should be granted." Bajart appeals the orders of the district court and the WCJ.

DISCUSSION

{5} On appeal, Bajart argues that she is not precluded from suing in tort by the exclusivity provision of the Act, see NMSA 1978, § 52-1-9 (1973) because she is not a worker covered by the Act. According to Bajart, the Act does not apply to her because NMSA 1978, § 52-1-63 (1989), either exempts her from the statute as a student laborer, or exempts UNM as an educational institution. Alternatively, Bajart contends that the WCJ erred in holding that she elected workers' compensation as her sole remedy because she was unaware that she could sue UNM for personal injury when she accepted workers' compensation benefits. Lastly, Bajart argues that the order granting summary judgment should be reversed because its application of collateral estoppel was based on the erroneous Compensation Order.

{6} For reasons discussed below, we affirm the Compensation Order. Because we affirm the Compensation Order, we need not address Bajart's arguments that summary judgment should be reversed and that she did not knowingly elect her remedies.

Section 52-1-63 Exempts Educational Institutions from the Act, Not Students

{7} Bajart first argues that Section 52-1-63 allows her to sue for damages in tort because she is exempted from the Act as a student laborer. In deciding whether the section exempts students or institutions, we are called upon to interpret the language of this section. The interpretation of statutory language is a matter of law. As such, our review is de novo. See State v. Adam M., 1998-NMCA-014, ¶ 15, 124 N.M. 505, 953 P.2d 40.

{8} Reading of the plain language of this section directly and without nuance reveals that the exemption is meant to be exercised by the educational institution, not the student. Section 52-1-63 provides:

Any educational institution in this state employing student labor in aid of students attending the institution by enabling students to defray their tuition and expenses and in which institution any class of machinery or appliances are [is] used for instruction or otherwise and which would subject the institution to the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act [this article] as engaging in a hazardous calling or business as defined by that act is hereby exempted from the terms and operations of the Workers' Compensation Act as to any liability accruing to any student so employed; provided, the terms of that act shall in no way relieve any institution from any liability for damages or injuries to any student which would otherwise be recoverable by law.

(Emphasis added.) (Other alterations in original.)

{9} Here, the subject of the sentence granting the exemption is "any educational institution." Students, on the other hand, are never the subject of the exemption. Rather, Section 52-1-63 only discusses student workers when describing the criteria the educational institution must satisfy in order to qualify for the exemption. For example, according to the statute, educational institutions are entitled to the exemption if, among other things, they employ student labor as a means of helping students defray the cost of tuition. Thus, we conclude that the exemption applies to the institution, not to the student workers. Because we conclude that the section exempts only educational institutions, we necessarily conclude that it does not exempt Bajart from the Act.

The Exemption Is a Privilege, Not an Exclusion

{10} Bajart also appears to argue that the Act does not apply in this case, and that she is not limited by the Act's exclusivity provision, Section 52-1-9, because UNM qualifies for the exemption created in Section 52-1-63. See footnote 1 As above, this argument requires us to interpret the language of the statute. In so doing, we presume that the legislature intended the statute to be reasonably construed according to its plain meaning, and we endeavor to give effect to the legislature's intent. See Adam M., 1998-NMCA-014, ¶ 15.

{11} In effect, Bajart argues that once UNM satisfies the requirements of Section 52-1-63, it is automatically excluded from the Act's coverage, and is prohibited from claiming coverage under the Act. We disagree. Although the Act exempts certain educational institutions, it does not exclude or except those institutions. This distinction is significant because we presume that the legislature intends the plain and common meaning of the words used in the statute. See Levario v. Ysidro Villareal Labor Agency, 120 N.M. 734, 736, 906 P.2d 266, 268 (Ct. App. 1995). Here, we presume that the legislature understood that the words "exempt" and "exclude" or "except" are not synonymous. To exempt is "[t]o release, discharge, waive, [or] relieve from liability," Black's Law Dictionary 571 (6th ed. 1990), whereas, to except is to exclude, see State v. Atencio, 85 N.M. 484, 485, 513 P.2d 1266, 1267 (Ct. App. 1973). Thus, a party that is excepted or excluded from a statute is completely removed from the statute. Without statutory language allowing the excepted party to elect coverage, that party may not avail itself of the statute's provisions.

{12} By contrast, an exemption merely relieves a party of a statutory...