Baker v. Alderman
| Decision Date | 19 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | 95-2983 and 95-3055,Nos. 94-3291,s. 94-3291 |
| Citation | 158 F.3d 516 |
| Parties | , 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 181 Charles N. BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Kennan G. Dandar, Movant-Appellant, v. Ronald ALDERMAN, individually and officially as Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, and Hillsborough County Civil Service Board, Defendants-Appellees. Kennan G. DANDAR, Movant-Appellant, v. Ronald ALDERMAN, Hillsborough County Civil Service Board, Defendants-Appellees. Charles N. BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald ALDERMAN, Hillsborough County Civil Service Board, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Kennan G. Dandar, Tampa, FL, pro se.
Andrew Grosso, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Richard C. McCrea, Jr., Frank Brown, Zinoboer & McCrea, Tampa, FL, for Hillsborough County Civil Service Board.
Jacqueline B. Whatley, Gibbons, Tucker, Miller, Whatley & Stein, Tampa, FL, for Alderman.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, and CLARK and CAMPBELL *, Senior Circuit Judges.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-appellant Charles Baker and his former attorney, Kennan G. Dandar ("Dandar"), appeal the district court's order awarding sanctions in the form of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 in the amount of $37,137.50 to defendant-appellee Ronald Alderman, and pursuant to Rule 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $89,088.39 to defendant-appellee Hillsborough County Civil Service Board ("the Board"). They also appeal the denial of Dandar's motions to dismiss Alderman's and the Board's claims for attorney's fees and to stay the order awarding attorney's fees pending appeal. 1
In 1984, Baker was employed by the Hillsborough County Property Appraiser as a land evaluator. He qualified as a candidate for the office of the Hillsborough County Property Appraiser and submitted a leave of absence without pay to the Property Appraiser and to the Board, pursuant to the Hillsborough County Civil Service Rules ("the local law"). 2 Prior to the election, Baker took an oath stating that he "had resigned from any office from which he [was] required to resign pursuant to Section 99.012 Florida Statutes" ("the statute"). 3 The statute required that "subordinate personnel" resign when qualifying "for a public office which is currently held by an individual who has the authority to appoint, employ, promote or otherwise supervise that subordinate personnel." Baker lost the election, and attempted to return to work on November 7, 1984. At the Property Appraiser's office, Baker was informed that he was no longer an employee pursuant to the statute.
The Property Appraiser filed an action in state trial court seeking a declaration that Baker had resigned under the statutory provisions. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Baker, finding that the local law governed because the statute and local law were inconsistent. 4 The state appellate court reversed, concluding that the statute and local law were not inconsistent and the statute required that Baker resign. 5
In 1988, Baker filed an action against Alderman, individually and as Property Appraiser, and Hillsborough County Civil Service Board ("the Board"), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6 Baker alleged that the defendants violated procedural due process because they terminated him without a hearing and did not advise him of the existence and application of the statute. 7 Baker also alleged that the defendants: violated substantive due process by terminating him in an arbitrary and capricious manner; terminated him because of his political party affiliation; wrongfully discharged him; and violated his equal protection and first amendment rights. 8 The district court granted summary judgment to Alderman and the Board, 9 finding that, because Baker had "resigned by operation of Florida law" when he signed the oath of candidate, he could not establish the "discharge" element of his civil rights claim. 10 It also found that Baker had forfeited his right to challenge the constitutionality of the Florida statute by failing to raise it during the prior state court proceeding. 11 Baker appealed, but this court affirmed. 12
Following the disposition of the appeal, the district court granted the motions for sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 filed by Alderman, individually, and under Rule 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 filed by the Board, stating that sanctions would "be awarded in the form of reasonable attorney's fees." 13 The district court granted an award as to Alderman in both his individual and official capacity. 14 It granted the Board's motion for reasonable cost and attorney's fees, stating that "to avoid duplicity, attorneys' fees will be awarded only under sanctions." 15 The district court denied without comment Baker's motion for rehearing, reconsideration or clarification which argued, inter alia, that Alderman had not moved for attorney's fees in his official capacity. Alderman, in his official capacity, and the Board submitted petitions for assessment of fees and costs, time sheets, billing statements, and affidavits, and Baker responded and moved to dismiss the affidavits as untimely. The district court denied Baker's motion to dismiss the affidavits as untimely, and awarded Alderman $37,137.50 in attorney's fees, and the Board $89,088.39 in attorney's fees. 16 Baker, represented by attorney Kennan G. Dandar, and Dandar, proceeding pro se appealed. 17 Dandar then moved to withdraw as counsel for Baker, based on the "inherent conflict of interest." 18 The district court granted the motion, and permitted Baker thirty days in which to seek other counsel or to notify the court if he would be proceeding pro se.
In response to the Board's request for entry of judgment, Dandar moved for an evidentiary hearing to determine ability to pay, a stay pending the appeal, and a protective order on discovery sought by the Board, and Baker filed objections pro se. The district court found that a hearing was not required, noted that it had jurisdiction to order sanctions despite a pending notice of appeal, and found that a stay was precluded by the "fact that a party may be unable to pay a judgment." 19 The district court denied Dandar's motion to stay and for a protective order, and granted the Board's motion for entry of judgment. Following the entry of judgment, Baker, proceeding pro se, and Dandar appealed. 20
II. ISSUES AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On appeal, Baker and Dandar raise two issues:
(1) Whether the district court erred by awarding attorney's fees under Rule 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
(2) Whether the amount of fees awarded by the district court was within its discretion.
This court reviews the district court's award of sanctions under Rule 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for abuse of discretion. 21
III. THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
Baker and Dandar argue that the district court erred in awarding fees because the motions for sanctions were not timely, Baker's claims were not frivolous, and there was no hearing on the motions. Baker also argues that he should not be held liable for the actions of his attorney. Dandar also argues that Alderman failed to file a motion for sanctions in his official capacity.
Baker and Dandar claim that the motions for sanctions and petitions for assessment were untimely, and that they were unfairly surprised and prejudiced by the delay.
The Board first notified Baker that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions if the case was not voluntarily dismissed with prejudice because the claims were "utterly frivolous" about one year after the district court action was filed. 22 In March 1990, Baker was notified by Alderman, individually, that he would pursue Rule 11 sanctions. 23 The Board requested and Alderman requested reasonable costs in their answers to the First Amended Complaint.
Within 30 days of the district court's entry of judgment against Baker, the Board moved for sanctions, costs, and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 24 Baker responded, arguing that the Board's motion was untimely. The district court entered an order ruling that the motion for sanctions would be deferred pending the disposition of the appeal. About one month later, Alderman, in his individual capacity, moved for sanctions under Rule 11, and Baker responded. 25 Following this court's opinion, the Board filed a "motion for renewed consideration" of the motion for sanctions, and Baker moved for a hearing on the motions for sanctions, and filed a supplemental response and affidavit to the motions for sanctions. Finding the motions for sanctions timely, the district court granted the Board's and Alderman's motions.
In finding the motions timely, the district court stated:
. . (T)he question of serving motions for cost and attorney's fees and sanction on a timely basis is a function of judicial efficiency. By itself a claim for untimely filing does not dispose of a claim for sanctions in all cases and does not apply to this case. Defendants entered motion for summary judgment, motioned for sanctions, costs and attorneys fees before entry of final judgment. Motions were made by the Defendants on a timely basis. 26
Baker moved for rehearing, reconsideration, or clarification, and the district court denied the rehearing motion, by endorsement, on January 26, 1994. 27 In May 1994, the Board filed a Petition for Assessment of Fees and Costs, stating that the Board's attorney had conferred with Baker's counsel, both by telephone and in writing, in a good faith effort to resolve the issues. 28 In August 1994, Alderman's attorney filed an affidavit in support of an assessment of fees on behalf of Alderman "in his capacity as Hillsborough County Property Appraiser." In response, Baker moved to dismiss the claims for attorney's fees, arguing that the affidavits...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Byrne v. Nezhat, No. 99-12623
...frivolous; and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been aware that they were frivolous." Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998). When filing a pleading in federal court, an attorney "certifies that he or she has conducted a reasonable inquiry and that ......
-
In re Engle Cases
...to the invocation of such sanctions and to justify his actions.' ") (quoting In re Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575–76 ); Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 526 (11th Cir. 1998) (although it is "prudent for a district judge to hold a hearing before imposing sanctions," there is "no requirement [under Ru......
-
Ocean City, Md. v. Barufaldi
...ability to pay must be considered in determining whether to award attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff. See Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 528 (11th Cir.1998); Mariani v. Banat Realty, 1993 WL 86530 (E.D.N.Y.1993); Vulcan Soc'y of Westchester Cnty., Inc. v. Fire Dep't of the City of ......
-
Schmitt v. Reimer, CV 110-102
...frivolous; and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been aware that they were frivolous." Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998). Although the Court previously advised Plaintiff that any Amended Complaint must be drafted in accordance with Rule 11, and ......
-
Appellate Practice and Procedure - William M. Droze and Andrea L. Siedlecki
...1201-02 (11th Cir. 1998). 144. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998). 145. Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1998). 146. Sea Servs. of the Keys v. Florida, 156 F.3d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir. 1998). 147. Metropolitan Life v. Lockette, 155 F.......
-
In Defense of the Foundation Stone: Deterring Post-election Abuse of the Legal Process
...substantial justification" means substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious. 78. Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998).79. Id.80. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct pmbl. para. [6] (Am. Bar Ass'n 2020), Westlaw MRPC.81. See Brent Kendall & Alexa C......