Baker v. Baker

Citation187 Conn. 315,445 A.2d 912
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date08 June 1982
PartiesBetty Lou BAKER v. Robert C. BAKER.

Samuel V. Schoonmaker III, Stamford, with whom were Jonathan D. Elliott, Stamford, and, on the brief, David L. deCourcy, Garry R. Lane, and David I. Bower, Stamford, for appellant (defendant).

Saul Kwartin, Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before SPEZIALE, C. J., and PETERS, HEALEY, ARMENTANO and SHEA, JJ.

SPEZIALE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant-husband from the denial of a post-judgment motion to enforce a pretrial agreement between the parties. The dissolution of marriage judgment itself has not been appealed. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in interpreting the pretrial agreement in such a way as to render it unenforceable in the circumstances of this case. Before we can reach that issue, however, we must first determine whether the pretrial agreement, which by its terms specifically provided that it be concealed from the trial court, is void as against public policy.

This dissolution of marriage action was commenced by the plaintiff in December 1977. In July 1978, the parties entered into the agreement which is the subject of this appeal. This agreement 1 provided that the defendant would relinquish to the plaintiff his right to acquire a one-third interest in a shopping center in Hornell, New York, which interest the defendant obtained through business dealings with the plaintiff's family. In return, the plaintiff agreed that the defendant would receive a credit of $312,500, the value of his interest in the shopping center, "against any amounts paid or payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in any given calendar year [as a result of the anticipated dissolution of marriage judgment] to the extent that said payments exceed $110,000 during such year. Said payments shall include lump sum alimony, periodic alimony, unallocated alimony and support and child support." Significantly, the agreement provided that the existence and terms of the agreement were to be concealed from the court and that it was to be filed with the court only "after the entry of final judgment." The agreement also specifically provided that "[t]he Plaintiff in filing her financial affidavit in this action may show the Hornell Shopping Center as an asset valued after deducting the credit without reference to the credit." Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a financial affidavit which undervalued the Hornell property by $312,500. The defendant also filed an affidavit which, in listing the plaintiff's assets, similarly undervalued the Hornell property.

In July 1979, prior to trial a dispute arose over the application of the agreement and counsel for the plaintiff attempted to depose the defendant concerning the terms of the agreement. 2 On July 20, 1979, the parties appeared before the court, Novack, J., 3 on the plaintiff's motion to compel the defendant to answer questions about the agreement. The parties allege that Judge Novack agreed that the existence and terms of the agreement were not to be divulged to the trial judge until after judgment. We note, however, that there is no indication in the record before us of any approval of such a procedure by the court. 4

The dissolution of marriage action was tried in October 1979 by the Hon. William L. Tierney, Jr., state referee. Judgment was rendered on February 14, 1980. The judgment dissolved the marriage, ordered joint custody of the minor children, adopted the defendant's proposal regarding support for the children, but awarded no alimony. The trial court concluded, however, for reasons not relevant here, that the plaintiff was entitled to a share of the defendant's assets. Consequently, the defendant was ordered to convey to the plaintiff his interest in two commercial properties in Tarrytown and Webster, New York. 5 As previously noted, no appeal was taken from the dissolution of marriage judgment itself.

On April 24, 1980, the defendant filed a motion to implement the terms of the pretrial agreement between the parties. On September 30, 1980, the trial court, after expressing displeasure that the agreement had been concealed from it, 6 denied the motion on the ground that the agreement by its own terms was unenforceable. The trial court concluded that the agreement called for the offsetting credit only if the award of alimony was above a certain amount. It, therefore, held that the agreement was unenforceable because the judgment only divided property and did not award alimony. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred by distinguishing the division of property from lump sum alimony. We need not reach the issue urged upon us by the defendant, however, because we conclude that the agreement is void and unenforceable as violative of public policy.

It is well settled in Connecticut that agreements, such as the one involved in this case, "when made not to facilitate divorce but solely as an amicable settlement of property affairs, and made in view of divorce proceedings already independently instituted or determined upon, are not necessarily contrary to public policy and void, unless concealed from the court. If submitted to and approved by the court with full opportunity for scrutiny before the decree, they are unobjectionable; but, if concealed from the court, they are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced unless in extreme cases where the refusal to do so would assist in the perpetration of an intentional fraud." (Emphasis added.) Maisch v. Maisch, 87 Conn. 377, 383, 87 A. 729 (1913). We have often cited this rule with approval. Rifkin v. Rifkin, 155 Conn. 7, 9-10, 229 A.2d 358 (1967); Whitney v. Heublein, 145 Conn. 154, 160, 139 A.2d 605 (1958); Koster v. Koster, 137 Conn. 707, 711, 81 A.2d 355 (1951); Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn. 41, 47, 32 A.2d 68 (1943); Lasprogato v. Lasprogato, 127 Conn. 510, 513, 18 A.2d 353 (1941); Felton v. Felton, 123 Conn. 564, 568, 196 A. 791 (1938); Weil v. Poulsen, 121 Conn. 281, 286, 184 A. 580 (1936); Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 620, 179 A. 5 (1935).

"The safeguard for the public policy against collusive separation agreements rests in the process by which separation agreements are incorporated into decrees of dissolution of marriage. Under our statutes, a court has an affirmative obligation, in divorce proceedings, to determine whether a settlement agreement is 'fair and equitable under all the circumstances.' General Statutes § 46b-66. The presiding judge has the obligation to conduct a searching inquiry to make sure that the settlement agreement is substantively fair and has been knowingly negotiated. Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 183-84, 413 A.2d 819, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S.Ct. 20, 62 L.Ed.2d 14 (1979). With such judicial supervision, private settlement of the financial affairs of estranged marital partners is a goal that courts should support rather than undermine. Paxton v. Paxton, 201 Neb. 545, 547, 270 N.W.2d 900 (1978); Guyton v. Guyton, 17 Ill.2d 439, 444, 161 N.E.2d 832 (1959); Viles v. Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 368-69, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672, 200 N.E.2d 567 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts (2d Rev.Ed.1978) p. 3-23." Hayes v. Beresford, --- Conn. ---, 440 A.2d 224 (1981).

The agreement in this case by its own terms specifically provided that it be concealed from the trial court. It is contrary to public policy and, therefore, void and unenforceable.

The defendant suggests that any concealment problem was overcome by the disclosure of the agreement to Judge Novack as part of the hearing on the plaintiff's motion to compel the defendant to answer questions about the agreement. Such an argument, however, misses the mark. The point of the rule discussed above is the disclosure of the agreement to the trial judge so that he or she may reach an informed judgment based upon an accurate and complete record. It is irrelevant that some other judge may have been aware of or even approved of such an agreement, because the agreement is against public policy so long as it is concealed from the trial court.

The problems in this case, however, go deeper than just the improper concealment of the agreement from the trial court. As a consequence of the agreement, both parties filed inaccurate and misleading financial affidavits with ...

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22 cases
  • Weinstein v. Weinstein
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • October 4, 2005
    ...a searching dialogue, about all of the facts that materially affect the client's rights and interests. Id., 183. In Baker v. Baker, 187 Conn. 315, 322, 445 A.2d 912 (1982), we imposed this requirement of honest disclosure between the litigating parties and the court. It is a logical extensi......
  • Dougan v. Dougan, No. 28711.
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    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
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    ...about all of the facts that materially affect the client's rights and interests.' [Citations omitted.]); see also Baker v. Baker, 187 Conn. 315, 445 A.2d 912 (1982); O'Bymachow v. O'Bymachow, 12 Conn.App. 113, 118-19, 529 A.2d 747, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 808, 532 A.2d 76 (1987); Grayson v.......
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    ...281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d 790 (2007) ; Weinstein v. Weinstein , 275 Conn. 671, 882 A.2d 53 (2005) ; Billington , supra ; Baker v. Baker , 187 Conn. 315, 445 A.2d 912 (1982) ; Monroe v. Monroe , 177 Conn. 173, 413 A.2d 819 (1979) ; Reinke , supra ; Jackson v. Jackson , 2 Conn. App. 179, 478 A.......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Survey of 1991 Developments in Connecticut Family Law
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 66, 1991
    • Invalid date
    ...two dissolution of marriage appeals, the Supreme Court, sua Sponte, opened judgments because of fraud on the trial court. Baker v. Baker, 187 Conn. 315, 445 912 (1982); and Casanova v. Casanova, 166 Conn. 304, 348 A.2d 668 (1974). 105. Baker, 187 Conn. at 323; Greger, 22 Conn. App. at 599-6......
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    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 65, 1990
    • Invalid date
    ...See, fucker 190 Conn. 874, discussed supra note 118. 129. 23 Conn. App. at 48. 130. Id. 131. Id. at 49. 130. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 187 Conn. 315,445 A.2d 912 (1982). 131. It is possible, with some imagination, to envision a situation where a fraud on the other party is not a fraud on t......

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